Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program

U.S. workplace deaths remain a public health crisis, with over 5,000 annual fatalities concentrated in high-risk sectors like construction, transportation, and agriculture. To address this under the OSH Act, NIOSH runs the Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) program, a non-regulatory initiative providing safety guidance through independent, non-enforcement investigations. Structurally, FACE operates as a unified effort split into two distinct, complementary branches: a centralized, national In-House program run directly by NIOSH, and a decentralized network of State FACE programs funded via cooperative agreements. While both share common goals and methods, they differ significantly in their organizational structure, authority, influence, and how they implement findings locally across diverse regional industries. Together, they generate extensive prevention resources and adapt to emerging workplace hazards.

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Line of Duty Death Report F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida

Schaeffer, Tammy L.

2025/04/14 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On June 30, 2022, two firefighters (FF-A and FF-B) were assigned to relocate a hazardous materials spill unit (sand trailer) from the fire department storage facility. While hooking the sand trailer to the tow vehicle, the coupler of the sand trailer tilted upward, pinning FF-A underneath the load at the rear. FF-A was pinned across his shoulders, ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida Personal Author(s) : Schaeffer, Tammy L. Published Date : 2025/04/14 Pages in Document : 19 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257785
Schaeffer, T. L. (2025). Line of Duty Death Report F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257785

Schaeffer, Tammy L.. Line of Duty Death Report F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257785.

Schaeffer, Tammy L. Line of Duty Death Report F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257785.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Schaeffer, Tammy L. AB - On June 30, 2022, two firefighters (FF-A and FF-B) were assigned to relocate a hazardous materials spill unit (sand trailer) from the fire department storage facility. While hooking the sand trailer to the tow vehicle, the coupler of the sand trailer tilted upward, pinning FF-A underneath the load at the rear. FF-A was pinned across his shoulders, chest, and lower legs. FF-B immediately called for help using a portable department radio and verbally yelling for help. Firefighters nearby heard the emergency call for assistance and quickly responded to the storage facility. Medical evaluation was conducted while rescue efforts were initiated. FF-A was reportedly unresponsive and fully cyanotic (blueish discoloration of the skin due to a lack of oxygenation) from mid-chest and up, including fully involved cerebral and neck edema. Crews worked quickly to stabilize and lift the load from FFA. Upon release of the load on FF-A's chest and shoulders, FF-A was heard taking in a deep breath and became progressively more responsive with diminishing cyanosis. Full extrication took place and FF-A was transferred to a stretcher and to the fire department's emergency medical service (EMS) unit. Request for a medical flight from the scene to the hospital was made; however, the driving distance to the hospital was determined to be faster than the provided response time of the medical helicopter. FF-A was transported by EMS, with full trauma protocol initiated, to the emergency room (ER). Upon arrival to the ER, FF-A was engaging in limited conversation with the EMS crew. FF-A was evaluated and diagnosed with crushing blunt force trauma to the trunk and upper extremities and a lower leg fracture. He was admitted to the intensive care unit. During the next 15-days, FF-A developed acute respiratory distress syndrome due to the crushing blunt force trauma, which required extracoporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) and kidney dialysis treatments. FF-A died from crushing blunt force trauma injury complications on July 15, 2022, as reported by the medical examiner. Contributing Factors: Vehicle and equipment inspection and maintenance; Inspection criteria and accountability for vehicles and equipment; Real-time risk assessment. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Develop a comprehensive vehicle and equipment inspection and maintenance program that includes emergency vehicle training and fleet management training. 2) Work with AHJ, ASE-certified mechanics and Emergency Vehicle Technicians to ensure inspection and maintenance criteria are developed and available to identify deficiencies that render vehicles or equipment out of service. 3) Develop a risk management program that reinforces personnel situational awareness throughout real-time risk assessments. AN - cdc:257785 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 4; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Motor vehicles; Situational awareness; Risk assessment; Traumatic injuries; Vehicle safety KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257785 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2025/04/14 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On June 30, 2022, two firefighters (FF-A and FF-B) were assigned to relocate a hazardous materials spill unit (sand trailer) from the fire department storage facility. While hooking the sand trailer to the tow vehicle, the coupler of the sand trailer tilted upward, pinning FF-A underneath the load at the rear. FF-A was pinned across his shoulders, ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2025/04/14 Pages in Document : 11 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257786
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2025). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257786

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257786.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257786.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On June 30, 2022, two firefighters (FF-A and FF-B) were assigned to relocate a hazardous materials spill unit (sand trailer) from the fire department storage facility. While hooking the sand trailer to the tow vehicle, the coupler of the sand trailer tilted upward, pinning FF-A underneath the load at the rear. FF-A was pinned across his shoulders, chest, and lower legs. FF-B immediately called for help using a portable department radio and verbally yelling for help. Firefighters nearby heard the emergency call for assistance and quickly responded to the storage facility. Medical evaluation was conducted while rescue efforts were initiated. FF-A was reportedly unresponsive and fully cyanotic (blueish discoloration of the skin due to a lack of oxygenation) from mid-chest and up, including fully involved cerebral and neck edema. Crews worked quickly to stabilize and lift the load from FFA. Upon release of the load on FF-A's chest and shoulders, FF-A was heard taking in a deep breath and became progressively more responsive with diminishing cyanosis. Full extrication took place and FF-A was transferred to a stretcher and to the fire department's emergency medical service (EMS) unit. Request for a medical flight from the scene to the hospital was made; however, the driving distance to the hospital was determined to be faster than the provided response time of the medical helicopter. FF-A was transported by EMS, with full trauma protocol initiated, to the emergency room (ER). Upon arrival to the ER, FF-A was engaging in limited conversation with the EMS crew. FF-A was evaluated and diagnosed with crushing blunt force trauma to the trunk and upper extremities and a lower leg fracture. He was admitted to the intensive care unit. During the next 15-days, FF-A developed acute respiratory distress syndrome due to the crushing blunt force trauma, which required extracoporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) and kidney dialysis treatments. FF-A died from crushing blunt force trauma injury complications on July 15, 2022, as reported by the medical examiner. Contributing Factors: Vehicle and equipment inspection and maintenance; Inspection criteria and accountability for vehicles and equipment; Real-time risk assessment. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Develop a comprehensive vehicle and equipment inspection and maintenance program that includes emergency vehicle training and fleet management training. 2) Work with AHJ, ASE-certified mechanics and Emergency Vehicle Technicians to ensure inspection and maintenance criteria are developed and available to identify deficiencies that render vehicles or equipment out of service. 3) Develop a risk management program that reinforces personnel situational awareness throughout real-time risk assessments. AN - cdc:257786 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 4; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Motor vehicles; Situational awareness; Risk assessment; Traumatic injuries; Vehicle safety KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-07: Career Firefighter Dies from Crush Injuries During Sand Trailer Operations - Florida UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257786 ER -
Palm Tree Trimmer Dies from Asphyxia When Crushed by Palm Fronds - California

Cierpich, Hank

2025/04/10 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On April 26, 2024, a 39-year-old male Hispanic tree trimmer was trimming a palm tree in the back yard of a private residence. The victim was not a certified or licensed tree trimmer. He climbed underneath the dead palm fronds and started cutting them from the tree. The skirt of dead palm fronds directly above him broke loose and slid down, compress ...

Title : Palm Tree Trimmer Dies from Asphyxia When Crushed by Palm Fronds - California Personal Author(s) : Cierpich, Hank Corporate Authors(s) : California Department of Public Health Published Date : 2025/04/10 Pages in Document : 8 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE 24CA001, 2025 Apr; :1-8 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHSFACE24CA001 Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Cierpich, H. (2025). Palm Tree Trimmer Dies from Asphyxia When Crushed by Palm Fronds - California. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE24CA001

Cierpich, Hank. "Palm Tree Trimmer Dies from Asphyxia When Crushed by Palm Fronds - California." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2025). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE24CA001.

Cierpich, Hank "Palm Tree Trimmer Dies from Asphyxia When Crushed by Palm Fronds - California." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE24CA001.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Cierpich, Hank A2 - California Department of Public Health AB - On April 26, 2024, a 39-year-old male Hispanic tree trimmer was trimming a palm tree in the back yard of a private residence. The victim was not a certified or licensed tree trimmer. He climbed underneath the dead palm fronds and started cutting them from the tree. The skirt of dead palm fronds directly above him broke loose and slid down, compressing him against the tree trunk and suffocating him. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS - Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: Improper work practices (removing fronds from below); Not using the correct equipment to do the job safely; Homeowner hiring tree trimmers and supervisors that are not certified or licensed. RECOMMENDATIONS - The California FACE (CA/FACE) investigator determined that, in order to prevent similar incidents, landscapers and self-employed tree trimmers should ensure that: Palm tree trimming or removal is performed by workers trained and certified by organizations such as the International Society of Arboriculture (ISA). Proper work procedures and equipment are used, such as an aerial lift and cutting fronds from above. Homeowners should: Hire tree trimmers who are certified by organizations such as ISA and have a tree and palm contractor's license (C-49). Local counties or cities should: Consider adopting regulations that require a permit for trimming residential palm trees. AN - cdc:258675 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHSFACE24CA001 J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Safety KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Crush Injuries KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Asphyxia KW - Mortality KW - Region 9; Accident analysis; Fatalities; Tree trimmers; Landscape services workers; Safety practices; Injury prevention; Asphyxiation KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Asphyxia KW - Crush Injuries KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Safety PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE 24CA001, 2025 Apr; :1-8 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Palm Tree Trimmer Dies from Asphyxia When Crushed by Palm Fronds - California UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258675 ER -
A Welder Dies from Methylene Chloride Exposure While Removing Oil Residue from the Inside of a Motor Oil Tank - California

Zubieta, Ingrid

2025/04/10 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On December 4, 2023, a 54-year-old male self-employed welder (the victim) working at a motor oil and lubricating products manufacturing facility, died from inhalation exposure to methylene chloride. The victim entered a 20 ft high by 10 ft wide empty motor oil storage tank to repair one of the blades inside. The victim was working by himself and us ...

Title : A Welder Dies from Methylene Chloride Exposure While Removing Oil Residue from the Inside of a Motor Oil Tank - California Personal Author(s) : Zubieta, Ingrid Corporate Authors(s) : California Department of Public Health Published Date : 2025/04/10 Pages in Document : 11 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE 23CA005, 2025 Apr; :1-11 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA005 Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Zubieta, I. (2025). A Welder Dies from Methylene Chloride Exposure While Removing Oil Residue from the Inside of a Motor Oil Tank - California. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA005

Zubieta, Ingrid. "A Welder Dies from Methylene Chloride Exposure While Removing Oil Residue from the Inside of a Motor Oil Tank - California." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2025). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA005.

Zubieta, Ingrid "A Welder Dies from Methylene Chloride Exposure While Removing Oil Residue from the Inside of a Motor Oil Tank - California." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA005.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Zubieta, Ingrid A2 - California Department of Public Health AB - On December 4, 2023, a 54-year-old male self-employed welder (the victim) working at a motor oil and lubricating products manufacturing facility, died from inhalation exposure to methylene chloride. The victim entered a 20 ft high by 10 ft wide empty motor oil storage tank to repair one of the blades inside. The victim was working by himself and used a product containing methylene chloride to remove oil residue at the bottom of the tank. The tank was not adequately ventilated, the victim was not trained in confined space entry, there was no attendant at the tank opening to monitor the work process inside, and there was no rescue plan in place. A company employee later located the victim at the bottom of the oil tank. The victim was removed from the tank and pronounced dead at the scene. Contributing factors: Using a product containing methylene chloride; Lack of confined space entry and rescue procedures; Lack of chemical hazard communication program; Lack of adequate respiratory protection. Recommendations - The California FACE (CA/FACE) investigator determined that, in order to prevent similar incidents, oil manufacturing companies should: 1) Avoid purchasing, storing and/or using products that contain methylene chloride. 2) Ensure oil tanks are identified as permit-required confined spaces when methylene chloride is used inside the tank. 3) Ensure a chemical hazard communication program is developed and implemented. AN - cdc:258865 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA005 J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Confined Spaces KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Methylene Chloride KW - Region 9; Fatalities; Safety practices; Confined spaces; Methylene chloride; Chemical safety; Respiratory protection; Small businesses; Substance use; Methamphetamine; Welders KW - Confined Spaces KW - Methylene Chloride KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE 23CA005, 2025 Apr; :1-11 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - A Welder Dies from Methylene Chloride Exposure While Removing Oil Residue from the Inside of a Motor Oil Tank - California UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258865 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report 2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland

Funke, Jeffrey ;

Attwood, Wesley R.

2025/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On January 24, 2022, a 33-year-old firefighter/EMT (acting company officer), a 37-year-old lieutenant/EMT, and a 30-year-old firefighter/paramedic died in a structural collapse of a 3-story abandoned, derelict row house. Additionally, a 47-year-old firefighter/EMT was seriously injured in the collapse. At 05:51 hours, the city's Fire Communications ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report 2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland Personal Author(s) : Funke, Jeffrey;Attwood, Wesley R.;Haas, Emily J.; Published Date : 2025/04/01 Pages in Document : 50 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257783
Funke, J., Attwood, W. R., & Haas, E. J. (2025). Line of Duty Death Report 2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257783

Funke, Jeffrey, Wesley R. Attwood, and Emily J. Haas. Line of Duty Death Report 2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257783.

Funke, Jeffrey, et al. Line of Duty Death Report 2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257783.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Funke, Jeffrey AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AU - Haas, Emily J. AB - On January 24, 2022, a 33-year-old firefighter/EMT (acting company officer), a 37-year-old lieutenant/EMT, and a 30-year-old firefighter/paramedic died in a structural collapse of a 3-story abandoned, derelict row house. Additionally, a 47-year-old firefighter/EMT was seriously injured in the collapse. At 05:51 hours, the city's Fire Communications Bureau (FCB) received numerous calls of a reported structure fire. Several addresses were reported, and one caller stated there were three children trapped inside the home. The FCB dispatched the alarm at 05:53 hours which consisted of Engine 55, Engine 14, Engine 23, Engine 36, Engine 47, Truck 23, Truck 10, Rescue 1, Battalion Chief 6 (BC 6), Battalion Chief 3 (BC 3), and Medic 21. At 05:55 hours, Engine 14 arrived on-scene and established a water supply. The officer reported fire showing on the second and third floors of a 3-story row house and assumed command. Truck 23 arrived and was positioned on Side Alpha. Engine 14's pipe firefighter (nozzleman) stretched a 1¾-inch hose line off Engine 14 and entered the front door on Side Alpha backed up by the acting officer (deceased firefighter). They began to knock down the fire on the first floor as they advanced into the structure. The lieutenant of Truck 23 (deceased firefighter) also entered to begin a primary search. Engine 55 and Truck 10 were initiating firefighting operations on Side Charlie. At 05:57 hours, BC 3 arrived, assumed command, and requested a "working fire" dispatch. At approximately 06:00 hours, a total collapse of all interior floors of the fire building occurred. Three firefighters from Engine 14, one firefighter from Truck 23, and two firefighters from Engine 36 were inside at the time of the collapse. Engine 36 firefighters were initially trapped but were able to self-extricate. A Mayday was called followed by a request for a 2nd Alarm at 06:07 hours. One firefighter (seriously injured) from Engine 14 was located and extricated by a rapid intervention team (RIT) from Engine 23 at 06:14 hours. The pipe firefighter from Engine 14 was located but was trapped by structural components. He was extricated at 07:39 hours and transported to a local shock trauma facility where he was pronounced deceased. The Engine 14 officer was located and the RIT continued extrication efforts. At 08:18 hours, the Engine 14 officer was removed from the structure and transported to a local shock trauma facility where she was also pronounced deceased. All operations were stopped due to the lack of structural stability of the building and falling materials. The incident commander (IC) announced a strategy change to transition from a rescue to a recovery operation. At 16:08 hours, the Truck 23 lieutenant was recovered and transported to the Medical Examiner's office. The incident was declared under control at 16:08 hours. Contributing Factors: Standard operating procedures (SOPs)/standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for fighting fires in abandoned, derelict structures. Training for firefighters, officers, and safety officers on SOPs and SOGs for fighting fires in row homes, with a focus on fire progression and structural collapse safety. Initial scene size-up and ongoing risk assessment by the first arriving resource. Resources committed to an offensive interior fire suppression operation with an incomplete riskversus-gain analysis (offensive vs. defensive). Incident fire structure in a severe state of neglect, disrepair, with structural instability from a previous fire event. Arson. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: Develop and implement SOPs for an identification/marking system for fighting fires in vacant/abandoned/derelict buildings as part of a comprehensive High-Risk Building program. Provide comprehensive training for firefighters, officers, and safety officers on SOPs and SOGs for fighting fires and understanding fire development in row houses, while also incorporating structural collapse principles into fire ground incident management. Ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment and reassesses as fire conditions progress. Consider exterior fire control (defensive strategy) when the initial size-up reveals heavy fire conditions indicating risk of collapse. Additionally, governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Collaborate with fire departments to develop and implement strategies for the identification and remediation (demolition) of condemned High-Risk buildings. AN - cdc:257783 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Accident analysis; Training; Structural failure KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report 2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257783 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report 2025-02: One Firefighter Dies During Unprotected Search in Nine-Apartment Building that was Originally Constructed to Be a Single-Family House - Hawaii

Attwood, Wesley R.

;

Johnson, James S.

2025/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On January 6, 2025, 25-year-old firefighter died after becoming disoriented and trapped while conducting an unprotected search in a nine-apartment residential building fire. At 19:44 hours, the Fire Communications Center (FCC) dispatched Engine 2, Engine 4, Engine 9, Engine 29, Ladder 2, and Battalion 1 for a building fire. A caller noted that apar ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report 2025-02: One Firefighter Dies During Unprotected Search in Nine-Apartment Building that was Originally Constructed to Be a Single-Family House - Hawaii Personal Author(s) : Attwood, Wesley R.;Johnson, James S.; Published Date : 2025/04/01 Pages in Document : 22 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257784
Attwood, W. R., & Johnson, J. S. (2025). Line of Duty Death Report 2025-02: One Firefighter Dies During Unprotected Search in Nine-Apartment Building that was Originally Constructed to Be a Single-Family House - Hawaii. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257784

Attwood, Wesley R. and James S. Johnson. Line of Duty Death Report 2025-02: One Firefighter Dies During Unprotected Search in Nine-Apartment Building that was Originally Constructed to Be a Single-Family House - Hawaii. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257784.

Attwood, Wesley R., and James S. Johnson Line of Duty Death Report 2025-02: One Firefighter Dies During Unprotected Search in Nine-Apartment Building that was Originally Constructed to Be a Single-Family House - Hawaii. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257784.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AU - Johnson, James S. AB - On January 6, 2025, 25-year-old firefighter died after becoming disoriented and trapped while conducting an unprotected search in a nine-apartment residential building fire. At 19:44 hours, the Fire Communications Center (FCC) dispatched Engine 2, Engine 4, Engine 9, Engine 29, Ladder 2, and Battalion 1 for a building fire. A caller noted that apartment #9 was involved. After receiving multiple calls, the FCC upgraded the incident to a second alarm at 19:45 hours. The second alarm dispatched Engine 1, Engine 22, Ladder 29, and Rescue 1. At 19:47 hours, Engine 2 arrived on-scene and provided a size up of a two-story apartment building, lazy smoke visible, but no flames. They pulled a pre-connect hoseline for fire attack while Engine 29 arrived and established a water supply. At 19:48 hours, Ladder 2 and Engine 9 arrived on-scene. At 19:50 hours, Ladder 29 and Battalion 1 arrived on-scene. Battalion 1 requested a conditions, actions, needs (CAN) report. Engine 2A responded that they had water on the fire from the exterior Side Charlie/Delta and the fire was located on the first division. Engine 9 entered and was performing searches on the second division. Engine 2 made entry from Side Charlie/Delta for fire control and primary search. Ladder 2 entered the building from the front door located on Side Alpha to perform searches on the first division. Engine 9 reported to Battalion 1 that they did not have a hoseline and that there was no fire on the second division. At 19:54 hours, Battalion 1 assigned Engine 4 to stage on Side Alpha with their rapid intervention team (RIT) gear and requested that Ladder 29 perform a 360 size-up of the building and secure utilities. At 19:55 hours, Engine 9A called a Mayday noting they were cut off with fire in the stairwell on the second division. Ladder 29A reported they had flames lapping up on the Side Delta toward the second division. Battalion 1 ordered multiple units to pull additional hoselines and assist with rescue of the Engine 9 firefighters. At 19:59 hours, Engine 9A reported that they were on the second division landing on Side Alpha. He further reported that his facepiece was melting, they had two firefighters, two firefighters were missing, and they needed water. At 20:01 hours, Engine 9A reported to Battalion 1 they had two firefighters out of the building with Rescue 1 but were still missing two firefighters. Multiple units reported that deteriorating fire conditions were delaying entry to the building. Engine 9A advised Battalion 1 that the missing firefighters were Engine 9C and Engine 9D (deceased firefighter). One minute later, Engine 9C transmitted that he was outside the building. At 20:21 hours, Engine 4A transmitted that they found the downed firefighter on the Bravo/Charlie corner on the first division and requested assistance. At 20:24 hours, Ladder 29A transmitted priority traffic that if all personnel were accounted for, all units should go to a defensive strategy as the second division was now fully involved. At 20:25 hours, Battalion 1 advised the FCC that the victim had been extricated and moved to EMS. Engine 9D was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Contributing Factors: Unprotected interior search; Hoseline selection and deployment; Door control/flow path; Mayday operations; Change of occupancy. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure that interior search crews' means of egress are protected by a staffed hoseline. 2) Use the appropriate hoseline based on conditions present. 3) Train on recognition of flow paths and interior fire attack techniques utilizing door control. 4) Employ proactive RIT operations for access and egress. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Ensure that the delegated zoning or building code enforcement authority shares change of occupancy information with the fire department. AN - cdc:257784 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 9; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Training; Fire safety KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report 2025-02: One Firefighter Dies During Unprotected Search in Nine-Apartment Building that was Originally Constructed to Be a Single-Family House - Hawaii UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257784 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania

Richardson, Michael ;

Attwood, Wesley R.

2025/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On December 7, 2022, two volunteer firefighters died after being exposed to a hostile fire event, losing their primary egress, and running out of air at a single-family residential structure fire. At 15:44 hours, the 911 public safety answering point (PSAP), referred to as County Radio, received a call reporting a fire in a residential structure wi ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania Personal Author(s) : Richardson, Michael;Attwood, Wesley R.;Funke, Jeffrey; Published Date : 2025/04/01 Pages in Document : 47 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257795
Richardson, M., Attwood, W. R., & Funke, J. (2025). Line of Duty Death Report F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257795

Richardson, Michael, Wesley R. Attwood, and Jeffrey Funke. Line of Duty Death Report F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257795.

Richardson, Michael, et al. Line of Duty Death Report F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257795.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Richardson, Michael AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AU - Funke, Jeffrey AB - On December 7, 2022, two volunteer firefighters died after being exposed to a hostile fire event, losing their primary egress, and running out of air at a single-family residential structure fire. At 15:44 hours, the 911 public safety answering point (PSAP), referred to as County Radio, received a call reporting a fire in a residential structure with occupants still inside. The caller, an occupant of the residence, advised that there was a fire involving oil or kerosene, the house was rapidly filling with smoke, and he was unable to locate another family member. At 15:45 hours, five volunteer fire departments were dispatched to a reported structure fire with entrapment. A police officer and chief fire officer arrived on-scene at 15:49. They reported heavy smoke coming from the house and advised that one occupant was missing. At approximately 15:51 hours, the initial arriving fire units began primary searches in the structure for the missing occupant. They initially encountered moderate to heavy smoke conditions, but no fire conditions on the first and second floors. At 15:58 hours, interior crews reported to Command that the primary search did not result in the occupant being found. Secondary searches were initiated. The crews also reported that they had not located any fire on the first or second floor, but that smoke conditions were increasing. They requested the deployment of hoselines into the house for protection. Exterior crews identified the main body of fire in the cellar from an exterior entrance on Side Charlie. A crew then initiated a fire attack into the rear cellar from the exterior. At 16:05 hours, exterior teams attempted to extinguish the cellar fire with water but were unsuccessful due to the involvement of a combustible liquid (fuel oil). Firefighters recognized the odor of a combustible liquid, combined with the inability to extinguish the fire with water, and a call was made to switch to foam for the cellar fire. A hoseline was deployed through the front door to the second floor for fire attack. Fire was located on the second floor towards Side Charlie. At approximately 16:11 hours, interior crews reported fire in multiple locations on the second floor and requested additional hoselines. Two companies from fire department 17 (engine and tanker) arrived on-scene and reported to the command post for an assignment. The crew of Engine 1712 was directed to enter and assist crews on the second floor with search and fire attack. At 16:17 hours, an interior crew on the second-floor reported fire conditions were deteriorating in multiple locations and they were leaving their position. Interior crews reported that the secondary searches were completed at 16:19 hours. Between 16:20 and 16:30 hours, multiple crews were operating on the second floor with two hoselines, one hoseline deployed through the front door up the stairs and one hoseline deployed via a ground ladder on Side Bravo. Crews on the exterior Side Charlie were also utilizing a hoseline to flow foam to fight the cellar fire and the fire that had extended up the Side Charlie wall. The fire had extended upward from the cellar through voids and the interior to the first floor, second floor, and top half story of the structure. At 16:31 hours, the incident commander (IC), Chief 37, advised County Radio that Chief 32 was Safety, Chief 55 was Water Supply, and Chief 3701 was Operations. Based on multiple reports of deteriorating conditions, Operations Chief 3701 called for all units to evacuate the structure and requested that County Radio activate the evacuation tones at 16:32 hours. Chief 3701 then called for a personal accountability report (PAR). At 16:33 hours, Deputy Chief 17 advised Operations Chief 3701 that two fire department 17 firefighters were trapped on the second floor. Deputy Chief 17 was communicating with the two firefighters on the fire department 17 radio frequency, which was different than the fireground radio frequency. Chief 3701 called for a hoseline to the front door and advised everyone that he had firefighters trapped on the second floor. Multiple crews, acting as two rapid intervention teams (RIT), started an effort to reach the second floor. One crew accessed the porch roof on Side Alpha via ground ladders to initiate Vent Enter Search (VES) while one crew entered the front door and attempted to use the front stairs to reach the second floor. At 16:34 hours, a Mayday call was made by a firefighter operating on the porch roof on Side Alpha. The call was acknowledged by Command. The Mayday caller advised that he had a downed firefighter inside of a window. At 16:36 hours, Command requested clarification on the Mayday status and accountability responded that they had two fire department 17 firefighters missing. Deputy Chief 17 confirmed that there were still two fire department 17 firefighters trapped on the second floor at 16:40. Due to rapidly developing fire conditions on both the first and second floor, the RIT was forced back out of the building. Between 16:40 and 16:52 hours, multiple crews worked from the front porch roof to access firefighter 17-1 who was found in the Alpha/Bravo corner bedroom. He was found unconscious and out of air. Additional crews entered the second floor from the front porch roof via the window on Side Alpha where firefighter 17-1 was being removed. They searched the rest of the front half of the second floor and worked towards the Alpha/Delta corner. Conditions on the second floor at this time were rapidly deteriorating with a flow path moving from the rear stairs through the center hallway and out the front window at the end of the hallway on Side Alpha. Between 16:52 and 17:02 hours, firefighter 17-1 was moved onto the front porch roof. He was then moved to the ground via ladders and transferred to the care of emergency medical services (EMS) in the front yard. Firefighter 17-2 was found by RIT in the Alpha/Delta bedroom. Firefighter 17-2 was out of air and unconscious. Firefighter 17-2 was extricated onto the front porch roof via the window and moved to the ground via ladders and transferred to the care of EMS. Both firefighters were transported to a local hospital in separate ambulances and pronounced deceased at the hospital. Contributing Factors: Arson fire with an ignitable liquid; Building construction and void spaces in combination with a previous fire; Strategy & tactics specific to hoseline deployments during fire attack; Incident management specific to incident assignment tracking and benchmarking; Ongoing risk vs. benefit analysis; Situational awareness during rapidly deteriorating conditions; Mayday operations and management. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should develop and provide training and/or develop and execute standard operating procedures (SOPs)/standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to all department personnel focused on: 1) Fire behavior involving Class B ignitable liquid fires that includes appropriate fire attack strategies. 2) Recognize and react to the impacts of building construction on fire behavior. 3) Fire suppression operations in accordance with NFPA 1700. 4) Communications and tracking of operations at the tactical and strategic levels. 5) Risk management principles at the tactical and strategic levels. 6) Situational awareness at the task, tactical, and strategic levels. 7) Procedures for Mayday operations and management. AN - cdc:257795 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Training; Fire safety; Situational awareness; Risk management; Communications equipment KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257795 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2025/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On December 7, 2022, two volunteer firefighters died after being exposed to a hostile fire event, losing their primary egress, and running out of air at a single-family residential structure fire. At 15:44 hours, the 911 public safety answering point (PSAP), referred to as County Radio, received a call reporting a fire in a residential structure wi ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2025/04/01 Pages in Document : 16 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257809
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2025). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257809

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257809.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257809.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On December 7, 2022, two volunteer firefighters died after being exposed to a hostile fire event, losing their primary egress, and running out of air at a single-family residential structure fire. At 15:44 hours, the 911 public safety answering point (PSAP), referred to as County Radio, received a call reporting a fire in a residential structure with occupants still inside. The caller, an occupant of the residence, advised that there was a fire involving oil or kerosene, the house was rapidly filling with smoke, and he was unable to locate another family member. At 15:45 hours, five volunteer fire departments were dispatched to a reported structure fire with entrapment. A police officer and chief fire officer arrived on-scene at 15:49. They reported heavy smoke coming from the house and advised that one occupant was missing. At approximately 15:51 hours, the initial arriving fire units began primary searches in the structure for the missing occupant. They initially encountered moderate to heavy smoke conditions, but no fire conditions on the first and second floors. At 15:58 hours, interior crews reported to Command that the primary search did not result in the occupant being found. Secondary searches were initiated. The crews also reported that they had not located any fire on the first or second floor, but that smoke conditions were increasing. They requested the deployment of hoselines into the house for protection. Exterior crews identified the main body of fire in the cellar from an exterior entrance on Side Charlie. A crew then initiated a fire attack into the rear cellar from the exterior. At 16:05 hours, exterior teams attempted to extinguish the cellar fire with water but were unsuccessful due to the involvement of a combustible liquid (fuel oil). Firefighters recognized the odor of a combustible liquid, combined with the inability to extinguish the fire with water, and a call was made to switch to foam for the cellar fire. A hoseline was deployed through the front door to the second floor for fire attack. Fire was located on the second floor towards Side Charlie. At approximately 16:11 hours, interior crews reported fire in multiple locations on the second floor and requested additional hoselines. Two companies from fire department 17 (engine and tanker) arrived on-scene and reported to the command post for an assignment. The crew of Engine 1712 was directed to enter and assist crews on the second floor with search and fire attack. At 16:17 hours, an interior crew on the second-floor reported fire conditions were deteriorating in multiple locations and they were leaving their position. Interior crews reported that the secondary searches were completed at 16:19 hours. Between 16:20 and 16:30 hours, multiple crews were operating on the second floor with two hoselines, one hoseline deployed through the front door up the stairs and one hoseline deployed via a ground ladder on Side Bravo. Crews on the exterior Side Charlie were also utilizing a hoseline to flow foam to fight the cellar fire and the fire that had extended up the Side Charlie wall. The fire had extended upward from the cellar through voids and the interior to the first floor, second floor, and top half story of the structure. At 16:31 hours, the incident commander (IC), Chief 37, advised County Radio that Chief 32 was Safety, Chief 55 was Water Supply, and Chief 3701 was Operations. Based on multiple reports of deteriorating conditions, Operations Chief 3701 called for all units to evacuate the structure and requested that County Radio activate the evacuation tones at 16:32 hours. Chief 3701 then called for a personal accountability report (PAR). At 16:33 hours, Deputy Chief 17 advised Operations Chief 3701 that two fire department 17 firefighters were trapped on the second floor. Deputy Chief 17 was communicating with the two firefighters on the fire department 17 radio frequency, which was different than the fireground radio frequency. Chief 3701 called for a hoseline to the front door and advised everyone that he had firefighters trapped on the second floor. Multiple crews, acting as two rapid intervention teams (RIT), started an effort to reach the second floor. One crew accessed the porch roof on Side Alpha via ground ladders to initiate Vent Enter Search (VES) while one crew entered the front door and attempted to use the front stairs to reach the second floor. At 16:34 hours, a Mayday call was made by a firefighter operating on the porch roof on Side Alpha. The call was acknowledged by Command. The Mayday caller advised that he had a downed firefighter inside of a window. At 16:36 hours, Command requested clarification on the Mayday status and accountability responded that they had two fire department 17 firefighters missing. Deputy Chief 17 confirmed that there were still two fire department 17 firefighters trapped on the second floor at 16:40. Due to rapidly developing fire conditions on both the first and second floor, the RIT was forced back out of the building. Between 16:40 and 16:52 hours, multiple crews worked from the front porch roof to access firefighter 17-1 who was found in the Alpha/Bravo corner bedroom. He was found unconscious and out of air. Additional crews entered the second floor from the front porch roof via the window on Side Alpha where firefighter 17-1 was being removed. They searched the rest of the front half of the second floor and worked towards the Alpha/Delta corner. Conditions on the second floor at this time were rapidly deteriorating with a flow path moving from the rear stairs through the center hallway and out the front window at the end of the hallway on Side Alpha. Between 16:52 and 17:02 hours, firefighter 17-1 was moved onto the front porch roof. He was then moved to the ground via ladders and transferred to the care of emergency medical services (EMS) in the front yard. Firefighter 17-2 was found by RIT in the Alpha/Delta bedroom. Firefighter 17-2 was out of air and unconscious. Firefighter 17-2 was extricated onto the front porch roof via the window and moved to the ground via ladders and transferred to the care of EMS. Both firefighters were transported to a local hospital in separate ambulances and pronounced deceased at the hospital. Contributing Factors: Arson fire with an ignitable liquid; Building construction and void spaces in combination with a previous fire; Strategy & tactics specific to hoseline deployments during fire attack; Incident management specific to incident assignment tracking and benchmarking; Ongoing risk vs. benefit analysis; Situational awareness during rapidly deteriorating conditions; Mayday operations and management. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should develop and provide training and/or develop and execute standard operating procedures (SOPs)/standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to all department personnel focused on: 1) Fire behavior involving Class B ignitable liquid fires that includes appropriate fire attack strategies. 2) Recognize and react to the impacts of building construction on fire behavior. 3) Fire suppression operations in accordance with NFPA 1700. 4) Communications and tracking of operations at the tactical and strategic levels. 5) Risk management principles at the tactical and strategic levels. 6) Situational awareness at the task, tactical, and strategic levels. 7) Procedures for Mayday operations and management. AN - cdc:257809 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Training; Fire safety; Situational awareness; Risk management; Communications equipment KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-10: Two Volunteer Firefighters Die while Conducting Fire Attack at a Single-Family Residence - Pennsylvania UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257809 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2025/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On January 24, 2022, a 33-year-old firefighter/EMT (acting company officer), a 37-year-old lieutenant/EMT, and a 30-year-old firefighter/paramedic died in a structural collapse of a 3-story abandoned, derelict row house. Additionally, a 47-year-old firefighter/EMT was seriously injured in the collapse. At 05:51 hours, the city's Fire Communications ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2025/04/01 Pages in Document : 13 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257804
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2025). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257804

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257804.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257804.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On January 24, 2022, a 33-year-old firefighter/EMT (acting company officer), a 37-year-old lieutenant/EMT, and a 30-year-old firefighter/paramedic died in a structural collapse of a 3-story abandoned, derelict row house. Additionally, a 47-year-old firefighter/EMT was seriously injured in the collapse. At 05:51 hours, the city's Fire Communications Bureau (FCB) received numerous calls of a reported structure fire. Several addresses were reported, and one caller stated there were three children trapped inside the home. The FCB dispatched the alarm at 05:53 hours which consisted of Engine 55, Engine 14, Engine 23, Engine 36, Engine 47, Truck 23, Truck 10, Rescue 1, Battalion Chief 6 (BC 6), Battalion Chief 3 (BC 3), and Medic 21. At 05:55 hours, Engine 14 arrived on-scene and established a water supply. The officer reported fire showing on the second and third floors of a 3-story row house and assumed command. Truck 23 arrived and was positioned on Side Alpha. Engine 14's pipe firefighter (nozzleman) stretched a 1¾-inch hose line off Engine 14 and entered the front door on Side Alpha backed up by the acting officer (deceased firefighter). They began to knock down the fire on the first floor as they advanced into the structure. The lieutenant of Truck 23 (deceased firefighter) also entered to begin a primary search. Engine 55 and Truck 10 were initiating firefighting operations on Side Charlie. At 05:57 hours, BC 3 arrived, assumed command, and requested a "working fire" dispatch. At approximately 06:00 hours, a total collapse of all interior floors of the fire building occurred. Three firefighters from Engine 14, one firefighter from Truck 23, and two firefighters from Engine 36 were inside at the time of the collapse. Engine 36 firefighters were initially trapped but were able to self-extricate. A Mayday was called followed by a request for a 2nd Alarm at 06:07 hours. One firefighter (seriously injured) from Engine 14 was located and extricated by a rapid intervention team (RIT) from Engine 23 at 06:14 hours. The pipe firefighter from Engine 14 was located but was trapped by structural components. He was extricated at 07:39 hours and transported to a local shock trauma facility where he was pronounced deceased. The Engine 14 officer was located and the RIT continued extrication efforts. At 08:18 hours, the Engine 14 officer was removed from the structure and transported to a local shock trauma facility where she was also pronounced deceased. All operations were stopped due to the lack of structural stability of the building and falling materials. The incident commander (IC) announced a strategy change to transition from a rescue to a recovery operation. At 16:08 hours, the Truck 23 lieutenant was recovered and transported to the Medical Examiner's office. The incident was declared under control at 16:08 hours. Contributing Factors: Standard operating procedures (SOPs)/standard operating guidelines (SOGs) for fighting fires in abandoned, derelict structures. Training for firefighters, officers, and safety officers on SOPs and SOGs for fighting fires in row homes, with a focus on fire progression and structural collapse safety. Initial scene size-up and ongoing risk assessment by the first arriving resource. Resources committed to an offensive interior fire suppression operation with an incomplete riskversus-gain analysis (offensive vs. defensive). Incident fire structure in a severe state of neglect, disrepair, with structural instability from a previous fire event. Arson. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: Develop and implement SOPs for an identification/marking system for fighting fires in vacant/abandoned/derelict buildings as part of a comprehensive High-Risk Building program. Provide comprehensive training for firefighters, officers, and safety officers on SOPs and SOGs for fighting fires and understanding fire development in row houses, while also incorporating structural collapse principles into fire ground incident management. Ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment and reassesses as fire conditions progress. Consider exterior fire control (defensive strategy) when the initial size-up reveals heavy fire conditions indicating risk of collapse. Additionally, governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Collaborate with fire departments to develop and implement strategies for the identification and remediation (demolition) of condemned High-Risk buildings. AN - cdc:257804 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Accident analysis; Training; Structural failure KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2022-01: Three Firefighters Die and Another Seriously Injured During the Collapse of an Abandoned, Derelict, 3-Story Row House Fire - Maryland UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257804 ER -
Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras Cae 8 Pies de una Viga de Borde

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2025/03/17 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

Un instalador de estructuras con experiencia, de 44 años de edad, cayó ocho pies desde una viga de borde mientras trabajaba en una pared. Trabajó durante cinco años para su empleador, un contratista residencial. El instalador de estructuras estaba con un compañero de trabajo, retirando vigas de piso instaladas previamente en el segundo nivel para c ...

Title : Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras Cae 8 Pies de una Viga de Borde Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2025/03/17 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229237
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2025). Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras Cae 8 Pies de una Viga de Borde. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229237

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras Cae 8 Pies de una Viga de Borde. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229237.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras Cae 8 Pies de una Viga de Borde. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229237.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - Un instalador de estructuras con experiencia, de 44 años de edad, cayó ocho pies desde una viga de borde mientras trabajaba en una pared. Trabajó durante cinco años para su empleador, un contratista residencial. El instalador de estructuras estaba con un compañero de trabajo, retirando vigas de piso instaladas previamente en el segundo nivel para cambiar de sitio una pared interior de una cocina, que fue instalada en el lugar equivocado. Después de terminar su tarea, se dirigió a una pared exterior en donde estaba trabajando su compañero de trabajo. Se sentó en una viga de borde para esperar. La viga estaba a ocho pies de altura sobre el entablado del piso y tenía una abertura de ventana justo debajo. Él estaba montado en la viga para sostenerse sobre la abertura. Después se inclinó hacia el interior de la pared y perdió el equilibrio. No pudo recuperar el equilibrio debido a la abertura y cayó de cabeza hacia el entablado del piso. Su compañero de trabajo lo vio caer, llamó al 911 y empezó a administrar RCP. Cuando llegó el personal de respuesta a emergencias, él respiraba, pero estaba inconsciente. Fue trasladado por vía aérea al hospital, donde se le colocó en soporte vital. Falleció cinco días después. Después del accidente, los investigadores determinaron que: El instalador de estructuras cayó desde una pared interior con una altura de ocho pies y tres cuartos de pulgada. El peligro de caída al exterior de la pared era de nueve pies y nueve y tres cuartos de pulgada. No se utilizó protección contra caídas porque los trabajadores estaban a menos de la altura mínima de 10 pies que los obligaría a usar protección contra caídas durante la instalación de elementos estructurales. El instalador de estructuras asistió a reuniones de seguridad semanales, en las que la protección contra caídas era un tema reiterado. El empleador tenía un plan de prevención de accidentes (APP) por escrito, con un plan de protección contra caídas. El gerente de proyecto del contratista general estaba en la obra cuando ocurrió el incidente. REQUISITOS - Los empleadores deben: Mantener el lugar de trabajo en condiciones que no pongan en peligro la salud, la seguridad o el bienestar de los empleados. RECOMENDACIONES: Los investigadores de FACE concluyeron que, para ayudar a prevenir sucesos similares, los empleadores deben hacer lo siguiente: Cuando los trabajadores deben caminar sobre placas elevadas, vigas, travesaños, armaduras de techo, vigas de soporte y otros elementos estructurales, proporcionarles protección contra caídas con andamios, elevadores, plataformas de protección de bordes, barandales, redes de seguridad o sistemas personales de protección contra caídas. Capacitar a los trabajadores para que usen correctamente estos métodos y equipos, y evaluar periódicamente sus conocimientos y habilidades sobre protección contra caídas. Llegar a la obra antes de que empiecen los trabajos o nombrar a un supervisor para realizar, de manera conjunta con los trabajadores, una evaluación de peligros de la obra, con el fin de identificar peligros y preparar soluciones de protección contra caídas. Durante la reunión de seguridad previa al trabajo, repasar la evaluación de peligros de la obra y explicar a los trabajadores su responsabilidades de usar protección contra caídas y seguir prácticas de trabajo seguras para prevención de caídas. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229237 KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Construcción KW - Protección contra caídas KW - Capacitación KW - Equipo de seguridad KW - Caídas KW - Lesiones en la cabeza KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - spa PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras Cae 8 Pies de una Viga de Borde UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229237 ER -
Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Falls 8 Feet from Rim Joist

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2025/03/17 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 44-year-old experienced framer fell eight feet from a rim joist while working on a wall. He worked for his employer, a residential contractor, for five years. The framer was with a co-worker removing previously installed second-level floor joists to relocate an inside kitchen wall that was framed in the wrong place. After finishing his task, he w ...

Title : Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Falls 8 Feet from Rim Joist Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2025/03/17 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229236
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2025). Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Falls 8 Feet from Rim Joist. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229236

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Falls 8 Feet from Rim Joist. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229236.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Falls 8 Feet from Rim Joist. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229236.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 44-year-old experienced framer fell eight feet from a rim joist while working on a wall. He worked for his employer, a residential contractor, for five years. The framer was with a co-worker removing previously installed second-level floor joists to relocate an inside kitchen wall that was framed in the wrong place. After finishing his task, he went to an outside wall where his co-worker was working. He sat down on a rim joist to wait. The joist was eight feet above the floor decking and had a window opening just below it. He was straddling the joist to support himself above the opening. He then leaned to the inside of the wall and lost balance. Unable to regain balance due to the opening, he fell headfirst to the floor decking below. His co-worker saw him fall, called 911, and began CPR. When first responders arrived, he was breathing but unresponsive. He was then airlifted to the hospital and placed on life support. He died five days later. Following the incident, investigators found: The framer fell from an inside wall height of eight feet, three-quarters inches. The fall hazard to the outside of the wall was nine feet, nine and three-quarters inches. Fall protection was not used because workers were under the 10-foot trigger height for fall protection requirements while installing structural members. The framer attended weekly safety meetings where fall protection was a recurring main topic. The employer had a written accident prevention program (APP) with a fall protection plan. REQUIREMENTS - Employers must: Maintain conditions within the workplace that will not endanger the health, safety or welfare of employees. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators concluded, that to help prevent similar occurrences employers, should: When workers must walk on top plates, joists, rafters, trusses, beams or other similar structural members, provide fall protection by using scaffolding, aerial lifts, edge protection platforms, guardrails, safety nets, or personal fall protection systems. Train workers to use these methods and equipment properly and periodically evaluate their fall protection knowledge and skills. Arrive on-site before work begins or appoint a supervisor to jointly conduct a site hazard assessment with workers to identify fall hazards and develop fall protection solutions. During the pre-job safety meeting, review the site hazard assessment and discuss workers' responsibilities to use fall protection and follow fall prevention safe work practices. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229236 KW - Construction Industry KW - Safety KW - Accidental Falls KW - Occupational Health KW - Staff Development KW - Accidents KW - Construction KW - Fall protection KW - Training KW - Safety equipment KW - Falls KW - Head injuries KW - Accidental Falls KW - Accidents KW - Construction Industry KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety KW - Staff Development LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Falls 8 Feet from Rim Joist UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229236 ER -
Agricultura Narración de Muertes: Trabajador Temporal es Aplastado Por Montacargas sin Conductor en una Granja Familiar

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2025/02/17 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

Un trabajador agrícola estacional de 43 años de edad fue aplastado por un montacargas en un cobertizo de empaquetado de cebollas. Trabajaba para un contratista de trabajadores temporales, quien lo envió a trabajar como empacador de tarimas en una granja familiar de cebollas. Había trabajado durante dos meses en su tercera temporada de cosecha en la ...

Title : Agricultura Narración de Muertes: Trabajador Temporal es Aplastado Por Montacargas sin Conductor en una Granja Familiar Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2025/02/17 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229235
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2025). Agricultura Narración de Muertes: Trabajador Temporal es Aplastado Por Montacargas sin Conductor en una Granja Familiar. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229235

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Agricultura Narración de Muertes: Trabajador Temporal es Aplastado Por Montacargas sin Conductor en una Granja Familiar. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229235.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Agricultura Narración de Muertes: Trabajador Temporal es Aplastado Por Montacargas sin Conductor en una Granja Familiar. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229235.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - Un trabajador agrícola estacional de 43 años de edad fue aplastado por un montacargas en un cobertizo de empaquetado de cebollas. Trabajaba para un contratista de trabajadores temporales, quien lo envió a trabajar como empacador de tarimas en una granja familiar de cebollas. Había trabajado durante dos meses en su tercera temporada de cosecha en la granja. Estaba trabajando en una cuadrilla de trabajo nocturno junto con un supervisor, un clasificador y dos apiladores, que trabajaban todos para el mismo contratista laboral. Su trabajo era usar película de plástico para empaquetar costales de cebollas apilados sobre tarimas, dentro del cobertizo de empaquetado. El supervisor era el operador de montacargas designado, encargado de mover las tarimas. A la cuadrilla de trabajo le faltaba un apilador, por lo que el supervisor acudió a ayudar con el apilado y le dijo al trabajador que condujera el montacargas para recoger contenedores de cebollas apilados en el exterior para procesarlos. Cuando no regresó después de casi una hora, el supervisor fue a buscarlo. Encontró al trabajador aplastado entre los depósitos cargados en el montacargas y los contenedores apilados en el suelo. Estaba inconsciente y no respiraba. El supervisor hizo retroceder el montacargas para liberar al trabajador y vio que estaba en neutral y no tenía aplicado el freno de estacionamiento. Después regresó al cobertizo y alertó a un compañero de trabajo, quien llamó al 911. Los trabajadores de respuesta a emergencias declararon al trabajador fallecido en la escena. Después del accidente, los investigadores determinaron que: El trabajador había operado el montacargas durante todo el tiempo que trabajó en la granja, sin haber recibido capacitación. El contratista solamente le dio una explicación general sobre la seguridad con los montacargas en una charla de orientación, antes de empezar a trabajar. El trabajador levantó y bajó dos contenedores, retrocedió, se detuvo y dejó el montacargas en una pendiente de un grado, sin aplicar el freno de estacionamiento. Después el montacargas rodó hacia adelante hasta golpearlo, mientras él se encontraba entre los contenedores para ajustar una lona. El área estaba oscura y la única luz provenía de su montacargas. El contratista y el empleador anfitrión se enteraron de que el trabajador usaba el montacargas sin haber recibido capacitación después de su primera semana en la granja. No se comunicaron eficazmente entre sí y con el supervisor de la cuadrilla de trabajo y el gerente de seguridad del contratista para impedir que el trabajador usara el montacargas. REQUISITOS: Los empleadores deben: Asegurarse de que los operadores de vehículos industriales motorizados (PIT, por sus siglas en inglés) hayan sido capacitados. Neutralizar los controles y aplicar los frenos cuando salgan del PIT. RECOMENDACIONES: Los investigadores de FACE concluyeron que, para ayudar a prevenir sucesos similares, los empleadores deben hacer lo siguiente: Usar PIT equipados con sistemas de freno de estacionamiento automático que puedan prevenir el movimiento sin conductor al aplicarse cuando el conductor libera el freno de servicio y sale del vehículo mientras funciona al ralentí. Elaborar y hacer cumplir políticas referentes a los PIT en sus programas de prevención de accidentes por escrito, de manera que: Solamente se permita que los trabajadores capacitados operen los PIT y se ordene que los supervisores impidan de inmediato que los trabajadores que no estén capacitados los usen. Se realice un análisis de los peligros del trabajo (JHA, por sus siglas en inglés), de manera conjunta con los supervisores y operadores de PIT, para identificar los peligros de movimiento sin conductor y de aplastamiento, como las zonas de operación con pendientes. Establecer comunicaciones claras sobre la seguridad con los empleadores anfitriones, para asegurarse de que los trabajadores temporales puedan recibir orientación, supervisión y capacitación eficaces en materia de seguridad, en las que se aborden los peligros laborales a los que estarán expuestos. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229235 KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Prevención de accidentes KW - Prácticas de seguridad KW - Montacargas KW - Trabajadores agrícolas KW - Trabajadores temporales KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - spa PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Agricultura Narración de Muertes: Trabajador Temporal es Aplastado Por Montacargas sin Conductor en una Granja Familiar UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229235 ER -
Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Temp Worker Crushed by Rollaway Forklift at Family Farm

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2025/02/17 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 43-year-old seasonal farm worker was crushed by a forklift at an onion packing shed. He was working for a temp labor contractor who sent him to work as a pallet wrapper at a family-owned onion farm. He was two months into his third harvest season at the farm. He was working on a night crew along with a supervisor, a sorter, and two stackers, who ...

Title : Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Temp Worker Crushed by Rollaway Forklift at Family Farm Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2025/02/17 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229234
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2025). Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Temp Worker Crushed by Rollaway Forklift at Family Farm. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229234

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Temp Worker Crushed by Rollaway Forklift at Family Farm. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229234.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Temp Worker Crushed by Rollaway Forklift at Family Farm. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229234.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 43-year-old seasonal farm worker was crushed by a forklift at an onion packing shed. He was working for a temp labor contractor who sent him to work as a pallet wrapper at a family-owned onion farm. He was two months into his third harvest season at the farm. He was working on a night crew along with a supervisor, a sorter, and two stackers, who all worked for the same labor contractor. His job was to shrink wrap sacks of onions stacked on pallets inside the packing shed. The supervisor was the designated forklift operator who moved the pallets. The crew was one stacker short so the supervisor went to help stack and told the worker to drive the forklift to pick up bins of onions stacked outside for processing. When he did not return for almost an hour, the supervisor went to look for him. He found the worker crushed between bins loaded on the forklift and bins stacked on the ground. He was unconscious and not breathing. The supervisor backed the forklift off the worker and saw it was in neutral with the parking brake not set. He then returned to the shed and alerted a coworker who called 911. First responders pronounced the worker dead at the scene. Following the incident, investigators found: The worker had been operating the forklift his entire time at the farm without training. The contractor only gave him an overview of forklift safety in an orientation before he began his job. The worker picked and lowered two bins, reversed, stopped, and left the forklift on a one-percent grade without setting the parking brake. The forklift then rolled forward into him as he stepped between the bins to adjust a tarp. The area was dark and the only light was from his forklift. The contractor and host employer became aware the worker was using the forklift without training after his first week at the farm. They did not effectively communicate with each other and with the crew supervisor and contractor's safety manager to prevent the worker from using the forklift. REQUIREMENTS: Employers must: Make sure powered industrial truck (PIT) operators are trained. Neutralize the controls and set the brakes when getting off the PIT. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators concluded that to help prevent similar occurrences, employers should: Use PITs equipped with automatic parking brake systems that can prevent rollaways by engaging when the driver releases the service brake and leaves the vehicle while it is still idling. Develop and enforce PIT policies in their written accident prevention program (APP) that: Allow only workers who are trained to operate PITs and require supervisors to immediately stop workers who are not trained from using them. Perform a job hazard analysis (JHA) jointly with supervisors and PIT operators to identify rollaway and crush hazards, such as operating areas with any inclines. Establish clear safety communication with host employers to ensure temporary workers get an effective safety orientation, supervision, and training on the job hazards they will be exposed to. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229234 KW - Farmers KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Accidents KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accident prevention KW - Safety practices KW - Forklifts KW - Farm workers KW - Temporary workers KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accidents KW - Farmers KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Temp Worker Crushed by Rollaway Forklift at Family Farm UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229234 ER -
Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Slaughterhouse Worker Crushed in Cattle Chute Door

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2025/01/20 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 36-year-old slaughterhouse worker was crushed by a pneumatic sliding door while moving cattle through a chute. His employer was a family-run beef slaughterhouse that had been in business for seven months. He had extensive slaughterhouse experience and was working as a kill floor manager. He was alone moving cattle from an outside corral to a kill ...

Title : Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Slaughterhouse Worker Crushed in Cattle Chute Door Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2025/01/20 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229233
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2025). Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Slaughterhouse Worker Crushed in Cattle Chute Door. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229233

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Slaughterhouse Worker Crushed in Cattle Chute Door. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229233.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Slaughterhouse Worker Crushed in Cattle Chute Door. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229233.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 36-year-old slaughterhouse worker was crushed by a pneumatic sliding door while moving cattle through a chute. His employer was a family-run beef slaughterhouse that had been in business for seven months. He had extensive slaughterhouse experience and was working as a kill floor manager. He was alone moving cattle from an outside corral to a kill floor access chute inside the slaughterhouse. He was using a hand-held shock prod while operating a pneumatic metal sliding door to control the number of cattle entering the chute. The door opened and closed by sliding through a small gap in a steel barrier that separated the chute from a walkway. It was electronically activated by two switches: one outside nineteen feet from the door and one inside three feet away. After waiting ten minutes and no cattle entered the kill floor from the chute, his coworker became concerned. She went to check on him and found him standing pinned and unconscious between the door and the barrier. She released the door pressure and he fell to the floor unresponsive. She called 911 and alerted coworkers who came to help do CPR until first responders arrived. He was emergency airlifted to a hospital where he died three days later from asphyxiation injuries. Following the incident, investigators found: The worker likely used the outside switch to close the door and started to go inside as the door was closing. As he entered the doorway, he tried to prod a remaining cow but was crushed between the closing door and barrier. He was unable to breathe for up to seven minutes. The door's pneumatic operating pressure was 65 to 70 psi, enough to compress the worker's chest and prevent him from breathing, yelling for help, or pushing the door open to get free. The employer did not have a written accident prevention program (APP), safety meetings, a safety committee, nor training on how to safely move cattle through the chute door. REQUIREMENTS: Employers must: construct your workplace so it is safe. Develop a formal, written APP. Establish and conduct safety committees. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators concluded that to help prevent similar occurrences, employers should: Use sliding doors with pneumatic or electric sensing edges that stop and reverse the door when the leading-edge contacts an obstruction. Inspect door regularly to ensure proper functioning. Develop and enforce policies in their written accident prevention program (APP) that: Prohibit lone work in corrals and instead require using a buddy system where workers team up so they can monitor each other and help quickly when someone is endangered. Require a formal job hazard analysis (JHA) be done jointly by supervisors and workers to identify hazards of corral systems, including pens, sorting alleys, chutes, gates, and doors. Implement less hazardous work practices and safety training to prevent fatalities and injuries. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229233 KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Accidents KW - Accident Prevention KW - Livestock KW - Accident prevention KW - Safety practices KW - Livestock KW - Slaughterhouses KW - Pneumatic equipment KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accidents KW - Livestock KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Agriculture Fatality Narrative: Slaughterhouse Worker Crushed in Cattle Chute Door UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229233 ER -
Trucking/Construction Fatality Narrative: Driver Dragged and Pinned by Rollaway Dump Truck

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2024/12/09 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 76-year-old truck driver was dragged and pinned when his dump truck rolled away after he unhooked a flatbed trailer. He was employed by an excavation contractor and had 15 years of experience driving dump trucks with trailers. He drove the truck to his employer's property to drop off the attached trailer. He backed up into a parking spot at the t ...

Title : Trucking/Construction Fatality Narrative: Driver Dragged and Pinned by Rollaway Dump Truck Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2024/12/09 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/246442
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2024). Trucking/Construction Fatality Narrative: Driver Dragged and Pinned by Rollaway Dump Truck. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/246442

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Trucking/Construction Fatality Narrative: Driver Dragged and Pinned by Rollaway Dump Truck. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/246442.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Trucking/Construction Fatality Narrative: Driver Dragged and Pinned by Rollaway Dump Truck. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/246442.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 76-year-old truck driver was dragged and pinned when his dump truck rolled away after he unhooked a flatbed trailer. He was employed by an excavation contractor and had 15 years of experience driving dump trucks with trailers. He drove the truck to his employer's property to drop off the attached trailer. He backed up into a parking spot at the top of a slight incline, set the trailer parking brake, and exited the truck. When he unhooked the trailer, the truck started to roll downhill. He ran after it and got onto the driver's side running board, attempting to get in the cab to stop the truck. The front driver's side rolled into a roadway drainage ditch and struck the hillside along the ditch. The driver was thrown off the truck into the narrow space between it and the hillside. He was then dragged until the truck finally stopped 150 feet from the parking area. The employer's son was working nearby and saw he was pinned against the hillside. He called his father, and they used an excavator to pull the truck off the driver. They called 911 but found he was already deceased when they tried to render first aid. Following the incident, investigators found: The driver set the trailer brake but not the truck's parking brake before exiting the cab and unhooking the trailer. The driver had parked the truck and trailer at the same site many times before. The employer's accident prevention program (APP) included state requirements for using parking brakes and wheel chocks at construction sites. Crew safety meeting and job hazard analysis (JHA) were also included as requirements but were not documented to assure hazards were being communicated to workers. REQUIREMENTS: Employers must: Employers must maintain conditions within the workplace that will not endanger the health, safety or welfare of employees. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators recommend that, to help prevent similar occurrences, employers should: Install electronic parking brake systems that automatically apply the parking brake when the driver has not set it before exiting the cab. Alarms are also available that alert drivers when brakes are not set. Develop and enforce APP policies including a parking brake and wheel chocking standard operating procedure (SOP) policy that requires drivers to: Put their foot on the service brake and place the transmission in neutral. Set the parking brake and time they park, regardless of whether or not they exit the cab. Stop the engine, lock the ignition, and remove the key and place it in their pocket. Turn the truck's front wheels to the curb or side of the road and chock at least one tractor drive wheel on each side if parked on any grade. Never to pursue or try to stop a rollaway truck if outside the cab. Train all drivers and periodically test their parking brake and wheel chocking SOP knowledge and skills. Document training for each driver and keep records up to date. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:246442 KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Accidents KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accident prevention; Truck drivers; Safety; Equipment operation; Trucking KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accidents KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2024 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Trucking/Construction Fatality Narrative: Driver Dragged and Pinned by Rollaway Dump Truck UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/246442 ER -
A Tow Truck Operator Dies on a Highway When He Is Struck by a Car While Loading a Vehicle onto a Tow Truck - California

Cierpich, Hank

2024/12/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On May 31, 2023, a 41-year-old male Hispanic tow truck operator was struck and killed by a passing vehicle on an interstate highway as he was loading a disabled vehicle onto a tow truck. Both the vehicle and tow truck were stopped on a triangular gore adjacent to the #6 lane and an onramp. The victim exited the driver's side of the flatbed truck an ...

Title : A Tow Truck Operator Dies on a Highway When He Is Struck by a Car While Loading a Vehicle onto a Tow Truck - California Personal Author(s) : Cierpich, Hank Corporate Authors(s) : California Department of Public Health Published Date : 2024/12/01 Pages in Document : 10 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE 23CA004, 2024 Dec; :1-10 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA004 Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Cierpich, H. (2024). A Tow Truck Operator Dies on a Highway When He Is Struck by a Car While Loading a Vehicle onto a Tow Truck - California. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA004

Cierpich, Hank. "A Tow Truck Operator Dies on a Highway When He Is Struck by a Car While Loading a Vehicle onto a Tow Truck - California." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2024). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA004.

Cierpich, Hank "A Tow Truck Operator Dies on a Highway When He Is Struck by a Car While Loading a Vehicle onto a Tow Truck - California." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2024. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA004.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Cierpich, Hank A2 - California Department of Public Health AB - On May 31, 2023, a 41-year-old male Hispanic tow truck operator was struck and killed by a passing vehicle on an interstate highway as he was loading a disabled vehicle onto a tow truck. Both the vehicle and tow truck were stopped on a triangular gore adjacent to the #6 lane and an onramp. The victim exited the driver's side of the flatbed truck and was standing within the #6 lane when he was struck by the vehicle traveling 65-70 mph. Contributing factors: Failure to recognize an unsafe condition posed by the gore; Lack of awareness of California's Move Over law; Failure to call law enforcement to secure the work area prior to loading a vehicle onto the tow truck. Recommendations - The California FACE (CA/FACE) investigator determined that, in order to prevent similar incidents, roadside assistance companies: 1) Develop and implement a safety training program for tow truck operators that emphasizes how to recognize and respond to unique situations (e.g., a gore), approaching traffic, and other hazards. 2) Promote awareness of the California Move Over law. 3) Ensure tow truck operators work with law enforcement/emergency service providers to secure the work area prior to loading a vehicle. 4) Promote use of variable messaging signs to help direct traffic away from roadside responders. AN - cdc:258864 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHSFACE23CA004 J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Motor Vehicles KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Truck Drivers KW - Region 9; Fatalities; Injury prevention; Traumatic injuries; Safety practices; Motor vehicles; Highway work zones; Drivers; Warning signs; Small businesses KW - Mortality KW - Motor Vehicles KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety KW - Truck Drivers PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2024 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE 23CA004, 2024 Dec; :1-10 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - A Tow Truck Operator Dies on a Highway When He Is Struck by a Car While Loading a Vehicle onto a Tow Truck - California UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258864 ER -
Construction Fatality Narrative: Welder Fell 32 Feet from Storage Tank Roof [2024]

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2024/11/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 60-year-old welder fell 32 feet while constructing the leading edge of a storage tank roof. His employer was an aboveground storage tank manufacturer. He had over 40 years of job experience. He was with three other workers constructing the leading edge with sheets of metal sheathing. The roof was 76-feet wide by 34.5-feet high, with a 1 in 12 pit ...

Title : Construction Fatality Narrative: Welder Fell 32 Feet from Storage Tank Roof [2024] Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2024/11/01 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229232
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2024). Construction Fatality Narrative: Welder Fell 32 Feet from Storage Tank Roof [2024]. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229232

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Construction Fatality Narrative: Welder Fell 32 Feet from Storage Tank Roof [2024]. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229232.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Construction Fatality Narrative: Welder Fell 32 Feet from Storage Tank Roof [2024]. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229232.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 60-year-old welder fell 32 feet while constructing the leading edge of a storage tank roof. His employer was an aboveground storage tank manufacturer. He had over 40 years of job experience. He was with three other workers constructing the leading edge with sheets of metal sheathing. The roof was 76-feet wide by 34.5-feet high, with a 1 in 12 pitch. He was acting as a "spotter" for a crane operator who was hoisting the sheets to cover a 16-foot hole remaining on the roof. After unloading the sheets, he needed to tack weld one near the center peak of the roof. He stepped from the leading edge to a rafter over part of the hole. He then sat down on the rafter and extended his legs two and a half feet across the hole to another rafter. While sitting on the rafter, he used a pry bar to bend and move the sheet into place for welding. As he pried, he fell backward through the hole between the rafter and leading edge. After landing on the ground, he was badly hurt but still conscious and breathing. Emergency responders arrived and had a critical care helicopter airlift him to the hospital. He died the next day. Following the incident, investigators found: The welder and his co-workers had tied off while riding a boom lift to the roof, but their supervisor allowed them to remove their personal fall arrest system (PFAS) harnesses on the roof. The workers and their supervisor discussed the fall hazards and the general contractor's fall protection expectations on the roof, but they chose not to use PFAS believing that lifelines would create a tripping hazard. The employer lacked a fall protection work plan (FPWP) and did not know about state requirements to have one. The supervisor only told the workers not to walk out on the rafters. The project manager also never conducted any safety inspections at the jobsite. REQUIREMENTS Employers must: Ensure that a fall protection system is provided, installed, and implemented in accordance with WAC 296-880-400 Fall protection system specifications when employees are exposed to fall hazards of six feet or more to the ground while constructing a leading edge. Develop and implement a written FPWP including each area of the work place where the employees are assigned and where fall hazards of ten feet or more exist. Conduct, document, and maintain records of pre-work walk-around safety inspections until the completion of the job. RECOMMENDATIONS FACE investigators concluded, that to help prevent similar occurrences employers, should: Use a crane instead of workers to move sheathing near roof leading edges. Develop FPWP and PFAS policies in their accident prevention program (APP). Policies should require pre-planning the use, training, and inspection of site-specific fall protection. Have supervisors review fall protection requirements with workers at pre-job crew meetings, routinely check that they are following them, and implement corrective action when needed. Demonstrate fall prevention leadership by prioritizing fall prevention at pre-job crew meetings, monthly safety meetings, annual stand-downs, and in company newsletters and social media. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229232 KW - Construction Industry KW - Safety KW - Accidental Falls KW - Welding KW - Occupational Health KW - Accidents KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accident prevention KW - Welding KW - Fall protection KW - Construction workers KW - Harnesses KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accidental Falls KW - Accidents KW - Construction Industry KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety KW - Welding LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2024 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Construction Fatality Narrative: Welder Fell 32 Feet from Storage Tank Roof [2024] UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229232 ER -
Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras es Golpeado Por una Viga Después de Caer de un Elevador de Tijera

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2024/09/25 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

Un instalador de estructuras de 41 años de edad cayó de un elevador de tijera y después fue golpeado por una viga de madera de 418 libras. El hombre trabajó para su empleador, un subcontratista de cimbas residenciales, durante dos semanas, y estaba recibiendo capacitación sobre el trabajo. El instalador de estructuras estaba ayudando a un compañero ...

Title : Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras es Golpeado Por una Viga Después de Caer de un Elevador de Tijera Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2024/09/25 Pages in Document : 1-2 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229231
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2024). Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras es Golpeado Por una Viga Después de Caer de un Elevador de Tijera. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229231

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras es Golpeado Por una Viga Después de Caer de un Elevador de Tijera. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229231.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras es Golpeado Por una Viga Después de Caer de un Elevador de Tijera. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229231.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - Un instalador de estructuras de 41 años de edad cayó de un elevador de tijera y después fue golpeado por una viga de madera de 418 libras. El hombre trabajó para su empleador, un subcontratista de cimbas residenciales, durante dos semanas, y estaba recibiendo capacitación sobre el trabajo. El instalador de estructuras estaba ayudando a un compañero en el sitio de construcción de un nuevo complejo de apartamentos. El plan era usar dos elevadores de tijera al mismo tiempo para levantar e insertar una viga de madera laminada en el costado de un perfil I horizontal que se encontraba a una altura de ocho pies sobre el piso de concreto. La viga de madera era de 22 pies de largo, 22.5 pulgadas de ancho y 3.5 pulgadas de grosor. Los trabajadores alinearon los elevadores a unos 0 pies de distancia y colocaron la viga con el lado ancho hacia abajo sobre las barandillas superiores de los elevadores, pero no la aseguraron. Estaba a 6.5 pies sobre el piso. Los trabajadores esperaban completar la tarea en dos horas, sin apresurarse. Los trabajadores estaban de pie en el suelo, en extremos opuestos de la viga. El instalador de estructuras estaba fuera del campo de visión de su compañero en la parte trasera del otro elevador. Subió inesperadamente las escaleras o se subió al costado de su elevador y cayó de espaldas. Posteriormente, la viga cayó del elevador sobre él. El compañero vio que la viga cayó y corrió a ayudar al instalador. Quitó la viga de encima del instalador de estructuras lesionado y notificó a dos superintendentes que estaban en el sitio, quienes llamaron al 911 e iniciaron la resucitación cardiopulmonar (RCP). Los socorristas llegaron poco después y declararon muerto al instalador de estructuras en el lugar a causa de lesiones graves en la cabeza. Después del incidente, los investigadores determinaron que: El instalador de estructuras no estaba capacitado ni autorizado para usar el elevador. Su compañero también tenía conocimiento limitado sobre los peligros de colocar materiales sobre las barandillas de la plataforma y levantarlos. El empleador y el supervisor de los trabajadores sabían sobre las advertencias del fabricante de no colocar materiales sobre las barandillas. No conocían ninguna opción más segura de equipos elevadores de materiales. Los operadores de los elevadores y los ayudantes en el lugar hablaban español y no pudieron leer la evaluación de riesgos en el trabajo del empleador (Job Hazard Assessment, JHA), la cual estaba escrita solo en inglés, para el trabajo de instalación. El Programa para la Prevención de Accidentes (Accident Prevention Program, APP) de la empresa, incluida la lista de comprobación para el operador del elevador de tijera, también estaba escrita solo en inglés. REQUISITOS: Los empleadores deben hacer lo siguiente: Asegurarse de que las plataformas de trabajo elevadas se usen solo para los fines previstos, tal como lo especifica el fabricante. Consulte el Código Administrativo de Washington. Asegurarse de capacitar al personal antes de que se les permita operar una plataforma hidráulica. RECOMENDACIONES Los investigadores del Programa de Evaluacion y Control de Fatalidades (Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation, FACE) concluyeron que, para ayudar a prevenir hechos similares, los empleadores deben: Usar montacargas, gruas o elevadores de materiales del contratista para levantar materiales de construccion, no elevadores de tijera. Desarrollar politicas para el uso seguro de plataformas de trabajo elevadas, como los elevadores de tijera, siguiendo el APP, las JHA, y los procedimientos operativos estandar (Standard Operating Procedure, SOP) y hacer que los supervisores las hagan cumplir. Traducir las politicas del APP, las JHA y los recursos de capacitacion a los idiomas de preferencia del trabajador. Capacitar a los operadores para que usen el manual del fabricante y resaltar las advertencias sobre no poner materiales sobre las barandillas ni permitir que excedan los limites de las mismas, a menos que el fabricante lo apruebe. Hablar sobre el uso seguro de las plataformas de trabajo elevadas en las reuniones de equipo antes del trabajo, asi como en las reuniones mensuales sobre seguridad. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229231 KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Prevención de accidentes KW - Construcción KW - Operación de equipos KW - Prácticas de seguridad KW - Capacitación KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - spa PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2024 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Construcción Narración de Muertes: Instalador de Estructuras es Golpeado Por una Viga Después de Caer de un Elevador de Tijera UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229231 ER -
Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Struck by Beam After Falling from Scissor Lift

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2024/09/25 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 41-year-old framer fell from a scissor lift and was then struck by a 418-pound wooden beam. He worked for his employer, a residential framing subcontractor, for two weeks, and was learning on-the-job. The framer was assisting a co-worker at the construction site of a new apartment complex. Their plan was to use two scissor lifts in tandem to rais ...

Title : Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Struck by Beam After Falling from Scissor Lift Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2024/09/25 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229230
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2024). Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Struck by Beam After Falling from Scissor Lift. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229230

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Struck by Beam After Falling from Scissor Lift. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229230.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Struck by Beam After Falling from Scissor Lift. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229230.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 41-year-old framer fell from a scissor lift and was then struck by a 418-pound wooden beam. He worked for his employer, a residential framing subcontractor, for two weeks, and was learning on-the-job. The framer was assisting a co-worker at the construction site of a new apartment complex. Their plan was to use two scissor lifts in tandem to raise and insert a glulam wooden beam into the side of a horizontal I-beam over eight feet above the concrete floor. The wooden beam was 22-feet long, 22.5-inches wide, and 3.5-inches thick. They aligned the lifts about 10-feet apart and placed the beam broadside down across the lifts' top guardrails but did not secure it. It was 6.5 feet above the floor. The workers expected to complete the task in two hours, without rushing. The workers were standing on the floor at opposite ends of the beam. The framer was out of view of his co-worker at the rear of the other lift. He unexpectedly went up the steps or climbed the side of his lift and fell on his back. The beam then fell off the lift on top of him. The co-worker saw the beam fall and ran over to help. He lifted the beam off the injured framer and notified two onsite superintendents who called 911 and began CPR. First responders came shortly after and pronounced the framer dead at the scene from severe head injuries. Following the incident, investigators found: The framer was not trained and authorized to use the lift. His co-worker also had limited knowledge of the hazards of placing and elevating materials on the platform guardrails. The employer and workers' supervisor knew of the lift manufacturer's warnings not to put materials on the guardrails. They were unaware of any safer material lifting equipment options. Lift operators and helpers at the site spoke Spanish and could not read the employer's job hazard assessment (JHA) for the installation task, which was written in English only. The company's accident prevention program (APP), including a scissor lift operator's checklist, was also in English only. REQUIREMENTS: Employers must: Make sure elevating work platforms are used only for their intended purpose as specified by the manufacturer. Make sure personnel are trained before they are permitted to operate an aerial lift. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators concluded, that to help prevent similar occurrences employers, should: Use forklifts, cranes, or contractor material lifts to elevate construction materials, not scissor lifts. Develop and have supervisors enforce APP policies, JHAs, and standard operating procedures (SOPs), for safe use of elevating work platforms, such as scissor lifts. Have APP policies, JHAs, and training resources translated to the worker's preferred language. Train operators using the manufacturers' manual and highlight warnings not to put materials on guardrails or have them exceed the confines of the guardrails unless approved by the manufacturer. Discuss safe use of elevating work platforms at pre-job crew meetings and monthly safety meetings. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229230 KW - Construction Industry KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Staff Development KW - Accidents KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accident prevention KW - Construction KW - Equipment operation KW - Safety practices KW - Training KW - Accident Prevention KW - Accidents KW - Construction Industry KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety KW - Staff Development LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2024 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Construction Fatality Narrative: Framer Struck by Beam After Falling from Scissor Lift UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229230 ER -
Servicios de Jardinería Narración de Muertes: Podador de Árboles Cae 25 Pies Desde una Canastilla

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries

2024/08/19 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

Un podador de árboles experimentado, de 59 años de edad, falleció después de caer desde una canastilla elevada que se atoró en una rama. Trabajaba para su empleador, una compañía de servicio de cuidado de árboles, desde hacía 24 años, como podador y operador de canastilla. Formaba parte de una cuadrilla de tres personas que podaba abedules en una r ...

Title : Servicios de Jardinería Narración de Muertes: Podador de Árboles Cae 25 Pies Desde una Canastilla Corporate Authors(s) : Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2024/08/19 Pages in Document : 1 Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229229
Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries (2024). Servicios de Jardinería Narración de Muertes: Podador de Árboles Cae 25 Pies Desde una Canastilla. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229229

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries. Servicios de Jardinería Narración de Muertes: Podador de Árboles Cae 25 Pies Desde una Canastilla. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229229.

Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries Servicios de Jardinería Narración de Muertes: Podador de Árboles Cae 25 Pies Desde una Canastilla. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2024, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229229.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington (State). Department of Labor and Industries AB - Un podador de árboles experimentado, de 59 años de edad, falleció después de caer desde una canastilla elevada que se atoró en una rama. Trabajaba para su empleador, una compañía de servicio de cuidado de árboles, desde hacía 24 años, como podador y operador de canastilla. Formaba parte de una cuadrilla de tres personas que podaba abedules en una residencia privada. Estaban usando un elevador de canastilla para retirar ramas dañadas. Subió en la canastilla solo, mientras sus compañeros trabajaban en el piso. Estaba usando todo el equipo de protección personal obligatorio, incluido un arnés de detención de caídas. Después de cortar algunas ramas, tuvo que mover el camión para cambiar el ángulo de la canastilla, cerca del árbol. Bajó la canastilla y desconectó su arnés para salir. Un compañero le ayudó a mover el camión y colocar los estabilizadores. Nadie lo vio cuando volvió a subir a la canastilla para elevarse. Cuando la canastilla subió, los trabajadores en el suelo vieron que el camión se inclinaba hacia el lado del pasajero, con las llantas separadas del suelo. La canastilla parecía estar atorada y empujando una rama con suficiente fuerza para inclinar el camión. Cuando la canastilla se liberó de la rama, las ruedas del camión golpearon el suelo y agitaron la canastilla con tanta violencia que el podador salió despedido y cayó 25 pies hasta el suelo. Los trabajadores en el suelo corrieron hacia él, llamaron al 911 y empezaron a administrar RCP conforme a las indicaciones de los despachadores de emergencias. El personal de respuesta a emergencias llegó pronto, pero lo declararon muerto en el lugar de los hechos debido a lesiones graves causadas por la caída. Después del accidente, los investigadores determinaron que: El cable del arnés de detención de caídas del trabajador no estaba sujeto a la canastilla. El empleador tenía un plan de trabajo para protección contra caídas y la cuadrilla recibió una explicación de seguridad antes del trabajo. El fabricante del camión elevador inspeccionó el vehículo y determinó que estaba en buenas condiciones de funcionamiento. REQUISITOS: Los empleadores deben: Antes de elevar la plataforma (canastilla elevadora), asegurarse de que todas las personas en la plataforma tengan puesto un arnés de cuerpo completo con un cable sujeto a: (a) el punto de sujeción recomendado por el fabricante; o (b) el aguilón o la plataforma, si el fabricante no especifica un punto de sujeción. El empleado nunca debe fijar el cable a un poste, estructura o equipo adyacente. RECOMENDACIONES: Los investigadores de FACE concluyeron que, para ayudar a prevenir sucesos similares, los empleadores deben hacer lo siguiente: Elaborar y hacer cumplir políticas y procedimientos de operación estándar (POE), en su programa de prevención de accidentes, que ordenen que: Un compañero de trabajo esté presente para observar cuando el operador de la canastilla entre a ella. El operador de la canastilla permita que el compañero de trabajo confirme visualmente que está usando un arnés personal de detención de caídas, con el cable sujeto a la canastilla, antes de subir. El compañero de trabajo debe gritar "alto total" o usar una pequeña bocina de aire y oprimir el interruptor de parada de emergencia cuando sea necesario interrumpir rápidamente una situación peligrosa inesperada para prevenir lesiones. Deben actualizarse las políticas para reflejar los cambios en las condiciones del sitio y del equipo de protección contra caídas. Explicar las políticas a los trabajadores en las reuniones de equipo, en reuniones mensuales de seguridad y en reuniones formales anuales sobre prevención de caídas. Impartir capacitación práctica recurrente sobre la protección contra caídas y asegurarse de que los trabajadores demuestre su dominio de las habilidades correspondientes. [Description provided by NIOSH] AN - cdc:229229 KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Prevención de accidentes KW - Podadores de árboles KW - Equipos de protección personal KW - Arneses KW - Protección contra caídas KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2024 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Servicios de Jardinería Narración de Muertes: Podador de Árboles Cae 25 Pies Desde una Canastilla UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/229229 ER -