Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program

U.S. workplace deaths remain a public health crisis, with over 5,000 annual fatalities concentrated in high-risk sectors like construction, transportation, and agriculture. To address this under the OSH Act, NIOSH runs the Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) program, a non-regulatory initiative providing safety guidance through independent, non-enforcement investigations. Structurally, FACE operates as a unified effort split into two distinct, complementary branches: a centralized, national In-House program run directly by NIOSH, and a decentralized network of State FACE programs funded via cooperative agreements. While both share common goals and methods, they differ significantly in their organizational structure, authority, influence, and how they implement findings locally across diverse regional industries. Together, they generate extensive prevention resources and adapt to emerging workplace hazards.

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Indoor Shooting Range Fatality Narrative: Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries

2026/04/15 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 33-year-old instructor died in a fire at an indoor shooting range. He worked there for six years as an instructor and operated a gunsmithing and holster making side business at the range. The instructor was working in the second-floor classroom inside the range. He was using an angle grinder to modify a metal cart for his side business. It is unk ...

Title : Indoor Shooting Range Fatality Narrative: Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire Corporate Authors(s) : Washington State Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2026/04/15 Pages in Document : 2 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Olympia, WA: Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 71-276-2026, 2026 Apr; :1-2 URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259084
Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (2026). Indoor Shooting Range Fatality Narrative: Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259084

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. Indoor Shooting Range Fatality Narrative: Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2026. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259084.

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries Indoor Shooting Range Fatality Narrative: Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2026, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259084.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Report A2 - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 33-year-old instructor died in a fire at an indoor shooting range. He worked there for six years as an instructor and operated a gunsmithing and holster making side business at the range. The instructor was working in the second-floor classroom inside the range. He was using an angle grinder to modify a metal cart for his side business. It is unknown why he was working there and not in the workshop, which was designated for metal work. He brought the grinder that day, and the owner believed the cart had been brought previously. The classroom contained flammable and combustible materials including ammunition, solvents, paper, and range sweep-off dust that contained unspent gunpowder. Three coworkers and seven customers were in other areas of the range. One worker went to the classroom and saw the instructor cutting the cart with the grinder, with no visible smoke or fire, then returned to the lobby. About a minute later, ceiling tiles began to fall and fire erupted from above. He ran toward an exit door and was blown through it, suffering burns and a head injury. At the same time, the two workers on the first floor heard rushing air followed by an explosion through the stairwell, possibly fueled by combustible dust above the ceiling. Alarms sounded as the fire spread rapidly. The injured worker directed customers to the exit and reentered several times but could not reach the instructor. The instructor was later found about 32 feet from the fire's origin. It is believed he was trying to reach the front exit where others were calling to him. He died from smoke inhalation and burn injuries. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS - Following the incident, investigators found: 1) Fire investigators reported the fire started in the classroom as indicated by burn patterns. They concluded that the source of ignition was either sparks from grinding or an electrical short circuit. The grinder was found unplugged. 2) The employer had an accident prevention program (APP) but it did not include safe use of angle grinders as they were not used by workers. The employer believed the instructor knew that he should do metal work or hot work only in the workshop. 3) One-second floor exit door and stairway were closed due to break-ins. 4) One worker described large accumulations of visible settled dust in the space above the ceiling tiles. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators concluded, that to help prevent similar occurrences, employers should: 1) Restrict hot work to designated areas. 2) Develop a range cleaning and waste disposal program. Add a cleaning and waste storage and disposal program to your APP. Collect and dispose of settled dusts frequently and safely. Include a focus on storing flammable and combustible materials in a fire safe area and promptly disposing of them. 3) Maintain exit routes to permit prompt evacuation during an emergency. AN - cdc:259084 KW - Fires KW - Dust KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Fatalities; Safety education; Fires; Grinding equipment; Gunpowder; Explosive dusts KW - Dust KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2026 T2 - Olympia, WA: Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 71-276-2026, 2026 Apr; :1-2 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Indoor Shooting Range Fatality Narrative: Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259084 ER -
Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries

2026/04/15 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 33-year-old instructor died in a fire at an indoor shooting range. He worked there for six years as an instructor and operated a gunsmithing and holster making side business at the range. The instructor was working in the second-floor classroom inside the range. He was using an angle grinder to modify a metal cart for his side business. It is unk ...

Title : Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire Corporate Authors(s) : Washington State Department of Labor and Industries Published Date : 2026/04/15 Pages in Document : 21 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Olympia, WA: Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 71-276-2026s, 2026 Apr; :1-21 URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259085
Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (2026). Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259085

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2026. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259085.

Washington State Department of Labor and Industries Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2026, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259085.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Presentation A2 - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries AB - A 33-year-old instructor died in a fire at an indoor shooting range. He worked there for six years as an instructor and operated a gunsmithing and holster making side business at the range. The instructor was working in the second-floor classroom inside the range. He was using an angle grinder to modify a metal cart for his side business. It is unknown why he was working there and not in the workshop, which was designated for metal work. He brought the grinder that day, and the owner believed the cart had been brought previously. The classroom contained flammable and combustible materials including ammunition, solvents, paper, and range sweep-off dust that contained unspent gunpowder. Three coworkers and seven customers were in other areas of the range. One worker went to the classroom and saw the instructor cutting the cart with the grinder, with no visible smoke or fire, then returned to the lobby. About a minute later, ceiling tiles began to fall and fire erupted from above. He ran toward an exit door and was blown through it, suffering burns and a head injury. At the same time, the two workers on the first floor heard rushing air followed by an explosion through the stairwell, possibly fueled by combustible dust above the ceiling. Alarms sounded as the fire spread rapidly. The injured worker directed customers to the exit and reentered several times but could not reach the instructor. The instructor was later found about 32 feet from the fire's origin. It is believed he was trying to reach the front exit where others were calling to him. He died from smoke inhalation and burn injuries. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS - Following the incident, investigators found: 1) Fire investigators reported the fire started in the classroom as indicated by burn patterns. They concluded that the source of ignition was either sparks from grinding or an electrical short circuit. The grinder was found unplugged. 2) The employer had an accident prevention program (APP) but it did not include safe use of angle grinders as they were not used by workers. The employer believed the instructor knew that he should do metal work or hot work only in the workshop. 3) One-second floor exit door and stairway were closed due to break-ins. 4) One worker described large accumulations of visible settled dust in the space above the ceiling tiles. RECOMMENDATIONS: FACE investigators concluded, that to help prevent similar occurrences, employers should: 1) Restrict hot work to designated areas. 2) Develop a range cleaning and waste disposal program. Add a cleaning and waste storage and disposal program to your APP. Collect and dispose of settled dusts frequently and safely. Include a focus on storing flammable and combustible materials in a fire safe area and promptly disposing of them. 3) Maintain exit routes to permit prompt evacuation during an emergency. AN - cdc:259085 KW - Fires KW - Dust KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Fatalities; Safety education; Fires; Grinding equipment; Gunpowder; Explosive dusts KW - Dust KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - Washington State Department of Labor and Industries PY - 2026 T2 - Olympia, WA: Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 71-276-2026s, 2026 Apr; :1-21 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Indoor Shooting Range Instructor Killed in Fire UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259085 ER -
Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

2026/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On February 20, 2026, one career firefighter was seriously injured after falling from a ladder while self-extricating from a boarding house fire. At approximately 10:45 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting an electrical fire in the basement of a boarding house. At 10:46 hours, a box alarm assignment was disp ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania Corporate Authors(s) : NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Published Date : 2026/04/01 Pages in Document : 17 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-02, 2026 Apr; :1-17 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602RS
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (2026). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602RS

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602RS.

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602RS.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Presentation A2 - NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program AB - On February 20, 2026, one career firefighter was seriously injured after falling from a ladder while self-extricating from a boarding house fire. At approximately 10:45 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting an electrical fire in the basement of a boarding house. At 10:46 hours, a box alarm assignment was dispatched for a high occupancy, electrical fire in the basement. At 10:48 hours, Engine 20-1 arrived on scene, and Lieutenant 20 reported smoke in the rear of the building. Utility 20 arrived on scene, and Captain 20 established command. Firefighters stretched a hoseline to the basement and extinguished the fire. Lieutenant 20 reported that the fire was knocked down and requested ventilation. Turbulent, heavy brown smoke came from the boarded-up windows on the first division near the basement door. At 10:53 hours, Captain 20 requested the second alarm. Ladder 24 arrived on scene and staged on Side Alpha. Ladder 24 firefighter (seriously injured) had a face-to-face with Captain 20, who assigned his crew to conduct a primary search. Ladder 24 firefighter entered the building as Ladder 24 driver/operator put on the rest of his personal protective equipment (PPE). At 10:55 hours, the PSAP dispatched the second alarm assignment. Captain 20 walked down the alley on Side Bravo and reported active fire from windows on the first division. Ladder 24 firefighter and driver/operator completed searches on the second division as the hallway started filling with heavy white smoke. Ladder 24 firefighter and driver/operator split up, and each found multiple victims, who were directed to the stairs to self-extricate. At 10:59 hours, Chief 20 assumed command and designated Chief 20-1 as operations. Between 11:00 and 11:05 hours, there were multiple reports of entrapments with requests for ladders on Sides Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. Ladder 24 firefighter and Ladder 24 driver/operator went to the third division to continue searches. Ladder 24 firefighter instructed Ladder 24 driver/operator to continue the search on the third division while he (i.e., Ladder 24 firefighter) went to the fourth division to search for a reported victim. As smoke conditions worsened, Ladder 24 driver/operator exited the building to get a thermal imaging camera (TIC) from his apparatus. At 11:06 hours, Captain 20 reported active fire on the second division. Multiple firefighters rescued victims from windows on all sides. At 11:10 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter started to find his way out and his end-of-service-time indicator (EOSTI) later sounded. Conditions were zero visibility, and Ladder 24 firefighter tried to find his way by feel. He realized that he did not have enough air to exit the building. He found a room that he previously searched that had a window. As he broke and cleared the window, his facepiece sealed tightly to his face. His self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) also indicated he was out of air. He removed his regulator, placed his hood over the facepiece connection to filter breathe, and hung his head out of the window. Multiple reports of entrapments continued with requests for ladders. Between 11:11 and 11:14 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter made multiple radio transmissions reporting he was out of air and needed a ladder to the window. At 11:15 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter called a Mayday and activated his personal alert safety system (PASS). Chief 20 requested the PSAP to clear the radio channel for the Mayday and move all other on-scene communications to the next available channel. Firefighters on scene looked at the building's windows, trying to locate Ladder 24 firefighter. Due to the amount of smoke exiting the windows, he was not visible. At 11:19 hours, Chief 20 requested the PSAP announce to all units to evacuate the structure. Not being able to hear the radio and transmit clearly, Ladder 24 firefighter deactivated his PASS. As the wind blew the smoke periodically from the windows, firefighters on the ground momentarily saw Ladder 24 firefighter. Ladder 24 firefighter again reported he could not exit or breathe. He stated the need for a ladder and could see one below him. Firefighters raised a 35 ft ladder to his location after initially raising it to an adjacent window in another room. Lieutenant 24 and Engine 20-1 firefighter placed the ladder against the building by putting it under cable lines that were running to the building from a telephone pole. The ladder was close to live power lines coming from the same telephone pole. At 11:21 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter stepped out and onto the ladder after it was raised to the correct window. As Ladder 24 firefighter descended and reached the top of the second division windows, he stepped off the ladder after losing consciousness and fell more than 20 ft to the ground. At 11:30 hours, an EMS unit reported that Ladder 24 firefighter was loaded and transported to a local hospital. Contributing Factors: Fall from ladder during self-extrication; Strategy and tactics; Air management and firefighter survival; Crew integrity; Available personnel/adequate staffing; Pre-incident planning; Fire inspection and identification of hazards; Structured communications protocols; Termination of utilities. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Assist Mayday firefighters down ground ladders during self-extrication when their medical status is unknown. 2) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for buildings converted to residential or multiple dwellings. 3) Ensure firefighters and fire officers are properly trained in and use principles of air management and survival procedures for out-of-air emergencies. 4) Train firefighters and fire officers to maintain crew integrity when operating in the hazard zone. 5) Ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents. 6) Develop a pre-incident plan for high-risk occupancies, such as boarding houses. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Partner with fire departments to enforce the applicable fire and life safety codes at high-risk occupancies, such as boarding houses. Public Safety Answering Points (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should have: Adequate staffing that allows dispatchers to be dedicated to an incident to support fireground operations, the incident commander, and Mayday management. Electric utility companies should: Ensure utilities are disconnected when requested by fire departments to support fireground operations and firefighter safety. AN - cdc:259132 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602RS KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidental Falls KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Falls; Ladders; Hazard identification; Power lines; Communications equipment; Safety practices KW - Accidental Falls KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-02, 2026 Apr; :1-17 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259132 ER -
Serious Injury Report F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania

Attwood, Wesley R.

2026/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On February 20, 2026, one career firefighter was seriously injured after falling from a ladder while self-extricating from a boarding house fire. At approximately 10:45 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting an electrical fire in the basement of a boarding house. At 10:46 hours, a box alarm assignment was disp ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania Personal Author(s) : Attwood, Wesley R. Published Date : 2026/04/01 Pages in Document : 30 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-02, 2026 Apr; :1-27 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602
Attwood, W. R. (2026). Serious Injury Report F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602

Attwood, Wesley R.. Serious Injury Report F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602.

Attwood, Wesley R. Serious Injury Report F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AB - On February 20, 2026, one career firefighter was seriously injured after falling from a ladder while self-extricating from a boarding house fire. At approximately 10:45 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting an electrical fire in the basement of a boarding house. At 10:46 hours, a box alarm assignment was dispatched for a high occupancy, electrical fire in the basement. At 10:48 hours, Engine 20-1 arrived on scene, and Lieutenant 20 reported smoke in the rear of the building. Utility 20 arrived on scene, and Captain 20 established command. Firefighters stretched a hoseline to the basement and extinguished the fire. Lieutenant 20 reported that the fire was knocked down and requested ventilation. Turbulent, heavy brown smoke came from the boarded-up windows on the first division near the basement door. At 10:53 hours, Captain 20 requested the second alarm. Ladder 24 arrived on scene and staged on Side Alpha. Ladder 24 firefighter (seriously injured) had a face-to-face with Captain 20, who assigned his crew to conduct a primary search. Ladder 24 firefighter entered the building as Ladder 24 driver/operator put on the rest of his personal protective equipment (PPE). At 10:55 hours, the PSAP dispatched the second alarm assignment. Captain 20 walked down the alley on Side Bravo and reported active fire from windows on the first division. Ladder 24 firefighter and driver/operator completed searches on the second division as the hallway started filling with heavy white smoke. Ladder 24 firefighter and driver/operator split up, and each found multiple victims, who were directed to the stairs to self-extricate. At 10:59 hours, Chief 20 assumed command and designated Chief 20-1 as operations. Between 11:00 and 11:05 hours, there were multiple reports of entrapments with requests for ladders on Sides Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. Ladder 24 firefighter and Ladder 24 driver/operator went to the third division to continue searches. Ladder 24 firefighter instructed Ladder 24 driver/operator to continue the search on the third division while he (i.e., Ladder 24 firefighter) went to the fourth division to search for a reported victim. As smoke conditions worsened, Ladder 24 driver/operator exited the building to get a thermal imaging camera (TIC) from his apparatus. At 11:06 hours, Captain 20 reported active fire on the second division. Multiple firefighters rescued victims from windows on all sides. At 11:10 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter started to find his way out and his end-of-service-time indicator (EOSTI) later sounded. Conditions were zero visibility, and Ladder 24 firefighter tried to find his way by feel. He realized that he did not have enough air to exit the building. He found a room that he previously searched that had a window. As he broke and cleared the window, his facepiece sealed tightly to his face. His self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) also indicated he was out of air. He removed his regulator, placed his hood over the facepiece connection to filter breathe, and hung his head out of the window. Multiple reports of entrapments continued with requests for ladders. Between 11:11 and 11:14 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter made multiple radio transmissions reporting he was out of air and needed a ladder to the window. At 11:15 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter called a Mayday and activated his personal alert safety system (PASS). Chief 20 requested the PSAP to clear the radio channel for the Mayday and move all other on-scene communications to the next available channel. Firefighters on scene looked at the building's windows, trying to locate Ladder 24 firefighter. Due to the amount of smoke exiting the windows, he was not visible. At 11:19 hours, Chief 20 requested the PSAP announce to all units to evacuate the structure. Not being able to hear the radio and transmit clearly, Ladder 24 firefighter deactivated his PASS. As the wind blew the smoke periodically from the windows, firefighters on the ground momentarily saw Ladder 24 firefighter. Ladder 24 firefighter again reported he could not exit or breathe. He stated the need for a ladder and could see one below him. Firefighters raised a 35 ft ladder to his location after initially raising it to an adjacent window in another room. Lieutenant 24 and Engine 20-1 firefighter placed the ladder against the building by putting it under cable lines that were running to the building from a telephone pole. The ladder was close to live power lines coming from the same telephone pole. At 11:21 hours, Ladder 24 firefighter stepped out and onto the ladder after it was raised to the correct window. As Ladder 24 firefighter descended and reached the top of the second division windows, he stepped off the ladder after losing consciousness and fell more than 20 ft to the ground. At 11:30 hours, an EMS unit reported that Ladder 24 firefighter was loaded and transported to a local hospital. Contributing Factors: Fall from ladder during self-extrication; Strategy and tactics; Air management and firefighter survival; Crew integrity; Available personnel/adequate staffing; Pre-incident planning; Fire inspection and identification of hazards; Structured communications protocols; Termination of utilities. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Assist Mayday firefighters down ground ladders during self-extrication when their medical status is unknown. 2) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for buildings converted to residential or multiple dwellings. 3) Ensure firefighters and fire officers are properly trained in and use principles of air management and survival procedures for out-of-air emergencies. 4) Train firefighters and fire officers to maintain crew integrity when operating in the hazard zone. 5) Ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents. 6) Develop a pre-incident plan for high-risk occupancies, such as boarding houses. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Partner with fire departments to enforce the applicable fire and life safety codes at high-risk occupancies, such as boarding houses. Public Safety Answering Points (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should have: Adequate staffing that allows dispatchers to be dedicated to an incident to support fireground operations, the incident commander, and Mayday management. Electric utility companies should: Ensure utilities are disconnected when requested by fire departments to support fireground operations and firefighter safety. AN - cdc:259131 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202602 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidental Falls KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Falls; Ladders; Hazard identification; Power lines; Communications equipment; Safety practices KW - Accidental Falls KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-02, 2026 Apr; :1-27 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report F2026-02: Career Firefighter Injured After Falling from Ladder While Self-Extricating from Boarding House Fire - Pennsylvania UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259131 ER -
Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

2026/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On December 29, 2025, four firefighters were seriously injured when a floor collapsed during interior operations in an abandoned residential structure fire. At 03:44 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting a structure fire with visible smoke and flames. The caller stated they did not think anyone was inside. At ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas Corporate Authors(s) : NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Published Date : 2026/04/01 Pages in Document : 16 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-01, 2026 Apr; :1-16 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601RS
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (2026). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601RS

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601RS.

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601RS.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study A2 - NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program AB - On December 29, 2025, four firefighters were seriously injured when a floor collapsed during interior operations in an abandoned residential structure fire. At 03:44 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting a structure fire with visible smoke and flames. The caller stated they did not think anyone was inside. At 03:45 hours, the PSAP dispatched Pumpers 4, 11, 14, 18, 19, Quint 2, Truck 14, Rescue 6, Medics 2, 18, Battalion 1, and Shift Commander for a low-rise alarm. Around 03:49 hours, Pumpers 18, 14, and Medic 18 arrived on scene. Pumper 18 officer gave a size-up of a single-story wood frame with heavy fire showing from Sides Bravo and Charlie. He reported that Pumper 18 would stretch an attack line and directed the second arriving pumper to establish a water supply. As Pumper 18 firefighter stretched the attack line to the front door, the crew of Medic 18 and four members of Quint 2 joined them. As Pumper 18 officer was conducting a 360 size-up, he viewed Side Delta then returned to his crew. Quint 2 firefighter along with a Medic 18 firefighter forced open the front door. Pumper 18 firefighter, Pumper 18 officer, and two Medic 18 firefighters made entry on the first floor. As the attack line entered the structure, Pumper 14 officer reported he had secured a second attack line at the garage with heavy fire showing. He extinguished heavy flames coming from the garage, significantly reducing fire conditions. Pumper 18 crew encountered heavy smoke conditions, no visibility, with no elevated heat. The crew of Quint 2 followed Pumper 18's crew and noticed flames coming through the floor. At 03:53 hours, the Shift Commander arrived on scene and assumed incident command (IC). Around the same time, there was a partial collapse of the living room floor. This caused Pumper 18 firefighter, Pumper 18 officer, and one Medic 18 firefighter to fall into the basement. Pumper 18 officer attempted to declare a Mayday. However, his message was unreadable. Medic 18 firefighter's radio was off. Once he turned the radio on, he declared a Mayday identifying himself. The IC acknowledged the Mayday and made a request to clear the airway. Dispatch announced a second alarm with Mayday. Medic 18 firefighter declared a second Mayday. Crews from Pumper 14, 11 (as the rapid intervention team (RIT)), Quint 2 and Truck 14 entered the basement to extinguish the fire and execute the rescue. Pumper 14 officer reported they located a downed firefighter and were working on extrication. At 04:01 hours, Medic 18 was removed from the basement. Pumper 14 firefighter returned from the hydrant, entered the front door, and fell into the collapsed hole. He declared a Mayday, reporting his location and available air supply. At 04:04 hours, the Safety Officer confirmed two firefighters were rescued from the structure. At 04:06 hours, Pumper 11 officer reported Pumper 14 firefighter was located and out of the structure. Pumper 18 firefighter, Pumper 18 officer, Medic 18 firefighter, and Pumper 14 firefighter were transported to the local hospital. At 04:08 hours, IC announced all personnel to evacuate the structure and ordered defensive operations. IC reported at 05:53 hours, the fire was out and no further units were needed. Contributing Factors: Scene size-up and risk assessment; Basement/below grade fire; Abandoned/derelict/vacant building; Benchmarking of critical information; Proficient use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) accessories; Mayday operations/firefighter survival; Personnel accountability system; Available personnel/adequate staffing. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Complete an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk/benefit analysis. 2) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for basement and below grade fires. 3) Develop and implement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)/Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) for operating at abandoned, derelict, and vacant building fires. 4) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 5) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are properly trained in the use of SCBA accessories, such as radio interface communication capabilities. 6) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are trained in Mayday operations and survival. 7) Use a personnel accountability system to identify the location and function of all operating personnel. 8) Ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents. AN - cdc:259054 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601RS KW - Risk Assessment KW - Firefighters KW - Emergency Responders KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 7; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Risk assessment; Communications equipment; Self contained breathing apparatus; SCBA KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Risk Assessment KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-01, 2026 Apr; :1-16 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259054 ER -
Serious Injury Report F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas

Lago, Louis R. ;

Attwood, Wesley R.

2026/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On December 29, 2025, four firefighters were seriously injured when a floor collapsed during interior operations in an abandoned residential structure fire. At 03:44 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting a structure fire with visible smoke and flames. The caller stated they did not think anyone was inside. At ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas Personal Author(s) : Lago, Louis R.;Attwood, Wesley R.; Published Date : 2026/04/01 Pages in Document : 31 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-01, 2026 Apr; :1-28 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601
Lago, L. R., & Attwood, W. R. (2026). Serious Injury Report F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601

Lago, Louis R. and Wesley R. Attwood. Serious Injury Report F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601.

Lago, Louis R., and Wesley R. Attwood Serious Injury Report F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Lago, Louis R. AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AB - On December 29, 2025, four firefighters were seriously injured when a floor collapsed during interior operations in an abandoned residential structure fire. At 03:44 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call reporting a structure fire with visible smoke and flames. The caller stated they did not think anyone was inside. At 03:45 hours, the PSAP dispatched Pumpers 4, 11, 14, 18, 19, Quint 2, Truck 14, Rescue 6, Medics 2, 18, Battalion 1, and Shift Commander for a low-rise alarm. Around 03:49 hours, Pumpers 18, 14, and Medic 18 arrived on scene. Pumper 18 officer gave a size-up of a single-story wood frame with heavy fire showing from Sides Bravo and Charlie. He reported that Pumper 18 would stretch an attack line and directed the second arriving pumper to establish a water supply. As Pumper 18 firefighter stretched the attack line to the front door, the crew of Medic 18 and four members of Quint 2 joined them. As Pumper 18 officer was conducting a 360 size-up, he viewed Side Delta then returned to his crew. Quint 2 firefighter along with a Medic 18 firefighter forced open the front door. Pumper 18 firefighter, Pumper 18 officer, and two Medic 18 firefighters made entry on the first floor. As the attack line entered the structure, Pumper 14 officer reported he had secured a second attack line at the garage with heavy fire showing. He extinguished heavy flames coming from the garage, significantly reducing fire conditions. Pumper 18 crew encountered heavy smoke conditions, no visibility, with no elevated heat. The crew of Quint 2 followed Pumper 18's crew and noticed flames coming through the floor. At 03:53 hours, the Shift Commander arrived on scene and assumed incident command (IC). Around the same time, there was a partial collapse of the living room floor. This caused Pumper 18 firefighter, Pumper 18 officer, and one Medic 18 firefighter to fall into the basement. Pumper 18 officer attempted to declare a Mayday. However, his message was unreadable. Medic 18 firefighter's radio was off. Once he turned the radio on, he declared a Mayday identifying himself. The IC acknowledged the Mayday and made a request to clear the airway. Dispatch announced a second alarm with Mayday. Medic 18 firefighter declared a second Mayday. Crews from Pumper 14, 11 (as the rapid intervention team (RIT)), Quint 2 and Truck 14 entered the basement to extinguish the fire and execute the rescue. Pumper 14 officer reported they located a downed firefighter and were working on extrication. At 04:01 hours, Medic 18 was removed from the basement. Pumper 14 firefighter returned from the hydrant, entered the front door, and fell into the collapsed hole. He declared a Mayday, reporting his location and available air supply. At 04:04 hours, the Safety Officer confirmed two firefighters were rescued from the structure. At 04:06 hours, Pumper 11 officer reported Pumper 14 firefighter was located and out of the structure. Pumper 18 firefighter, Pumper 18 officer, Medic 18 firefighter, and Pumper 14 firefighter were transported to the local hospital. At 04:08 hours, IC announced all personnel to evacuate the structure and ordered defensive operations. IC reported at 05:53 hours, the fire was out and no further units were needed. Contributing Factors: Scene size-up and risk assessment; Basement/below grade fire; Abandoned/derelict/vacant building; Benchmarking of critical information; Proficient use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) accessories; Mayday operations/firefighter survival; Personnel accountability system; Available personnel/adequate staffing. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Complete an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk/benefit analysis. 2) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for basement and below grade fires. 3) Develop and implement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)/Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) for operating at abandoned, derelict, and vacant building fires. 4) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 5) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are properly trained in the use of SCBA accessories, such as radio interface communication capabilities. 6) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are trained in Mayday operations and survival. 7) Use a personnel accountability system to identify the location and function of all operating personnel. 8) Ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents. AN - cdc:259053 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202601 KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Risk Assessment KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 7; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Risk assessment; Communications equipment; Self contained breathing apparatus; SCBA KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Risk Assessment KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2026-01, 2026 Apr; :1-28 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report F2026-01: Four Career Firefighters Injured from a Floor Collapse in an Abandoned Residential Structure Fire - Kansas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259053 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report F2025-12: 53-Year-Old Sergeant Dies from Cardiac Event While Asleep in Station During Duty Shift - Indiana

Eisenberg, Judith S. ;

Silliman, Matthew

2026/04/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

A 53-year-old male was hired by this FD in 1995 and at the time of this incident held the rank of SGT at this fire department (FD). On April 13, 2025, his unit responded to three medical calls-two were canceled en route, and the third at 1900 involved a chest pain patient who was assessed and transferred to an ALS unit for transport. The remainder ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2025-12: 53-Year-Old Sergeant Dies from Cardiac Event While Asleep in Station During Duty Shift - Indiana Personal Author(s) : Eisenberg, Judith S.;Silliman, Matthew; Published Date : 2026/04/01 Pages in Document : 23 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-12, 2026 Apr; :1-21 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202512
Eisenberg, J. S., & Silliman, M. (2026). Line of Duty Death Report F2025-12: 53-Year-Old Sergeant Dies from Cardiac Event While Asleep in Station During Duty Shift - Indiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202512

Eisenberg, Judith S. and Matthew Silliman. Line of Duty Death Report F2025-12: 53-Year-Old Sergeant Dies from Cardiac Event While Asleep in Station During Duty Shift - Indiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202512.

Eisenberg, Judith S., and Matthew Silliman Line of Duty Death Report F2025-12: 53-Year-Old Sergeant Dies from Cardiac Event While Asleep in Station During Duty Shift - Indiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202512.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Eisenberg, Judith S. AU - Silliman, Matthew AB - A 53-year-old male was hired by this FD in 1995 and at the time of this incident held the rank of SGT at this fire department (FD). On April 13, 2025, his unit responded to three medical calls-two were canceled en route, and the third at 1900 involved a chest pain patient who was assessed and transferred to an ALS unit for transport. The remainder of the shift was uneventful, and he went to bed around 2200 hours. On April 14 at 0730, he was found deceased in his quarters after missing the 0700 shift change. Resuscitation was not initiated due to clear signs of rigor. An autopsy found the cause of death was a blood clot in one of the arteries of the heart with diffuse narrowing of the heart arteries due to buildup of cholesterol plaques as a contributing factor. Notably, on March 19, 2025, the SGT had an echocardiogram (heart ultrasound) conducted by an external contractor sponsored jointly by the FD and IAFF union local to conduct whole body ultrasounds as voluntary screening examinations. The echocardiogram showed a new finding of aortic valve dysfunction, a condition that can affect blood flow from the heart. The contractor advised him to follow-up with his cardiologist. He was seen by his cardiologist on April 11, 2025, where he reported new shortness of breath and exercise intolerance. The cardiologist's notes cite the reason for his visit were new symptoms and the abnormal echocardiogram. The date of onset of these new symptoms was not noted but his physical exam at that visit was normal. The cardiologist arranged for additional testing on April 25, 2025, to better assess his new aortic valve dysfunction. The SGT had also been diagnosed with a seizure disorder in January 2023 but had been cleared by his neurologist to work as a firefighter. Key Recommendations - NIOSH offers the following recommendations to reduce the risk of heart attacks and sudden cardiac arrest among firefighters at this and other fire departments across the country. Many of our recommendations cite relevant National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards which are periodically updated. Please note that it is our practice to cite the version of each standard in effect at the time of the fatality. Key Recommendation #1: Consider implementing return-to-work policies consistent with NFPA recommendations [2025 NFPA]. Key Recommendation #2: Consider placing information regarding components of required annual medical examinations as per NFPA 1582/1580 recommendations and the contact information for their occupational health provider in a location where this information is easily accessible to all members. Key Recommendation #3: Encourage members to promptly report new or changing medical conditions to the department as they occur so they can be evaluated by a physician aware of NFPA guidelines to ensure their safety and that of their coworkers. AN - cdc:259133 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202512 KW - Myocardial Infarction KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Cardiovascular System KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 5; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Medical fitness evaluation; Cardiovascular disease; Return to work; Heart attacks; Cardiac arrest KW - Cardiovascular System KW - Firefighters KW - Myocardial Infarction KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-12, 2026 Apr; :1-21 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2025-12: 53-Year-Old Sergeant Dies from Cardiac Event While Asleep in Station During Duty Shift - Indiana UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/259133 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia

Ringer, Stephen J. ;

Attwood, Wesley R.

2026/03/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On September 8, 2025, a master firefighter died after becoming disoriented while trying to evacuate a warehouse at a commercial structure fire. At 13:32 hours, the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) transmitted an alarm assignment for a business fire. Engines 13 and 25, Quints 17 and 24, Trucks 16 and 25, Battalions 3 and 4, Heavy Rescue (HR) 24, ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia Personal Author(s) : Ringer, Stephen J.;Attwood, Wesley R.; Published Date : 2026/03/01 Pages in Document : 39 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-09, 2026 Mar; :1-36 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509 Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Ringer, S. J., & Attwood, W. R. (2026). Line of Duty Death Report F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509

Ringer, Stephen J. and Wesley R. Attwood. "Line of Duty Death Report F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2026). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509.

Ringer, Stephen J., and Wesley R. Attwood "Line of Duty Death Report F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Ringer, Stephen J. AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AB - On September 8, 2025, a master firefighter died after becoming disoriented while trying to evacuate a warehouse at a commercial structure fire. At 13:32 hours, the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) transmitted an alarm assignment for a business fire. Engines 13 and 25, Quints 17 and 24, Trucks 16 and 25, Battalions 3 and 4, Heavy Rescue (HR) 24, Advanced Rescue 26, and Car 7 were dispatched. At 13:34 hours, Engine 14, Squad 14, and Squad 24 requested to be added. At 13:37 hours, Engine 14 arrived on scene, gave a size-up of a one-story commercial structure with heavy smoke coming from the roofline, and assumed command. Engine 14 radioed that they did not see a hydrant in the area and requested the first arriving truck to open the garage doors on Side Alpha. He provided an update at 13:39 hours that he was unable to complete a 360 size-up but that the incident building was a large metal commercial structure with garage doors on Sides Alpha and Delta. He stated that his crew would make entry and be in offensive mode. Engine 14 officer and tailboard entered the structure with a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch hoseline. They observed clear conditions with smoke at the ceiling. As the crew began to encounter film studio props, Engine 14 officer announced that the structure was a haunted house and that it was "cut up inside." HR 24 and Quint 24 arrived on scene. HR 24 officer announced that he would assume command and conduct a 360 size-up. He requested that Quint 24 perform a primary search and that the HR 24 tailboards work on the garage doors. Quint 24 entered the structure and began a primary search off the hoseline. At 13:43 hours, HR 24 assigned Quint 17 to assist with the garage doors on Side Delta. Battalion 4 arrived on scene, assumed command, and assigned HR 24 officer as safety officer. At 13:48 hours, Engine 14 driver radioed they could not open the hydrant in front of the warehouse but had one on the other side of the fence at the adjacent property. HR 24 officer radioed Battalion 4 that there was a lot of fire on the backside. He stated that he was unsure how far Engine 14 was in the structure but suggested they evacuate until a water supply was established. At 13:50 hours, Battalion 4 ordered all interior crews to evacuate the structure until a water supply was established. He announced that all operations would be defensive. At this time, conditions were hotter with near-zero visibility on the interior. Smoke became black with fire showing. On the interior, Quint 24 officer directed Engine 14 tailboard to spray up and cool the ceiling above them. As Engine 14 tailboard opened the nozzle, he faced Side Bravo and sprayed Quint 24 officer in the head. Quint 24 officer went to the floor and became disoriented. Not seeing him go to the floor due to zero visibility conditions, Engine 14 crew followed the hoseline back to Side Alpha, taking the nozzle with them. Quint 24 was left without a hoseline to follow to the exit as conditions deteriorated and heat increased. By this time, multiple garage doors were open, and a water supply established. At 13:52 hours, Engine 14 crew reached the man door on Side Alpha and began to exit the structure. Speaking to his tailboard and accidentally keying his microphone, Quint 24 officer radioed that he was "going to go ahead and call a Mayday." HR 24 officer, driver, tailboard 1, and tailboard 2 (deceased firefighter) entered the structure through the man door on the Side Alpha/Delta corner, split up, and began their search for Quint 24. Around 13:54 hours, HR 24 officer reported that he had two members of Quint 24 and they were on their way out. Hearing that Quint 24 was out, HR 24 tailboard 2 said to tailboard 1 that "the fire is burning above us, and we have to get out." Tailboard 1 handed him the search line bag as he followed the line back to the exit. Both firefighters could hear the metal roof popping and conditions were very hot. They became separated as they proceeded to Side Alpha. At 13:59 hours, HR 24 tailboard 2 called a Mayday stating he was trying to make his way out. HR 24 officer and Truck 16 officer entered the structure. At 14:10 hours, HR 24 officer radioed to Car 7 that they found tailboard 2 and were coming out. He was located about 20 feet into the structure. At 14:13 hours, Car 7 announced that HR 24 tailboard 2 was out of the structure. Crews began treating him for cardiac arrest. He was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Contributing Factors: Strategy and tactics at high-risk occupancy; Coordinated ventilation and fire control; Benchmarking of critical information; Mayday operations/firefighter survival; Available personnel; Task saturation; Psychological safety; Pre-incident planning; Fire inspection and identification of hazards; Change of occupancy; Structured communication protocols. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for high-risk occupancies such as warehouses. 2) Ensure that firefighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner. 3) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 4) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are trained in Mayday operations and survival. 5) Employ an on-deck crew in a forward staged position throughout the incident that can be assigned to developing needs. 6) Ensure incident command functions are expanded to prevent task saturation of the incident commander. 7) Develop and/or implement a professional development program that promotes psychological safety, with a focus on open safety communication during incidents as a key element for improving worker empowerment and decision making on the fireground. 8) Develop a pre-incident plan for high-risk occupancies such as warehouses. 9) Ensure appropriate staffing is available to enforce the applicable fire and life safety codes at high-risk occupancies. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: 1) Ensure that the delegated zoning or building code enforcement authorities coordinate efforts and share change of occupancy information with the fire department. 2) Consider requiring the use of fixed fire suppression systems, such as sprinklers, at high-risk commercial occupancies. Public Safety Answering Points (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should have: 1) Communication standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment that allow dispatchers to support fireground operations and the incident commander, including the ability to monitor and record all radio traffic during fireground operations. AN - cdc:258805 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509 J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Ventilation KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 4; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Fatalities; Accident analysis; Recommendations; Ventilation; Communications equipment; Smoke inhalation KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety KW - Ventilation PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-09, 2026 Mar; :1-36 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258805 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

2026/03/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On September 8, 2025, a master firefighter died after becoming disoriented while trying to evacuate a warehouse at a commercial structure fire. At 13:32 hours, the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) transmitted an alarm assignment for a business fire. Engines 13 and 25, Quints 17 and 24, Trucks 16 and 25, Battalions 3 and 4, Heavy Rescue (HR) 24, ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia Corporate Authors(s) : NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Published Date : 2026/03/01 Pages in Document : 20 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-09, 2026 Mar; :1-20 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509RS Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (2026). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509RS

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. "Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2026). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509RS.

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program "Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509RS.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study A2 - NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program AB - On September 8, 2025, a master firefighter died after becoming disoriented while trying to evacuate a warehouse at a commercial structure fire. At 13:32 hours, the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) transmitted an alarm assignment for a business fire. Engines 13 and 25, Quints 17 and 24, Trucks 16 and 25, Battalions 3 and 4, Heavy Rescue (HR) 24, Advanced Rescue 26, and Car 7 were dispatched. At 13:34 hours, Engine 14, Squad 14, and Squad 24 requested to be added. At 13:37 hours, Engine 14 arrived on scene, gave a size-up of a one-story commercial structure with heavy smoke coming from the roofline, and assumed command. Engine 14 radioed that they did not see a hydrant in the area and requested the first arriving truck to open the garage doors on Side Alpha. He provided an update at 13:39 hours that he was unable to complete a 360 size-up but that the incident building was a large metal commercial structure with garage doors on Sides Alpha and Delta. He stated that his crew would make entry and be in offensive mode. Engine 14 officer and tailboard entered the structure with a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch hoseline. They observed clear conditions with smoke at the ceiling. As the crew began to encounter film studio props, Engine 14 officer announced that the structure was a haunted house and that it was "cut up inside." HR 24 and Quint 24 arrived on scene. HR 24 officer announced that he would assume command and conduct a 360 size-up. He requested that Quint 24 perform a primary search and that the HR 24 tailboards work on the garage doors. Quint 24 entered the structure and began a primary search off the hoseline. At 13:43 hours, HR 24 assigned Quint 17 to assist with the garage doors on Side Delta. Battalion 4 arrived on scene, assumed command, and assigned HR 24 officer as safety officer. At 13:48 hours, Engine 14 driver radioed they could not open the hydrant in front of the warehouse but had one on the other side of the fence at the adjacent property. HR 24 officer radioed Battalion 4 that there was a lot of fire on the backside. He stated that he was unsure how far Engine 14 was in the structure but suggested they evacuate until a water supply was established. At 13:50 hours, Battalion 4 ordered all interior crews to evacuate the structure until a water supply was established. He announced that all operations would be defensive. At this time, conditions were hotter with near-zero visibility on the interior. Smoke became black with fire showing. On the interior, Quint 24 officer directed Engine 14 tailboard to spray up and cool the ceiling above them. As Engine 14 tailboard opened the nozzle, he faced Side Bravo and sprayed Quint 24 officer in the head. Quint 24 officer went to the floor and became disoriented. Not seeing him go to the floor due to zero visibility conditions, Engine 14 crew followed the hoseline back to Side Alpha, taking the nozzle with them. Quint 24 was left without a hoseline to follow to the exit as conditions deteriorated and heat increased. By this time, multiple garage doors were open, and a water supply established. At 13:52 hours, Engine 14 crew reached the man door on Side Alpha and began to exit the structure. Speaking to his tailboard and accidentally keying his microphone, Quint 24 officer radioed that he was "going to go ahead and call a Mayday." HR 24 officer, driver, tailboard 1, and tailboard 2 (deceased firefighter) entered the structure through the man door on the Side Alpha/Delta corner, split up, and began their search for Quint 24. Around 13:54 hours, HR 24 officer reported that he had two members of Quint 24 and they were on their way out. Hearing that Quint 24 was out, HR 24 tailboard 2 said to tailboard 1 that "the fire is burning above us, and we have to get out." Tailboard 1 handed him the search line bag as he followed the line back to the exit. Both firefighters could hear the metal roof popping and conditions were very hot. They became separated as they proceeded to Side Alpha. At 13:59 hours, HR 24 tailboard 2 called a Mayday stating he was trying to make his way out. HR 24 officer and Truck 16 officer entered the structure. At 14:10 hours, HR 24 officer radioed to Car 7 that they found tailboard 2 and were coming out. He was located about 20 feet into the structure. At 14:13 hours, Car 7 announced that HR 24 tailboard 2 was out of the structure. Crews began treating him for cardiac arrest. He was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Contributing Factors: Strategy and tactics at high-risk occupancy; Coordinated ventilation and fire control; Benchmarking of critical information; Mayday operations/firefighter survival; Available personnel; Task saturation; Psychological safety; Pre-incident planning; Fire inspection and identification of hazards; Change of occupancy; Structured communication protocols. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for high-risk occupancies such as warehouses. 2) Ensure that firefighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner. 3) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 4) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are trained in Mayday operations and survival. 5) Employ an on-deck crew in a forward staged position throughout the incident that can be assigned to developing needs. 6) Ensure incident command functions are expanded to prevent task saturation of the incident commander. 7) Develop and/or implement a professional development program that promotes psychological safety, with a focus on open safety communication during incidents as a key element for improving worker empowerment and decision making on the fireground. 8) Develop a pre-incident plan for high-risk occupancies such as warehouses. 9) Ensure appropriate staffing is available to enforce the applicable fire and life safety codes at high-risk occupancies. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: 1) Ensure that the delegated zoning or building code enforcement authorities coordinate efforts and share change of occupancy information with the fire department. 2) Consider requiring the use of fixed fire suppression systems, such as sprinklers, at high-risk commercial occupancies. Public Safety Answering Points (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should have: 1) Communication standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment that allow dispatchers to support fireground operations and the incident commander, including the ability to monitor and record all radio traffic during fireground operations. AN - cdc:258806 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509RS J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Ventilation KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 4; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Fatalities; Accident analysis; Recommendations; Ventilation; Communications equipment; Smoke inhalation KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety KW - Ventilation PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-09, 2026 Mar; :1-20 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258806 ER -
Serious Injury Report F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas

Ringer, Stephen J. ;

Madrzykowski, Daniel

2026/03/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On January 7, 2025, a senior captain and two firefighters were injured while performing a primary search in a garden apartment building. At 05:28 hours, the office of emergency communications (OEC) received the first call reporting an apartment fire and subsequently dispatched the first alarm assignment. District Chief 46 (DC46) arrived on scene wi ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas Personal Author(s) : Ringer, Stephen J.;Madrzykowski, Daniel;Stull, Jeffrey O.;Seaton, Jeffrey; Published Date : 2026/03/01 Pages in Document : 44 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-01, 2026 Mar; :1-41 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501 Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Ringer, S. J., Madrzykowski, D., Stull, J. O., & Seaton, J. (2026). Serious Injury Report F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501

Ringer, Stephen J., Daniel Madrzykowski, Jeffrey O. Stull, and Jeffrey Seaton. "Serious Injury Report F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2026). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501.

Ringer, Stephen J., et al. "Serious Injury Report F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Ringer, Stephen J. AU - Madrzykowski, Daniel AU - Stull, Jeffrey O. AU - Seaton, Jeffrey AB - On January 7, 2025, a senior captain and two firefighters were injured while performing a primary search in a garden apartment building. At 05:28 hours, the office of emergency communications (OEC) received the first call reporting an apartment fire and subsequently dispatched the first alarm assignment. District Chief 46 (DC46) arrived on scene with smoke showing in the courtyard. DC46 pulled past Side Alpha to view Side Charlie where fire had self-ventilated through a window. DC46 positioned across the street from the apartment complex facing the courtyard of the building and provided a size up of "District 46 on scene, fire showing on a two-story apartment, establishing command." DC46 updated Engine 35 (E35) that the fire appeared to be on the first floor past the courtyard (see Photo 1). E35 stretched a crosslay and an apartment lay preconnect from the rear of the engine. With the hoseline stretched to the front door of the apartment, E35A called E35D to charge the line repeatedly. Getting no response, E35A headed toward the engine and became involved in a physical altercation with a civilian. This prevented E35A from following Ladder 46's (L46) crew with a hoseline as they made entry into the apartment to conduct a primary search. The altercation between the civilian and E35 continued and subsequently distracted many of the personnel on scene. The door and living room window to the apartment were open with fire venting out when L46 made entry. Fire conditions progressed rapidly while L46's crew was inside conducting the primary search. During the civilian altercation with E35, flames filled the doorway and the door closed to the unit. DC46 requested a status update from E35 asking if there was water on the fire at 05:37 hours. E35A said they had water on the fire and were making entry. Less than a minute later E35A requested a medic unit to the front door. Immediately following that request was a Mayday call from L46B using the emergency activation button on the remote speaker mic. At the same time, firefighters from E35 attempted to force the door open and remove the L46 crew. L46A and L46C were removed rapidly once the door was broken down and removed. L46B self-extricated through the Side Alpha door about one minute after the other members of L46. At 05:41 hours, DC46 began conducting personnel accountability reports (PARs) for operating crews to account for all firefighters and requested a second alarm. Roughly a minute later, the L46 crew showed all in alert on the electronic accountability system. DC46 requested confirmation that all personnel were out of the structure. DC26 arrived on scene at 05:43 hours and assigned Side Alpha as their area of responsibility. Crews began re-entering the structure and extinguished the fire. At 05:44 hours, OEC updated command that 10 minutes had passed. At 05:55 hours, DC46 declared the incident under control. At 06:02 hours, DC46 updated OEC that three injured firefighters were transported from the scene. Contributing Factors: Fire behavior, dynamics, and tactics; Department culture and risk management; Impact of the personal protective equipment (PPE) on perception and recognition of environmental changes; Delayed water application and responder scene safety; Communication of conditions; Delayed fire department notification. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure firefighters employ tactics aligned with fire conditions when making entry to reduce thermal exposure to PPE. 2) Ensure personnel identify isolation opportunities from changing fire conditions. 3) Ensure all personnel are trained on the "GRAB LIVES" fireground survival techniques. 4) Develop a department culture that balances the life safety mission with proactive risk management. 5) Ensure that firefighters understand the capabilities and limitations of selected PPE for the applicable hazards and tactical operations. 6) Coordinate response procedures with local law enforcement to protect firefighters and prevent interference when working at emergency scenes. 7) Ensure incident commanders (ICs) immediately establish divisions/groups with a supervisor to communicate conditions, actions, or needs. 8) Ensure firefighters protect radios and cables by wearing radio straps under their turnout coat. 9) Educate the community to enhance individual knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors to help reduce risks, injuries, and fires within the community. AN - cdc:258667 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501 J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Personal Protective Equipment KW - Occupational Health KW - Risk Management KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Risk management; Personal protective equipment; PPE KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Personal Protective Equipment KW - Risk Management KW - Safety PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-01, 2026 Mar; :1-41 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258667 ER -
Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

2026/03/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On January 7, 2025, a senior captain and two firefighters were injured while performing a primary search in a garden apartment building. At 05:28 hours, the office of emergency communications (OEC) received the first call reporting an apartment fire and subsequently dispatched the first alarm assignment. District Chief 46 (DC46) arrived on scene wi ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas Corporate Authors(s) : NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Published Date : 2026/03/01 Pages in Document : 14 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-01, 2026 Mar; :1-14 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501RS Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (2026). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501RS

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. "Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2026). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501RS.

NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program "Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501RS.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Presentation A2 - NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program AB - On January 7, 2025, a senior captain and two firefighters were injured while performing a primary search in a garden apartment building. At 05:28 hours, the office of emergency communications (OEC) received the first call reporting an apartment fire and subsequently dispatched the first alarm assignment. District Chief 46 (DC46) arrived on scene with smoke showing in the courtyard. DC46 pulled past Side Alpha to view Side Charlie where fire had self-ventilated through a window. DC46 positioned across the street from the apartment complex facing the courtyard of the building and provided a size up of "District 46 on scene, fire showing on a two-story apartment, establishing command." DC46 updated Engine 35 (E35) that the fire appeared to be on the first floor past the courtyard (see Photo 1). E35 stretched a crosslay and an apartment lay preconnect from the rear of the engine. With the hoseline stretched to the front door of the apartment, E35A called E35D to charge the line repeatedly. Getting no response, E35A headed toward the engine and became involved in a physical altercation with a civilian. This prevented E35A from following Ladder 46's (L46) crew with a hoseline as they made entry into the apartment to conduct a primary search. The altercation between the civilian and E35 continued and subsequently distracted many of the personnel on scene. The door and living room window to the apartment were open with fire venting out when L46 made entry. Fire conditions progressed rapidly while L46's crew was inside conducting the primary search. During the civilian altercation with E35, flames filled the doorway and the door closed to the unit. DC46 requested a status update from E35 asking if there was water on the fire at 05:37 hours. E35A said they had water on the fire and were making entry. Less than a minute later E35A requested a medic unit to the front door. Immediately following that request was a Mayday call from L46B using the emergency activation button on the remote speaker mic. At the same time, firefighters from E35 attempted to force the door open and remove the L46 crew. L46A and L46C were removed rapidly once the door was broken down and removed. L46B self-extricated through the Side Alpha door about one minute after the other members of L46. At 05:41 hours, DC46 began conducting personnel accountability reports (PARs) for operating crews to account for all firefighters and requested a second alarm. Roughly a minute later, the L46 crew showed all in alert on the electronic accountability system. DC46 requested confirmation that all personnel were out of the structure. DC26 arrived on scene at 05:43 hours and assigned Side Alpha as their area of responsibility. Crews began re-entering the structure and extinguished the fire. At 05:44 hours, OEC updated command that 10 minutes had passed. At 05:55 hours, DC46 declared the incident under control. At 06:02 hours, DC46 updated OEC that three injured firefighters were transported from the scene. Contributing Factors: Fire behavior, dynamics, and tactics; Department culture and risk management; Impact of the personal protective equipment (PPE) on perception and recognition of environmental changes; Delayed water application and responder scene safety; Communication of conditions; Delayed fire department notification. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure firefighters employ tactics aligned with fire conditions when making entry to reduce thermal exposure to PPE. 2) Ensure personnel identify isolation opportunities from changing fire conditions. 3) Ensure all personnel are trained on the "GRAB LIVES" fireground survival techniques. 4) Develop a department culture that balances the life safety mission with proactive risk management. 5) Ensure that firefighters understand the capabilities and limitations of selected PPE for the applicable hazards and tactical operations. 6) Coordinate response procedures with local law enforcement to protect firefighters and prevent interference when working at emergency scenes. 7) Ensure incident commanders (ICs) immediately establish divisions/groups with a supervisor to communicate conditions, actions, or needs. 8) Ensure firefighters protect radios and cables by wearing radio straps under their turnout coat. 9) Educate the community to enhance individual knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors to help reduce risks, injuries, and fires within the community. AN - cdc:258668 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202501RS J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Firefighters KW - Emergency Responders KW - Safety KW - Personal Protective Equipment KW - Occupational Health KW - Risk Management KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Risk management; Personal protective equipment; PPE KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Personal Protective Equipment KW - Risk Management KW - Safety PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-01, 2026 Mar; :1-14 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-01: Senior Captain and Two Firefighters of Ladder Company Burned During Primary Search in Garden Apartment Fire - Texas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258668 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report F2025-04: 46-Year-Old Lieutenant Collapses While Serving as Driver/Engineer at Residential Fire - Maryland

Barger, Alexandra ;

Wilkinson, Andrea F.

2026/03/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On October 19, 2024, a 46-year-old Lieutenant (L1) was hospitalized after experiencing a stroke. L1 used the fire department's (FD) shift substitution policy for time off work as he recovered, rather than taking medical leave. He would not report back to work at the fire station until January 8, 2025. On January 11, 2025, (L1's second shift back to ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2025-04: 46-Year-Old Lieutenant Collapses While Serving as Driver/Engineer at Residential Fire - Maryland Personal Author(s) : Barger, Alexandra;Wilkinson, Andrea F.;Judah, Lindsay; Published Date : 2026/03/01 Pages in Document : 23 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) Source : Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-04, 2026 Mar; :1-21 DOI : 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202504 Journal Title : National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Barger, A., Wilkinson, A. F., & Judah, L. (2026). Line of Duty Death Report F2025-04: 46-Year-Old Lieutenant Collapses While Serving as Driver/Engineer at Residential Fire - Maryland. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202504

Barger, Alexandra, Andrea F. Wilkinson, and Lindsay Judah. "Line of Duty Death Report F2025-04: 46-Year-Old Lieutenant Collapses While Serving as Driver/Engineer at Residential Fire - Maryland." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2026). https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202504.

Barger, Alexandra, et al. "Line of Duty Death Report F2025-04: 46-Year-Old Lieutenant Collapses While Serving as Driver/Engineer at Residential Fire - Maryland." National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. Stacks. https://doi.org/10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202504.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Field Study AU - Barger, Alexandra AU - Wilkinson, Andrea F. AU - Judah, Lindsay AB - On October 19, 2024, a 46-year-old Lieutenant (L1) was hospitalized after experiencing a stroke. L1 used the fire department's (FD) shift substitution policy for time off work as he recovered, rather than taking medical leave. He would not report back to work at the fire station until January 8, 2025. On January 11, 2025, (L1's second shift back to work since October), at 16:55, units were dispatched for a working structural fire of a single-family home. The responding FDs were working as part of an automatic aid agreement. At 1709, a firefighter (FF1) from Engine 3 (E3) witnessed L1 collapse after throwing a ladder and notified his Lieutenant (L2). At 1709, L2 sent a priority radio message to command stating they needed EMS side bravo. Battalion Chief 1 (BC1) acknowledged and stated he saw the member down. Due to the snowy and steep conditions of the scene, L2 and Master FF1 (MFF1) (FD1, E3) pulled the unresponsive and unconscious L1 closer to the street (approximately 20-30 yards from site of collapse) so that the paramedic stretcher could be used. At this point, care was transferred to the awaiting advanced life support (ALS) team who moved L1 onto the stretcher at 1711. The ALS team noted L1 to be unresponsive, not breathing (apneic), and without a pulse. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was initiated on the stretcher. Once connected to a monitor, L1 was observed to be in ventricular fibrillation. The patient was defibrillated with no conversion of ventricular fibrillation. Despite the medical interventions, L1 remained in ventricular fibrillation throughout the majority of transport time to the emergency department, with the exception of brief periods of pulseless electrical activity (PEA). Upon arrival at the hospital, hospital staff continued resuscitation efforts. Advanced life support efforts were continued for another 15 minutes after arrival, but L1 never regained a pulse and time of death was declared at 1801. Review of medical records shows that L1 had a history of surgically repaired coarctation of the aorta, a congenital heart condition. During his hospitalization for stroke, L1 was newly diagnosed with congestive heart failure. Heart failure can lead to an increased risk of sudden cardiac death, and in some cases requires restriction from certain work duties per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1582 occupational medical standards. This diagnosis was never reported to the department's physician, and since L1 used shift substitution rather than medical leave for his recovery, a return-to-work medical evaluation was never conducted. Though it is not possible to determine conclusively if this contributed to the fatality, the lack of a return-to-work medical evaluation by a provider with occupational health expertise was a missed opportunity for promotion of firefighter safety. Key Recommendations - NIOSH offers the following recommendations to reduce the risk of firefighter mortality at this and other fire departments across the country. Many of our recommendations cite relevant NFPA standards which are periodically updated. Please note that it is our practice to cite the version of each standard in effect at the time of the fatality. Key Recommendation #1: Ensure that a physician familiar with the essential tasks of firefighting as outlined by the NFPA and the physiologic requirements to complete them safely signs off on return-to-work physicals. Key Recommendation #2: Evaluate department shift substitution and medical leave policies to ensure they are being applied appropriately. Key Recommendation #3: Promote effective fireground communication with all mutual aid companies to ensure critical radio traffic is understood and relayed to on-scene personnel for incident stabilization and safety. Key Recommendation #4: Continuously evaluate staffing and deployment strategy to plan for effective emergency response. Key Recommendation #5: Work with automatic aid companies to establish a policy for clearing the fire scene following an incident of this nature. AN - cdc:258742 DO - 10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202504 J2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health KW - Fires KW - Cardiovascular Diseases KW - Emergency Responders KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Cardiovascular System KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 3; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Medical fitness evaluation; Cardiovascular disease; Return to work; Heart attacks; KW - Author Keywords: firefighter; stroke history; cardiovascular disease; congestive heart failure KW - Cardiovascular Diseases KW - Cardiovascular System KW - Emergency Responders KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T2 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health T2 - Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-04, 2026 Mar; :1-21 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2025-04: 46-Year-Old Lieutenant Collapses While Serving as Driver/Engineer at Residential Fire - Maryland UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258742 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York

Schaeffer, Tammy L. ;

Madrzykowski, Dan

2026/01/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On March 1, 2023, a career firefighter (E-2B) died during overpressure events in a three-story mixed-use structure after becoming trapped by debris. At 09:56, the public safety answering point telecommunicator (PSAP-T) transmitted a full alarm assignment for a building fire. PSAP-T advised that the caller reported seeing flames coming from the buil ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York Personal Author(s) : Schaeffer, Tammy L.;Madrzykowski, Dan;Stakes, Keith; Published Date : 2026/01/01 Pages in Document : 31 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257813
Schaeffer, T. L., Madrzykowski, D., & Stakes, K. (2026). Line of Duty Death Report F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257813

Schaeffer, Tammy L., Dan Madrzykowski, and Keith Stakes. Line of Duty Death Report F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257813.

Schaeffer, Tammy L., et al. Line of Duty Death Report F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257813.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Schaeffer, Tammy L. AU - Madrzykowski, Dan AU - Stakes, Keith AB - On March 1, 2023, a career firefighter (E-2B) died during overpressure events in a three-story mixed-use structure after becoming trapped by debris. At 09:56, the public safety answering point telecommunicator (PSAP-T) transmitted a full alarm assignment for a building fire. PSAP-T advised that the caller reported seeing flames coming from the building while working on masonry on the outside of the building. At 09:58 Engine 2 (E-2) and Ladder 2 (L-2), not on the original dispatch, arrived on scene after clearing another call nearby. E-2 pulled beyond the dispatched address after observing a civilian waving to them from a parking lot which contained a one-story building. L-2 was positioned behind E-2. The civilian was the reporting person. E-2 notified PSAP-T that there was nothing showing. A battalion chief (B-43) arrived on scene at 09:59 and reported a one-story ordinary construction building and then paused. The reporting person directed them to the fire building as battalion chief B-56 (IC) arrived on scene at 10:00, took command, and notified PSAP-T with a confirmed address. The IC described heavy smoke on the first floor of a three-story fire resistive construction building. The IC requested a second alarm, with staging south of the fire building, and police for traffic control. E-2 and L-2 self-deployed a 1¾-inch hoseline to Side Alpha and began to breach multiple doors to make entry. The IC was not notified of these actions. IC requested Rescue 1 (R-1) to 'recon' to see how far back the building went and if entry from Side Charlie was needed. R-1 acknowledged this request and reported that they were currently making entry on Side A. Feeling intense heat and rapidly changing conditions, the interior crews decided to evacuate the building just as the IC ordered an evacuation. As crews were exiting, fire conditions again rapidly changed, resulting in an overpressure event (OPE) that separated E-2 officer and E-2B. During this same time, IC reported to PSAP-T that the fire became heavy with turbulent smoke and was extending. IC notified PSAP-T that they were going to pull everyone out and go with defensive operations. PSAPT initiated evacuation tones and called for evacuation by radio. The OPE occurred while IC was ordering defensive operations for Side Alpha and Side C. IC notified PSAP-T of a "possible backdraft" and that there was heavy fire on all three floors. PSAP-T notified IC of mayday calls from E-2B, and then PSAP-T attempted to obtain a location from E-2B. IC attempted to obtain an accountability report from E-2 crew and coordinated for an additional Ladder to Side C. E-2 officer confirmed E-2B as missing. At this same time, R-1 attempted to make reentry for rescue, although this was not coordinated with IC. IC observed R-1 making entry and ordered B-43 to stop R-1 from entry because they did not have a handline. IC put B-43 in charge of the mayday. B-43, R-1 and firefighter assist and search team (FAST) coordinated rescue operations. R-1 made entry due to being familiar with E-2B's location. FAST remained outside for R-1. At this time, E-2B's personal alert safety system (PASS) device was heard by R-1and E-2B was located. E-2B was entangled in clothing racks and other contents. While R-1 attempted to extricate E-2B from the racks and debris another OPE occurred which forced R-1 to evacuate and abandon the rescue. Between 10:21 and 13:40 defensive operations continued. At 13:41 hours, recovery personnel made entry and recovery was completed at 13:44. E-2B was transported to a local hospital and pronounced deceased. Contributing Factors: Scene size-up and risk assessment; Fire behavior/dynamics and tactics; Professional development/fireground operations procedures; Communicating critical incident benchmarks; Mayday management; Incident management; Building condition and renovations. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis before committing firefighters to interior operations. 2) Train personnel on modern fire dynamics, including air flow path management, and develop fireground strategies based on a thorough risk/benefit analysis that accounts for building types, their characteristics, associated risks, and available on-scene resources. 3) Ensure fireground operations and safety procedures are developed, trained on, and followed by fire officers and firefighters. 4) Ensure critical incident benchmarks are communicated to the IC through the chain of command throughout the incident. 5) Ensure that fire officers and dispatchers are trained in managing a Mayday. 6) Ensure that the Incident Command System (ICS) is compliant with national incident management system (NIMS), fire department members and dispatchers are trained and can demonstrate ICS proficiency, and that the incident command group is properly resourced to address multiple duties. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Ensure the applicable fire and life safety codes are enforced for commercial occupancies and relevant information is shared with and made available to the fire department. AN - cdc:257813 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 2; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Fire safety; Training; Risk assessment KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257813 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2026/01/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On March 1, 2023, a career firefighter (E-2B) died during overpressure events in a three-story mixed-use structure after becoming trapped by debris. At 09:56, the public safety answering point telecommunicator (PSAP-T) transmitted a full alarm assignment for a building fire. PSAP-T advised that the caller reported seeing flames coming from the buil ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2026/01/01 Pages in Document : 16 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257814
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2026). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257814

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257814.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257814.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On March 1, 2023, a career firefighter (E-2B) died during overpressure events in a three-story mixed-use structure after becoming trapped by debris. At 09:56, the public safety answering point telecommunicator (PSAP-T) transmitted a full alarm assignment for a building fire. PSAP-T advised that the caller reported seeing flames coming from the building while working on masonry on the outside of the building. At 09:58 Engine 2 (E-2) and Ladder 2 (L-2), not on the original dispatch, arrived on scene after clearing another call nearby. E-2 pulled beyond the dispatched address after observing a civilian waving to them from a parking lot which contained a one-story building. L-2 was positioned behind E-2. The civilian was the reporting person. E-2 notified PSAP-T that there was nothing showing. A battalion chief (B-43) arrived on scene at 09:59 and reported a one-story ordinary construction building and then paused. The reporting person directed them to the fire building as battalion chief B-56 (IC) arrived on scene at 10:00, took command, and notified PSAP-T with a confirmed address. The IC described heavy smoke on the first floor of a three-story fire resistive construction building. The IC requested a second alarm, with staging south of the fire building, and police for traffic control. E-2 and L-2 self-deployed a 1¾-inch hoseline to Side Alpha and began to breach multiple doors to make entry. The IC was not notified of these actions. IC requested Rescue 1 (R-1) to 'recon' to see how far back the building went and if entry from Side Charlie was needed. R-1 acknowledged this request and reported that they were currently making entry on Side A. Feeling intense heat and rapidly changing conditions, the interior crews decided to evacuate the building just as the IC ordered an evacuation. As crews were exiting, fire conditions again rapidly changed, resulting in an overpressure event (OPE) that separated E-2 officer and E-2B. During this same time, IC reported to PSAP-T that the fire became heavy with turbulent smoke and was extending. IC notified PSAP-T that they were going to pull everyone out and go with defensive operations. PSAPT initiated evacuation tones and called for evacuation by radio. The OPE occurred while IC was ordering defensive operations for Side Alpha and Side C. IC notified PSAP-T of a "possible backdraft" and that there was heavy fire on all three floors. PSAP-T notified IC of mayday calls from E-2B, and then PSAP-T attempted to obtain a location from E-2B. IC attempted to obtain an accountability report from E-2 crew and coordinated for an additional Ladder to Side C. E-2 officer confirmed E-2B as missing. At this same time, R-1 attempted to make reentry for rescue, although this was not coordinated with IC. IC observed R-1 making entry and ordered B-43 to stop R-1 from entry because they did not have a handline. IC put B-43 in charge of the mayday. B-43, R-1 and firefighter assist and search team (FAST) coordinated rescue operations. R-1 made entry due to being familiar with E-2B's location. FAST remained outside for R-1. At this time, E-2B's personal alert safety system (PASS) device was heard by R-1and E-2B was located. E-2B was entangled in clothing racks and other contents. While R-1 attempted to extricate E-2B from the racks and debris another OPE occurred which forced R-1 to evacuate and abandon the rescue. Between 10:21 and 13:40 defensive operations continued. At 13:41 hours, recovery personnel made entry and recovery was completed at 13:44. E-2B was transported to a local hospital and pronounced deceased. Contributing Factors: Scene size-up and risk assessment; Fire behavior/dynamics and tactics; Professional development/fireground operations procedures; Communicating critical incident benchmarks; Mayday management; Incident management; Building condition and renovations. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis before committing firefighters to interior operations. 2) Train personnel on modern fire dynamics, including air flow path management, and develop fireground strategies based on a thorough risk/benefit analysis that accounts for building types, their characteristics, associated risks, and available on-scene resources. 3) Ensure fireground operations and safety procedures are developed, trained on, and followed by fire officers and firefighters. 4) Ensure critical incident benchmarks are communicated to the IC through the chain of command throughout the incident. 5) Ensure that fire officers and dispatchers are trained in managing a Mayday. 6) Ensure that the Incident Command System (ICS) is compliant with national incident management system (NIMS), fire department members and dispatchers are trained and can demonstrate ICS proficiency, and that the incident command group is properly resourced to address multiple duties. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: Ensure the applicable fire and life safety codes are enforced for commercial occupancies and relevant information is shared with and made available to the fire department. AN - cdc:257814 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 2; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Fire safety; Training; Risk assessment KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2023-03: Career Firefighter Dies While Trapped During Overpressure Events in a Mixed-Use Structure - New York UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257814 ER -
Serious Injury Report F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas

Lago, Louis ;

Attwood, Wesley R.

2026/01/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On September 3, 2025, a career firefighter from Engine 11 was seriously injured and his officer received minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 10:51 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. At 10:53 hours, the PSAP dispatched Eng ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas Personal Author(s) : Lago, Louis;Attwood, Wesley R.; Published Date : 2026/01/01 Pages in Document : 15 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257817
Lago, L., & Attwood, W. R. (2026). Serious Injury Report F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257817

Lago, Louis and Wesley R. Attwood. Serious Injury Report F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257817.

Lago, Louis, and Wesley R. Attwood Serious Injury Report F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257817.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Lago, Louis AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AB - On September 3, 2025, a career firefighter from Engine 11 was seriously injured and his officer received minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 10:51 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. At 10:53 hours, the PSAP dispatched Engines 14, 11, 5, 1, Towers 1 and 2, and Battalion 1 and 2. Engine 3 and Truck 14 self-dispatched. At 10:56 hours, Engine 11 arrived on scene. Engine 11 officer gave a size-up of a one-story residence showing heavy fire. He reported that his crew would deploy a hoseline. At 10:57 hours, Engine 5, Battalion 2, and Engine 14 arrived on scene. Engine 11 firefighter deployed a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch pre-connect and began to extinguish fire under the carport by starting on the left side and moving right. Engine 11 officer directed him to the Side Alpha/Delta corner to extinguish a burning car under the carport. Engine 11 firefighter took one step under the carport at the corner and started extinguishing the wood support beam. Seconds later at 10:59 hours, the carport experienced a lean-to-style collapse with the roof remaining attached to the residence. This collapse trapped Engine 11 firefighter under the burning roof. Battalion 2 directed Engine 14 to send their crew to the scene immediately, then called a Mayday stating a firefighter was trapped under the partial collapse of the building on Side Alpha. He requested Truck 14 bring rescue tools and called for the PSAP to dispatch a second alarm. Engine 5 officer and firefighters from other units tried to extricate Engine 11 firefighter from the collapse. They used hand tools and manually lifted the roof enough to pull the firefighter out. At 11:01 hours, Engine 11 firefighter was extricated and put onto a stretcher for treatment and transport. He was airlifted to a medical facility for treatment. Engine 11 officer was also transported for smoke inhalation injuries. After the extrication, multiple hoselines and a defensive strategy were used to bring the fire under control at 11:54 hours. Contributing Factors: Structural collapse; Scene size-up and risk assessment; Incident command; Scene access. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure firefighters extinguish fires from a relative area of safety when performing exterior fire control as part of a transitional attack. 2) Educate fire officers and firefighters in building performance under fire conditions and the potential for structural collapse. 3) Complete an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis. 4) Train incident commanders how to spot and correct task saturation to quickly refocus emergency response operations. 5) Coordinate with law enforcement agencies to overcome challenges of scene access for responding fire apparatus. AN - cdc:257817 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Training; Risk assessment; Smoke inhalation; Safety education; Structural failure KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Occupational Health KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257817 ER -
Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2026/01/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On September 3, 2025, a career firefighter from Engine 11 was seriously injured and his officer received minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 10:51 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. At 10:53 hours, the PSAP dispatched Eng ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2026/01/01 Pages in Document : 11 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257818
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2026). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257818

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257818.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2026, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257818.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On September 3, 2025, a career firefighter from Engine 11 was seriously injured and his officer received minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 10:51 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. At 10:53 hours, the PSAP dispatched Engines 14, 11, 5, 1, Towers 1 and 2, and Battalion 1 and 2. Engine 3 and Truck 14 self-dispatched. At 10:56 hours, Engine 11 arrived on scene. Engine 11 officer gave a size-up of a one-story residence showing heavy fire. He reported that his crew would deploy a hoseline. At 10:57 hours, Engine 5, Battalion 2, and Engine 14 arrived on scene. Engine 11 firefighter deployed a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch pre-connect and began to extinguish fire under the carport by starting on the left side and moving right. Engine 11 officer directed him to the Side Alpha/Delta corner to extinguish a burning car under the carport. Engine 11 firefighter took one step under the carport at the corner and started extinguishing the wood support beam. Seconds later at 10:59 hours, the carport experienced a lean-to-style collapse with the roof remaining attached to the residence. This collapse trapped Engine 11 firefighter under the burning roof. Battalion 2 directed Engine 14 to send their crew to the scene immediately, then called a Mayday stating a firefighter was trapped under the partial collapse of the building on Side Alpha. He requested Truck 14 bring rescue tools and called for the PSAP to dispatch a second alarm. Engine 5 officer and firefighters from other units tried to extricate Engine 11 firefighter from the collapse. They used hand tools and manually lifted the roof enough to pull the firefighter out. At 11:01 hours, Engine 11 firefighter was extricated and put onto a stretcher for treatment and transport. He was airlifted to a medical facility for treatment. Engine 11 officer was also transported for smoke inhalation injuries. After the extrication, multiple hoselines and a defensive strategy were used to bring the fire under control at 11:54 hours. Contributing Factors: Structural collapse; Scene size-up and risk assessment; Incident command; Scene access. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure firefighters extinguish fires from a relative area of safety when performing exterior fire control as part of a transitional attack. 2) Educate fire officers and firefighters in building performance under fire conditions and the potential for structural collapse. 3) Complete an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis. 4) Train incident commanders how to spot and correct task saturation to quickly refocus emergency response operations. 5) Coordinate with law enforcement agencies to overcome challenges of scene access for responding fire apparatus. AN - cdc:257818 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Training; Risk assessment; Smoke inhalation; Safety education; Structural failure KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Occupational Health KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2026 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-10: Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire - Texas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257818 ER -
Serious Injury Report F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas

Lago, Louis ;

Attwood, Wesley R.

2025/12/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On August 30, 2025, two firefighters were seriously injured and seven sustained minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 21:10 hours, the city public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from an occupant reporting a fire in the master bedroom of a residential home. At 21:11 hours, the PSAP dispatched Tiller 11 ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas Personal Author(s) : Lago, Louis;Attwood, Wesley R.; Published Date : 2025/12/01 Pages in Document : 25 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257815
Lago, L., & Attwood, W. R. (2025). Serious Injury Report F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257815

Lago, Louis and Wesley R. Attwood. Serious Injury Report F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257815.

Lago, Louis, and Wesley R. Attwood Serious Injury Report F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257815.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Lago, Louis AU - Attwood, Wesley R. AB - On August 30, 2025, two firefighters were seriously injured and seven sustained minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 21:10 hours, the city public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from an occupant reporting a fire in the master bedroom of a residential home. At 21:11 hours, the PSAP dispatched Tiller 11, Medics 3 and 11, Trucks 3 and 5, Engine 7, and Battalion Chief 2 (BC2) for a residential structure fire. At 21:17 hours, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 arrived on scene. Tiller 11 gave a size-up of a two-story residence with heavy smoke coming from the front door on Side Alpha. Captain 11 reported he was unable to conduct a 360 size-up, there was a hydrant on Side Alpha, and his crew would conduct a fast attack with a pre-connect. Captain 11 assigned Medic 11 firefighters to conduct search operations as both crews entered the structure, proceeding to the second division. Truck 3 and Medic 3 arrived on scene. BC2 arrived on scene with his incident command technician (ICT) and assumed command as the incident commander (IC). Truck 3 deployed a secondary hoseline and entered the structure. Between 21:20 and 21:33 hours, all interior crews worked on the second division in zero visibility conditions but were unable to locate the fire. Exterior crews deployed hoselines on Side Delta after locating the fire on the first division at the Side Charlie/Delta corner. At 21:34 hours, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 firefighters on the second division became low on air and decided to exit. Captain 3 (Truck 3 officer) reported that his crew was still operating on the second division but they were headed to Side Charlie sector as flames were visible. Tiller 11 firefighter ran out of air, and Captain 3 called a Mayday. Captain 11 then ran out of air. Medic 5 entered the structure as the rapid intervention team (RIT) and located Tiller 11 firefighter. They began to extricate him and, with the assistance of Truck 5, cleared the structure at 21:49 hours - followed by the remaining interior crews. Tiller 11 firefighter and Captain 11 were transported to a local hospital for treatment of significant smoke inhalation. Seven additional firefighters were transported to the local hospital and evaluated for smoke inhalation, an overexertion injury, and extreme dehydration. Contributing Factors: Scene size-up and risk assessment; Supervision of interior operations; Fire behavior, dynamics, and tactics; Air management and firefighter survival; Clear communication of assignments; Communication of critical information; Resources for responding to Mayday; Staged and available emergency medical services (EMS); Psychological safety. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis before committing firefighters to interior operations. 2) Ensure ICs immediately establish divisions/groups with a supervisor to communicate conditions and provide accountability. 3) Ensure each apparatus has established riding assignments to designate a crew officer. 4) Train firefighters and fire officers to select interior fire attack strategies and tactics based on fire conditions present. 5) Ensure firefighters and fire officers are properly trained in and use principles of air management and survival procedures for out-of-air emergencies. 6) Train firefighters and fire officers to use Task-Location-Objective assignments for clear communication of expectations. 7) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 8) Ensure a rapid intervention team/crew is dedicated and in place during structural firefighting operations to immediately respond to a firefighter emergency. 9) Employ an on-deck crew in a forward staged position throughout the incident to be assigned to developing needs. 10) Ensure EMS with transport capability is on scene at any fire or special operation location to provide emergency medical care and transport. 11) Develop and implement a professional development program that promotes psychological safety, and effective safety communication during incidents as a key element for improving worker empowerment and decision making on the fireground. AN - cdc:257815 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Training; Risk assessment; Smoke inhalation; Communications equipment; Safety practices KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Occupational Health KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257815 ER -
Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2025/12/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On August 30, 2025, two firefighters were seriously injured and seven sustained minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 21:10 hours, the city public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from an occupant reporting a fire in the master bedroom of a residential home. At 21:11 hours, the PSAP dispatched Tiller 11 ...

Public Domain

Title : Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2025/12/01 Pages in Document : 11 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257816
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2025). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257816

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257816.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257816.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On August 30, 2025, two firefighters were seriously injured and seven sustained minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 21:10 hours, the city public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from an occupant reporting a fire in the master bedroom of a residential home. At 21:11 hours, the PSAP dispatched Tiller 11, Medics 3 and 11, Trucks 3 and 5, Engine 7, and Battalion Chief 2 (BC2) for a residential structure fire. At 21:17 hours, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 arrived on scene. Tiller 11 gave a size-up of a two-story residence with heavy smoke coming from the front door on Side Alpha. Captain 11 reported he was unable to conduct a 360 size-up, there was a hydrant on Side Alpha, and his crew would conduct a fast attack with a pre-connect. Captain 11 assigned Medic 11 firefighters to conduct search operations as both crews entered the structure, proceeding to the second division. Truck 3 and Medic 3 arrived on scene. BC2 arrived on scene with his incident command technician (ICT) and assumed command as the incident commander (IC). Truck 3 deployed a secondary hoseline and entered the structure. Between 21:20 and 21:33 hours, all interior crews worked on the second division in zero visibility conditions but were unable to locate the fire. Exterior crews deployed hoselines on Side Delta after locating the fire on the first division at the Side Charlie/Delta corner. At 21:34 hours, Tiller 11 and Medic 11 firefighters on the second division became low on air and decided to exit. Captain 3 (Truck 3 officer) reported that his crew was still operating on the second division but they were headed to Side Charlie sector as flames were visible. Tiller 11 firefighter ran out of air, and Captain 3 called a Mayday. Captain 11 then ran out of air. Medic 5 entered the structure as the rapid intervention team (RIT) and located Tiller 11 firefighter. They began to extricate him and, with the assistance of Truck 5, cleared the structure at 21:49 hours - followed by the remaining interior crews. Tiller 11 firefighter and Captain 11 were transported to a local hospital for treatment of significant smoke inhalation. Seven additional firefighters were transported to the local hospital and evaluated for smoke inhalation, an overexertion injury, and extreme dehydration. Contributing Factors: Scene size-up and risk assessment; Supervision of interior operations; Fire behavior, dynamics, and tactics; Air management and firefighter survival; Clear communication of assignments; Communication of critical information; Resources for responding to Mayday; Staged and available emergency medical services (EMS); Psychological safety. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving resource completes an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis before committing firefighters to interior operations. 2) Ensure ICs immediately establish divisions/groups with a supervisor to communicate conditions and provide accountability. 3) Ensure each apparatus has established riding assignments to designate a crew officer. 4) Train firefighters and fire officers to select interior fire attack strategies and tactics based on fire conditions present. 5) Ensure firefighters and fire officers are properly trained in and use principles of air management and survival procedures for out-of-air emergencies. 6) Train firefighters and fire officers to use Task-Location-Objective assignments for clear communication of expectations. 7) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 8) Ensure a rapid intervention team/crew is dedicated and in place during structural firefighting operations to immediately respond to a firefighter emergency. 9) Employ an on-deck crew in a forward staged position throughout the incident to be assigned to developing needs. 10) Ensure EMS with transport capability is on scene at any fire or special operation location to provide emergency medical care and transport. 11) Develop and implement a professional development program that promotes psychological safety, and effective safety communication during incidents as a key element for improving worker empowerment and decision making on the fireground. AN - cdc:257816 KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Fire safety; Training; Risk assessment; Smoke inhalation; Communications equipment; Safety practices KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Occupational Health KW - Occupational Injuries KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Serious Injury Report Report Slides F2025-08: Nine Career Firefighters Injured at Residential Structure Fire - Texas UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257816 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana

Lago, Louis

2025/09/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On July 15, 2025, a volunteer firefighter (Firefighter A) died, and another (Firefighter B) was injured during a single-vehicle crash while responding to a medical emergency. At approximately 03:35 hours, the parish public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a motorist stopped on the side of the highway reporting trouble breathin ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana Personal Author(s) : Lago, Louis Published Date : 2025/09/01 Pages in Document : 14 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257791
Lago, L. (2025). Line of Duty Death Report F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257791

Lago, Louis. Line of Duty Death Report F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257791.

Lago, Louis Line of Duty Death Report F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257791.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array AU - Lago, Louis AB - On July 15, 2025, a volunteer firefighter (Firefighter A) died, and another (Firefighter B) was injured during a single-vehicle crash while responding to a medical emergency. At approximately 03:35 hours, the parish public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a motorist stopped on the side of the highway reporting trouble breathing and chest pains. Fire District 4 was dispatched for advanced life support (ALS) response. Upon activation of the pager for the dispatch, Firefighters A and B - who were married - responded in their privately owned vehicle (POV) from their home with Firefighter A driving. Dense fog and darkness created low visibility, which was compounded by rural roadway conditions that included loose surface material and no painted lines or reflectors. After traveling 0.9 miles, they approached a 90-degree righthand curve in the roadway. Firefighter A realized they had entered the curve before slowing down. Firefighter A engaged the brakes and directed the POV straight to avoid a rollover. The POV left the roadway, hit two trees, and came to a rest 97 ft from the edge of the roadway. The POV sustained severe damage (see Photo 1). Firefighter A was partially ejected and located by Firefighter B. She called 911 to report the crash, pulled him to a flat surface, and began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Fire District 4 units arrived and provided medical treatment. With consultation from medical command at the local hospital, Firefighter A was pronounced deceased at the scene. Firefighter B was treated for minor injuries. Contributing Factors: Weather/roadway conditions with low visibility; Standard operating procedures (SOPs); Inattentive driving; Self-dispatch. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure that initial and annual emergency vehicle operations training emphasize adjusting driving for weather and roadway conditions present. 2) Enforce SOPs for driving and operating POVs that respond to an emergency. 3) Ensure all firefighters are trained in and recognize the ways that physiological and psychological factors affect driving when responding to an emergency. 4) Ensure all firefighters are trained on and aware of skill-based human performance mode errors. 5) Ensure emergency response protocols include content that explicitly prohibits firefighters and resources from self-dispatching to an emergency scene unless formally requested. AN - cdc:257791 KW - Motor Vehicles KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Motor vehicles; Drivers; Vehicle safety; Accident prevention KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Motor Vehicles KW - Mortality KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257791 ER -
Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.)

2025/09/01 | Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)

On July 15, 2025, a volunteer firefighter (Firefighter A) died, and another (Firefighter B) was injured during a single-vehicle crash while responding to a medical emergency. At approximately 03:35 hours, the parish public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a motorist stopped on the side of the highway reporting trouble breathin ...

Public Domain

Title : Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana Corporate Authors(s) : Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Published Date : 2025/09/01 Pages in Document : 8 pdf pages Series : Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) URL : https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257810
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) (2025). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257810

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.). Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257810.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2025, Stacks. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257810.
Export RIS Citation Information. TY - Array A2 - Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (U.S.) AB - On July 15, 2025, a volunteer firefighter (Firefighter A) died, and another (Firefighter B) was injured during a single-vehicle crash while responding to a medical emergency. At approximately 03:35 hours, the parish public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a motorist stopped on the side of the highway reporting trouble breathing and chest pains. Fire District 4 was dispatched for advanced life support (ALS) response. Upon activation of the pager for the dispatch, Firefighters A and B - who were married - responded in their privately owned vehicle (POV) from their home with Firefighter A driving. Dense fog and darkness created low visibility, which was compounded by rural roadway conditions that included loose surface material and no painted lines or reflectors. After traveling 0.9 miles, they approached a 90-degree righthand curve in the roadway. Firefighter A realized they had entered the curve before slowing down. Firefighter A engaged the brakes and directed the POV straight to avoid a rollover. The POV left the roadway, hit two trees, and came to a rest 97 ft from the edge of the roadway. The POV sustained severe damage (see Photo 1). Firefighter A was partially ejected and located by Firefighter B. She called 911 to report the crash, pulled him to a flat surface, and began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Fire District 4 units arrived and provided medical treatment. With consultation from medical command at the local hospital, Firefighter A was pronounced deceased at the scene. Firefighter B was treated for minor injuries. Contributing Factors: Weather/roadway conditions with low visibility; Standard operating procedures (SOPs); Inattentive driving; Self-dispatch. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure that initial and annual emergency vehicle operations training emphasize adjusting driving for weather and roadway conditions present. 2) Enforce SOPs for driving and operating POVs that respond to an emergency. 3) Ensure all firefighters are trained in and recognize the ways that physiological and psychological factors affect driving when responding to an emergency. 4) Ensure all firefighters are trained on and aware of skill-based human performance mode errors. 5) Ensure emergency response protocols include content that explicitly prohibits firefighters and resources from self-dispatching to an emergency scene unless formally requested. AN - cdc:257810 KW - Motor Vehicles KW - Fires KW - Firefighters KW - Safety KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Occupational Health KW - Mortality KW - Region 6; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Fatalities; Emergency responders; Recommendations; Accident analysis; Motor vehicles; Drivers; Vehicle safety; Accident prevention KW - Accidents, Occupational KW - Firefighters KW - Fires KW - Mortality KW - Motor Vehicles KW - Occupational Health KW - Safety LA - eng PB - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health PY - 2025 T3 - Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE) TI - Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-07: Volunteer Firefighter Dies and Second Injured in Privately Owned Vehicle Crash - Louisiana UR - https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/257810 ER -

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