Line of Duty Death Report Report Slides F2025-09: Career Firefighter Dies During Warehouse Fire at Unpermitted Film Studio - Georgia

Details

• Journal Article:
  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
• Corporate Authors:
  NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program
• Description:
  On September 8, 2025, a master firefighter died after becoming disoriented while trying to evacuate a warehouse at a commercial structure fire. At 13:32 hours, the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) transmitted an alarm assignment for a business fire. Engines 13 and 25, Quints 17 and 24, Trucks 16 and 25, Battalions 3 and 4, Heavy Rescue (HR) 24, Advanced Rescue 26, and Car 7 were dispatched. At 13:34 hours, Engine 14, Squad 14, and Squad 24 requested to be added. At 13:37 hours, Engine 14 arrived on scene, gave a size-up of a one-story commercial structure with heavy smoke coming from the roofline, and assumed command. Engine 14 radioed that they did not see a hydrant in the area and requested the first arriving truck to open the garage doors on Side Alpha. He provided an update at 13:39 hours that he was unable to complete a 360 size-up but that the incident building was a large metal commercial structure with garage doors on Sides Alpha and Delta. He stated that his crew would make entry and be in offensive mode. Engine 14 officer and tailboard entered the structure with a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch hoseline. They observed clear conditions with smoke at the ceiling. As the crew began to encounter film studio props, Engine 14 officer announced that the structure was a haunted house and that it was "cut up inside." HR 24 and Quint 24 arrived on scene. HR 24 officer announced that he would assume command and conduct a 360 size-up. He requested that Quint 24 perform a primary search and that the HR 24 tailboards work on the garage doors. Quint 24 entered the structure and began a primary search off the hoseline. At 13:43 hours, HR 24 assigned Quint 17 to assist with the garage doors on Side Delta. Battalion 4 arrived on scene, assumed command, and assigned HR 24 officer as safety officer. At 13:48 hours, Engine 14 driver radioed they could not open the hydrant in front of the warehouse but had one on the other side of the fence at the adjacent property. HR 24 officer radioed Battalion 4 that there was a lot of fire on the backside. He stated that he was unsure how far Engine 14 was in the structure but suggested they evacuate until a water supply was established. At 13:50 hours, Battalion 4 ordered all interior crews to evacuate the structure until a water supply was established. He announced that all operations would be defensive. At this time, conditions were hotter with near-zero visibility on the interior. Smoke became black with fire showing. On the interior, Quint 24 officer directed Engine 14 tailboard to spray up and cool the ceiling above them. As Engine 14 tailboard opened the nozzle, he faced Side Bravo and sprayed Quint 24 officer in the head. Quint 24 officer went to the floor and became disoriented. Not seeing him go to the floor due to zero visibility conditions, Engine 14 crew followed the hoseline back to Side Alpha, taking the nozzle with them. Quint 24 was left without a hoseline to follow to the exit as conditions deteriorated and heat increased. By this time, multiple garage doors were open, and a water supply established. At 13:52 hours, Engine 14 crew reached the man door on Side Alpha and began to exit the structure. Speaking to his tailboard and accidentally keying his microphone, Quint 24 officer radioed that he was "going to go ahead and call a Mayday." HR 24 officer, driver, tailboard 1, and tailboard 2 (deceased firefighter) entered the structure through the man door on the Side Alpha/Delta corner, split up, and began their search for Quint 24. Around 13:54 hours, HR 24 officer reported that he had two members of Quint 24 and they were on their way out. Hearing that Quint 24 was out, HR 24 tailboard 2 said to tailboard 1 that "the fire is burning above us, and we have to get out." Tailboard 1 handed him the search line bag as he followed the line back to the exit. Both firefighters could hear the metal roof popping and conditions were very hot. They became separated as they proceeded to Side Alpha. At 13:59 hours, HR 24 tailboard 2 called a Mayday stating he was trying to make his way out. HR 24 officer and Truck 16 officer entered the structure. At 14:10 hours, HR 24 officer radioed to Car 7 that they found tailboard 2 and were coming out. He was located about 20 feet into the structure. At 14:13 hours, Car 7 announced that HR 24 tailboard 2 was out of the structure. Crews began treating him for cardiac arrest. He was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Contributing Factors: Strategy and tactics at high-risk occupancy; Coordinated ventilation and fire control; Benchmarking of critical information; Mayday operations/firefighter survival; Available personnel; Task saturation; Psychological safety; Pre-incident planning; Fire inspection and identification of hazards; Change of occupancy; Structured communication protocols. Key Recommendations - Fire departments should: 1) Ensure the first arriving firefighters choose initial and ongoing operational strategies based on the tactical considerations for high-risk occupancies such as warehouses. 2) Ensure that firefighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner. 3) Educate personnel on use of radio communication processes for sharing critical information, such as conditions and actions. 4) Ensure all fire officers and firefighters are trained in Mayday operations and survival. 5) Employ an on-deck crew in a forward staged position throughout the incident that can be assigned to developing needs. 6) Ensure incident command functions are expanded to prevent task saturation of the incident commander. 7) Develop and/or implement a professional development program that promotes psychological safety, with a focus on open safety communication during incidents as a key element for improving worker empowerment and decision making on the fireground. 8) Develop a pre-incident plan for high-risk occupancies such as warehouses. 9) Ensure appropriate staffing is available to enforce the applicable fire and life safety codes at high-risk occupancies. Governing municipalities (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should: 1) Ensure that the delegated zoning or building code enforcement authorities coordinate efforts and share change of occupancy information with the fire department. 2) Consider requiring the use of fixed fire suppression systems, such as sprinklers, at high-risk commercial occupancies. Public Safety Answering Points (federal, state, regional/county, and local) should have: 1) Communication standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment that allow dispatchers to support fireground operations and the incident commander, including the ability to monitor and record all radio traffic during fireground operations.
• Subjects:
  Firefighters Occupational Health Safety Ventilation
• Keywords:
  Region 4; Fire fighters; Fire fighting; Emergency responders; Fatalities; Accident analysis; Recommendations; Ventilation; Communications equipment; Smoke inhalation
• FACE - Firefighter:
  Cause of Death Trauma (0004) ; Structure Fire (0011) ; Non-Residential (0013)
• Source:
  Morgantown, WV: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, FACE F2025-09, 2026 Mar; :1-20
• Series:
  Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Reports (FACE)
• Subseries:
  Firefighter Fatality Investigation
• DOI:
  10.26616/NIOSHFFFACEF202509RS
• Publisher:
  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
• Document Type:
  Text
• Genre:
  Field Study
• Place as Subject:
  Georgia ; West Virginia ; Atlanta Region [OSHA] ; Philadelphia Region [OSHA]
• CIO:
  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
• Division:
  DSR - Division of Safety Research
• Topic:
  Workplace Safety & Health
• Location:
  North America
• Pages in Document:
  20 pdf pages
• NIOSHTIC Number:
  nn:20071330
• Federal Fiscal Year:
  2026
• NORA Priority Area:
  Public Safety
• Peer Reviewed:
  False
• NAICS and SIC Codes:
  92 - Public Administration - (NAICS 2022)
• Start Date:
  20250908
• Collection(s):
  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
• Main Document Checksum:
  urn:sha-512:06da4ba817eb65e4bf2c195f932648b511f265380bfb021ae0b383483cee1bd7ad595e1a418821f9440143be280217720f33321c3b8f34fa5f4faf43dbc61c50
• Download URL:
  https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/258806/cdc_258806_DS1.pdf
• File Type:
  [PDF - 1.19 MB ]