Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.

Details

• Alternative Title:
  Emerg Infect Dis
• Personal Author:
  Meltzer, M. I. ; Damon, I. ; LeDuc, J. W. ; Millar, J. D.
• Description:
  We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.
• Subjects:
  • Research Article
  • Biological Warfare
  • Bioterrorism
  • Disease Outbreaks
  • Humans
  • Proportional Hazards Models
  • Quarantine
  • Sensitivity And Specificity
  • Smallpox
  • Smallpox Vaccine
  More +
• Source:
  Emerg Infect Dis. 7(6):959-969.
• Document Type:
  Journal Article
• Volume:
  7
• Issue:
  6
• Download URL:
  https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/3349/cdc_3349_DS1.pdf
• File Type:
  [PDF - 103.99 KB]
• Collection(s):
  Emerging Infectious Diseases
• Main Document Checksum:
  urn:sha-512:d106139747da8fb0105a0a301570b876a2153380b2a0b7a02f02b385a03584d8c422f011d38a123cb84d08b14c0956e333f1de4c54a2ab7c958e89ed6eaa6de2