CDC STACKS serves as an archival repository of CDC-published products including scientific findings, journal articles, guidelines, recommendations, or other public health information authored or co-authored by CDC or funded partners.
As a repository, CDC STACKS retains documents in their original published format to ensure public access to scientific information.
i
Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
-
2001 Nov-Dec
-
-
Source: Emerg Infect Dis. 7(6):959-969.
[PDF-103.99 KB]
Details:
-
Alternative Title:Emerg Infect Dis
-
Personal Author:
-
Description:We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.
-
Subjects:
-
Source:
-
Document Type:
-
Volume:7
-
Issue:6
-
Collection(s):
-
Main Document Checksum:
-
Download URL:
-
File Type:
