A Bioassay Monitoring Lesson Learned from a Special Exposure Cohort Evaluation

Details

• Personal Author:
  Davis J ; Findley W ; Taulbee T
• Description:
  A Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) evaluation for the Idaho National Laboratory, conducted under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICP A) of 2000, provides a good opportunity to influence current bioassay monitoring programs that use surrogate radionuclides as indicators of internal exposure. From 1963 through 1974, the Chemical Processing Plant (CPP) separated and recovered plutonium in conjunction with the primary process of recovering enriched uranium from a wide variety of spent nuclear reactor fuels. During this time period, there was a degradation of the radiological controls as indicated by the access corridor in the process building transitioning from a relatively clean area where no personal protective equipment (PPE) was required to an area that required coveralls and shoe covers. Even though surveys indicated that contamination was increasing and spreading, special bioassay monitoring for plutonium was not instituted. The general belief was that significant intakes would be identified either through air monitoring or through mixed fission product bioassay. This practice was considered an adequate defense in depth approach at the time. In 1972, an airborne radioactivity incident in the Mass Spectroscopy Laboratory at CPP required follow-up bioassay for plutonium. During the follow-up evaluation, bioassay from one of the workers exhibited a different 238Pu/239Pu ratio than expected. The investigation revealed that this worker had been involved in a separate, undetected internal exposure incident approximately 6 mo earlier. This incident brought into question the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's (NIOSH's) ability to reconstruct internal dose with sufficient accuracy by raising the following question: Were there other CPP workers who received undocumented intakes from undetected incidents? As a result of our review of this issue, NIOSH recommended that all CPP workers with employment between 1963 and 1974 be added to the Special Exposure Cohort. The lesson learned from this example is that air monitoring and surrogate bioassay may not be sufficient to adequately monitor a workforce when the radionuclide of concern can be separated from the surrogate radionuclide. Special attention should be given to analytical laboratories and portions of operational processes where separations can occur. [Description provided by NIOSH]
• Subjects:
  Biological Assay Chemistry Cohort Studies Fuel Oils Occupational Health Personal Protective Equipment Safety
• Keywords:
  Bioassays Chemical Properties Chemicals Cohort Studies Fuels Monitoring Systems Nuclear Reactors Personal Protective Equipment Plutonium Compounds Radionuclides Uranium Uranium Compounds

  More +
• ISSN:
  0017-9078
• Document Type:
  Text
• Genre:
  Abstract or Summary
• Place as Subject:
  Ohio ; OSHA Region 4 ; OSHA Region 5 ; Tennessee
• CIO:
  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
• Division:
  DCAS - Division of Compensation Analysis and Support
• Topic:
  Workplace Safety & Health
• Location:
  North America
• Volume:
  113
• Issue:
  1
• NIOSHTIC Number:
  nn:20050118
• Citation:
  Health Phys 2017 Jul; 113(1):S94
• Email:
  taulbet@gmail.com
• CAS Registry Number:
  Plutonium (CAS RN 7440-07-5) ; Uranium (CAS RN 7440-61-1)
• Federal Fiscal Year:
  2017
• Peer Reviewed:
  True
• Source Full Name:
  Health Physics
• Collection(s):
  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
• Main Document Checksum:
  urn:sha-512:0623c15d2ce5058e59cbd7d0f1e990d9f564ea72a827ab85fcf846032b218f385fb3933e1868b9f71fc7c78ab3c736168b8b9b5bb6c1c55a9a34b52a5e368d35
• Download URL:
  https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/210605/cdc_210605_DS1.pdf
• File Type:
  [PDF - 836.68 KB ]