Details:

Corporate Authors:
National Center for Environmental Health (U.S.). Chemical Demilitarization Branch.
Description:
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is directed by Congress to provide public health oversight of Department of Defense’s chemical weapons disposal facilities. This responsibility has been delegated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which is an agency within the DHHS. In response to the release of GB (sarin) at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF), CDC dispatched a team to conduct an independent evaluation of this release. This investigation focused on the air monitoring systems and the potential public health impact of the release.

From 11:26 pm on May 8, 2000 to 12:56 am on May 9, 2000, GB was released from the common stack during a bi-phasic incident at TOCDF. The peak concentration was approximately 3.6 times the allowable stack concentration. No munitions or bulk agent were being processed at the time of the release. The source of agent in this incident included a liquid GB agent strainer sock placed on the deactivation furnace system gate. The release occurred during a maintenance procedure conducted under abnormal incinerator conditions. This event does not reflect the efficiency of the deactivation furnace system with its associated pollution abatement system under normal operating conditions.

The Automatic Continuous Air Monitoring System� (ACAMS) for the common stack functioned as designed, alerting personnel of the release. However, control room personnel incorrectly assumed that no agent source existed in the deactivation furnace system. This incorrect assumption resulted in continuation of their attempts to purge and re-light the afterburners even after the second stack ACAMS went into alarm. Because the two involved ACAMS have different types of chromatographic columns, the simultaneous alarms were essentially a confirmation of presence of GB. Control room personnel discounted or misunderstood this information. The contingency procedure implemented during the event incorrectly utilized the protocol that assumed presence of agent was not probable.

Review of the biweekly TOCDF ACAMS quality control report indicated that all ACAMS stations at TOCDF were operating well within established quality control limits. However, the deactivation furnace system duct ACAMS provided inconsistent data compared with that observed at the common stack. This inconsistency is believed to have resulted from contamination in the duct sample probe.

The perimeter Depot Area Air Monitoring System (DAAMS) stations were operational at the time of the incident. The GB results of the DAAMS tubes were all below the administratively established reporting limit of 20% of the general population limit. However, perimeter station 905 showed a small, but discernable, chromatographic response at the retention time for GB. Careful evaluation of the meteorological data at the time the incident does not support a relationship between the release at the common stack and the response observed at station 905. However, analytical data from the DAAMS analysis cannot confirm or deny the presence of GB in this sample.

technical-investigation-report.pdf


Subjects:
[+]
Chemical Warfare Agents Organophosphorus Compounds Sarin Waste Management
Document Type:
Report
Place as Subject:
Utah
Collection(s):
Stephen B. Thacker CDC Library collection
Main Document Checksum:
[+]
urn:sha256:3b2810d530524498dce2add21cbdc326d50b3f1a05c9c715a1006f58fd9d1b5c
Download URL:
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/130733/cdc_130733_DS1.pdf
File Type:

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