An animal mortality monitoring network in Gabon and the Republic of Congo has demonstrated potential to predict and possibly prevent human Ebola outbreaks.
All human Ebola virus outbreaks during 2001–2003 in the forest zone between Gabon and Republic of Congo resulted from handling infected wild animal carcasses. After the first outbreak, we created an Animal Mortality Monitoring Network in collaboration with the Gabonese and Congolese Ministries of Forestry and Environment and wildlife organizations (Wildlife Conservation Society and Programme de Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des Ecosystèmes Forestiers en Afrique Centrale) to predict and possibly prevent human Ebola outbreaks. Since August 2001, 98 wild animal carcasses have been recovered by the network, including 65 great apes. Analysis of 21 carcasses found that 10 gorillas, 3 chimpanzees, and 1 duiker tested positive for Ebola virus. Wild animal outbreaks began before each of the 5 human Ebola outbreaks. Twice we alerted the health authorities to an imminent risk for human outbreaks, weeks before they occurred.
Ebola virus, a member of the
An alert network was set up by the Ministries of Health in hospitals and clinics in the different regions of Gabon and Republic of Congo, designed to report all human cases of viral hemorrhagic syndromes. Particular attention was paid to the northeastern region of Gabon, which had already been affected by outbreaks, and to its border region with Republic of Congo. Wildlife organizations such as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Programme de Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des Ecosystèmes Forestiers en Afrique Centrale (ECOFAC), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) were chosen to form the backbone of AMMN, in close collaboration with the Ministries of Forestry and Environment of the 2 countries. WWF was present in the Minkébé Reserve in Gabon, while ECOFAC was in charge of the Odzala National Park and the Lossi gorilla sanctuary in Republic of Congo (
Map of the forest zone straddling the border between Gabon and Republic of Congo, showing (red points) the location of Ebola virus–positive carcasses, confirmed by testing in the Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville biosafety level 4 unit during the 2001–2003 outbreaks in Gabon and Republic of Congo.
All information on human cases of viral hemorrhagic syndrome or on the presence of dead animals in affected areas was centralized by a Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Committee (VHFC), composed of representatives of the Ministries of Health, Forestry, and Environment, the World Health Organization (WHO), wildlife agencies, and the Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville (CIRMF). VHFC was also charged with sending specialized CIRMF teams to sample animal carcasses for diagnostic purposes. CIRMF is the regional reference laboratory for viral hemorrhagic fevers, and communicates its results to the Ministries of Health, Forestry, and Environment and to WHO.
The Gabonese and Congolese Ministries of Health, in close collaboration with WHO and its partners in the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), were in charge of human epidemiologic investigations. A case of Ebola hemorrhagic fever was defined as any probable or laboratory-confirmed case, based on internationally recognized criteria (definition available from
From August 2001 to June 2003, carcasses were found on both sides of the Gabon–Republic of Congo border in the Ogooué Ivindo (Gabon) and West Basin (Congo) provinces (
The large-animal fauna includes
Local hunters (primarily adult and adolescent men of the Bakota, Bakola, Mboko, Mongom, and Pygmy tribes) were the main sources of information regarding the location of carcasses. Their reported sightings were confirmed by ECOFAC monitoring teams who recorded both the global positioning system (GPS) position on a CyberTraker field computer (available from
When wild animal carcasses were found, VHFC asked CIRMF to send a team to the site for diagnostic purposes. Sampling permits were granted by the Gabonese and Congolese Ministries of Forestry and Environment and Health. Owing to the isolated nature of the outbreak zone and its distance from CIRMF, a base camp was established nearby. GPS location of the carcasses, and the information provided on their state of decomposition, allowed the autopsy team to sample only the freshest carcasses.
Ideally, the carcass sampling teams comprised a minimum of 5 persons (3 porters and 2 persons to perform the autopsy). One of the porters was charged with disinfection procedures. Digital photographs were taken. Necropsy was performed with high-level precautions, including watertight clothes Pro-Tech "C" (Tyvek, Contern, Luxembourg) equipped with air filtration equipment and Proflow Automask Litehood face shields (Delta Protection, Lyon, France) (
Field watertight clothes equipped with air filtration equipment, used for high-risk wild animal necropsy. Odzala National Park Republic of Congo, June 2003. Photo: P. Rouquet.
The nature of the samples taken depended on the state of the carcasses. When the carcasses were in good condition, 0.5-cm3 specimens of liver, spleen, muscle, and skin were taken. Half of the samples were placed in Nunc CryoTube vials (Nalge International, Rochester, New York, USA), which were placed in a small liquid nitrogen dry-shipper container (5.4 L) for cryopreservation (–196°C). The other samples were placed in Nunc CryoTube vials containing 10% formalin, for immunohistochemical testing. Bones were placed in hermetic containers. At the main camp, the dry-shipper contents were transferred into larger dry-shipper containers (20.3 L), which were then forwarded to the CIRMF laboratory at the end of the mission.
Potentially infected specimens were collected and manipulated according to WHO guidelines on viral hemorrhagic fever agents in Africa (
Muscle and skin tissue samples were tested by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), antigen detection, and, in some cases, immunohistochemical staining. Bone marrow and internal bone tissue were tested by PCR only.
Samples were used for antigen detection as previously described (
For the detection of viral mRNA, total RNA was isolated from sample extracts by using the RNeasy kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany), and cDNA was synthesized from mRNA as previously described (
Formalin-fixed specimens were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, Georgia, USA) for immunohistochemical staining as previously described (
From October 2001 to December 2003, 5 human Ebola virus outbreaks of the Zaire subtype occurred in the area straddling the border between Gabon (northeast) and Republic of Congo (northwest), with 313 cases and 264 deaths (
From August 2001 to June 2003, a total of 98 animal carcasses were found in an area of about 20,000 km2 (
Species distribution of carcasses found in the forest straddling the border between Gabon and Republic of Congo (2001–2003). * = other primates:
Temporal distribution of carcasses found in the forest straddling the border between Gabon and the Republic of Congo (2001–2003). Two peaks of mortality were observed: the first occurred in the Ekata region (Gabon) from November to December 2001 and the second from December 2002 to February 2003 in the Lossi gorilla sanctuary (Republic of Congo).
An animal carcass was considered infected by Ebola virus if >1 of the 3 laboratory tests (antigen detection, DNA amplification, and immunohistochemical staining) was positive. When possible, DNA amplification was confirmed by sequencing the PCR products. Twenty-one gorilla, chimpanzee, and duiker carcasses were sampled in the wild and analyzed in the CIRMF biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory. Fourteen of these carcasses tested positive for Ebola virus, 6 in 2 or 3 tests and 8 in only 1 test (
| Animal | Location | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area | GPS | Date | Tissue | Death | PCR | Ag | IHC | ||
| Ebola+ by 2 or 3 tests | |||||||||
| Gorilla | Zadié | 0,7055N | 14,2747E | Nov 2001 | Muscle§ | 5 d | + | + | + |
| Gorilla | Lossi | 0,2395N | 14,4938E | Dec 2002 | Muscle§ | 8 d | + | + | + |
| Gorilla | Lossi | 0,2354N | 14,4839E | Dec 2002 | Muscle§ | 8 d | + | + | + |
| Gorilla | Mbanza | 0,6987N | 14,7029E | Jun 2003 | Muscle§ | 5 d | + | + | N/A |
| Chimp† | Lossi | 0,2387N | 14,4885E | Dec 2002 | Muscle§ | 3 d | – | + | + |
| Chimp | Lossi | Feb 2003 | Muscle¶ | 10 d | + | + | N/A | ||
| Ebola+ by 1 test | |||||||||
| Gorilla | Zadié | 1,1669N | 14,1650E | Feb 2002 | Bone marrow# | 1 mo | + | N/A | N/A |
| Gorilla†‡ | Zadié | 0,7310N | 14,2644E | Mar 2002 | Bone# | 3 wk | + | N/A | N/A |
| Gorilla†‡ | Zadié | 0,7310N | 14,2644E | Mar 2002 | Bone# | 3 wk | + | N/A | N/A |
| Gorilla | Lossi | 0,2348N | 14,4852E | Dec 2002 | Bone# | 2 wk | + | N/A | N/A |
| Gorilla | Lossi | 0,2346N | 14,4823E | Dec 2002 | Bone# | 2 wk | + | N/A | N/A |
| Gorilla | Lossi | 0,2987N | 14,5075E | Feb 2003 | Muscle¶ | 8 d | – | + | N/A |
| Duiker | Lossi | 0,2293N | 14,4892E | Dec 2002 | Bone# | 2 wk | + | N/A | N/A |
| Chimp† | Lossi | 0,2387N | 14,4885E | Dec 2002 | Muscle¶ | 12 h | – | + | – |
| Tested and Ebola– | |||||||||
| Gorilla‡ | Zadié | 0,6510N | 14,2375E | Mar 2002 | Skull# | 1 mo | – | N/A | N/A |
| Duiker | Lossi | 0,2376N | 14,4882E | Dec 2002 | Bone# | 3 wk | – | N/A | N/A |
| Duiker | Lossi | Jun 2003 | Skin§ | 2 d | – | – | N/A | ||
| Lossi | 0,2737N | 14,5163E | Feb 2003 | Muscle§ | 3 d | – | – | N/A | |
| Genet | Zadié | 0,6749N | 13,8851E | Nov 2001 | Muscle¶ | 5 d | – | – | N/A |
| Genet | Zadié | 0,6771N | 14,2937E | Feb 2002 | Muscle§ | 2 d | – | – | N/A |
| Sitatunga | Zadié | 0,9560N | 13,7776E | Apr 2002 | Muscle§ | 3 d | – | – | N/A |
*GPS, global positioning system (CyberTracker field computer); PCR, polymerase chain reaction; Ag, antigen detection; IHC, immunohistochemical tests; N/A, not applicable. †Mother and infant. ‡1-month delay between the field and the laboratory and preserved in bad conditions. §Sample found in good condition. ¶Sample found in poor condition. #Sample found in very poor condition (bone only).
We describe the successful implementation of a surveillance network of Ebola outbreaks in wild large mammals. We often identified wild animal outbreaks before human Ebola outbreaks. Twice this enabled us to alert the health authorities of Republic of Congo and Gabon to an imminent risk for human outbreaks, after the discovery of carcasses of Ebola virus–infected animals.
Human Ebola outbreaks in this region have always occurred in remote areas, raising major logistic problems. Roads are often barely passable, and means of communication are frequently nonexistent. The carcass detection and investigation network therefore had to rely on teams already present in these forest zones, and notably those possessing radios or satellite telephones. Conservation organizations such as ECOFAC, WCS, and WWF were thus the ideal partners. ECOFAC monitoring teams played a critical role by exploring remote forest zones, capitalizing on the information provided by villagers and hunters.
Performing an autopsy on high-risk animal carcasses requires heavy equipment, highly qualified personnel, and experienced veterinarians, as illustrated by the case of the Swiss anthropologist who was infected after examining a chimpanzee carcass without adequate protective measures in the Tai forest (
State of the wild animal carcasses found in the field, Lossi gorilla sanctuary, Republic of Congo, December 2002. Carcasses decompose very rapidly in the equatorial forest. Photo: P. Rouquet. A) Female chimpanzee, 3 days after death. B) Female gorilla, 7 days after death. C) Female gorilla, 21 days after death.
Although the PCR technique used by CIRMF can detect Ebola virus genetic material in carcasses 3–4 weeks old, the material is often degraded and incomplete. Often, only a small sequence of the L-gene (RNA polymerase) can be analyzed, and this cannot be used for strain identification. Furthermore, degraded samples increase the false-negative rate (
Using a combination of 3 laboratory techniques (PCR, immunohistochemical staining, and antigen capture), we showed for the first time that wild gorillas and chimpanzees can be decimated by Ebola. Bones of a
The source of gorilla infection is unknown, but several lines of evidence point to direct infection by >1 natural hosts. First, the detection of different strains of Ebola virus in gorilla carcasses located only a few kilometers apart argues against a major role of gorilla-to-gorilla transmission. Indeed, Ebola virus remains genetically stable during a given outbreak, from the first to the last case (
Chimpanzees are probably infected by the same mechanisms as gorillas. During the Tai outbreak in Côte d'Ivoire, carnivorous behavior (especially consumption of
Duikers represent a special case. Although they are the most common large-mammal species in this region, few carcasses were found. This circumstance may be due to the lack of interactions among individuals, as duikers generally live alone or in pairs. Some duikers, despite being herbivorous, eat the flesh of decomposing carcasses (K. Abernethy, unpub. data). Thus, in addition to being directly infected by the natural host(s), duikers might also become infected by licking or eating fresh carcasses of Ebola virus–infected animals. This scenario would play a marginal role, however, because carcasses are only infective for 3 or 4 days after the animal's death (E.M. Leroy, P. Rollin, unpub. data). Furthermore, we observed little scavenging of carcasses during the first days after the animal's death.
Serum from a survivor of the human outbreak in Mekambo (Grand Etoumbi, March 2002), who had direct contact with a gorilla carcass, was positive for Ebola virus–specific IgG. Ebola virus L gene sequences were detected in bone marrow samples of this gorilla, conclusively linking the 2 cases. Thus, the last outbreaks in Mekambo (Gabon, 2001) and Lossi (Republic of Congo, 2002–2003) confirm that wild animal mortality can reveal Ebola virus propagation in the forest ecosystem and indicate a role of wild animals as "vectors" in human outbreaks.
No effective medical treatment or vaccine exists for Ebola virus infection. The only way of minimizing human cases is to break the chain of human-human transmission. Humans do not seem to be at a major risk for infection by the unidentified natural host(s). Large outbreaks among wild animals can amplify human outbreaks by increasing the number of index transmission events. Therefore, reducing contacts between humans and dead wildlife can reduce the risks for transmission.
Epidemiologic surveillance of animal mortality rates can thus help prevent the emergence of the disease in human populations (
Schematic representation of the Ebola cycle in the equatorial forest and proposed strategy to avoid Ebola virus transmission to humans and its subsequent human-human propagation. Ebola virus replication in the natural host (a). Wild animal infection by the natural host(s) (b), no doubt the main source of infection. Wild animal infection by contact with live or dead wild animals (c). This scenario would play a marginal role. Infection of hunters by manipulation of infected wild animal carcasses or sick animals (d). Three animal species are known to be sensitive to Ebola virus and to act as sources of human outbreaks, gorillas, chimpanzees, and duikers. Person-to-person transmission from hunters to their family and then to hospital workers (e). The wild animal mortality surveillance network can predict and might prevent human outbreaks. Medical surveillance can prevent Ebola virus propagation in the human population.
These authors contributed equally to this work.
We thank the national and international teams involved in the control of the Ebola outbreaks that occurred in Gabon and the Republic of Congo. The national teams were members of the Gabonese Health Ministry and the Health Service of the Gabonese Defense Ministry during the Gabon outbreaks, and members of the Congolese Health Ministry during the outbreaks in the Republic of Congo. The international teams were mainly scientific and medical experts from WHO and Médecins Sans Frontières. We thank all those involved in wildlife conservation for sample collection and case reporting, in particular the ECOFAC monitoring teams and T. Smith. We are also grateful to G. Moussavou and L. Allela for technical assistance; D. Young, X. Pourrut, and J. Wickings for help in preparing the manuscript; and D. Drevet, P. Blot, and C. Aveling for constant support and encouragement. Lastly, we thank T.G. Ksiazek for generously providing reagents to CIRMF.
CIRMF is supported by the Government of Gabon, Total-Fina-Elf Gabon, and Ministère de la Coopération Française. This work was also supported by a Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire and a Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération, grants from the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France (FSP no. 2002005700 and FAC no. 1999-49).
Dr. Rouquet is the head of the Primate Center at CIRMF. He is experienced in the treatment and evaluation of simian immunodeficiency virus and simian/HIV transmission in different primate models of HIV infection (pathogenic and nonpathogenic); Since 1995, he has been involved in hemorrhagic fever research, particularly Ebola.