We analyzed the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 epizootic of 2016–17 in Europe by epidemiologic and genetic characteristics and compared it with 2 previous epizootics caused by the same H5 Guangdong lineage. The 2016–17 epizootic was the largest in Europe by number of countries and farms affected and greatest diversity of wild birds infected. We observed significant differences among the 3 epizootics regarding region affected, epidemic curve, seasonality, and outbreak duration, making it difficult to predict future HPAI epizootics. However, we know that in 2005–06 and 2016–17 the initial peak of wild bird detections preceded the peak of poultry outbreaks within Europe. Phylogenetic analysis of 2016–17 viruses indicates 2 main pathways into Europe. Our findings highlight the need for global surveillance of viral changes to inform disease preparedness, detection, and control.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a zoonotic notifiable disease that can cause high mortality rates in most domestic poultry and in some wild bird species. Since 2003, HPAI H5 viruses have been circulating in poultry in many countries (
A passive surveillance system of testing wild birds found dead or sick for avian influenza has been in place in European Union (EU) member states since 2005 (Commission Decision 2005/94/EC, replaced with 2010/367/EU), with the objective of timely detection of HPAI subtype H5N1. Laboratory confirmation of HPAI infection following the development of clinical signs (passive surveillance) is the primary method of poultry surveillance in the EU member states, complemented by a serologic active surveillance program (
During epidemiologic year 2005–06 (epidemiologic years run from October to September of the next year), HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 virus of the Guangdong H5 lineage spread to a number of countries in Europe, infecting poultry and wild bird populations (
In October 2016, a novel HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 virus of the Guangdong lineage was detected in Hungary and was subsequently reported in other countries in Europe, infecting many poultry farms and causing both large-scale and sporadic deaths in wild bird populations. The hemagglutinin (HA) gene of this virus was considered phylogenetically distinct from the previous 2014 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses and was nominally suffixed by A (the 2016 clade) or B (the 2014 clade (
We collected data from the 3 major HPAI H5 epizootics in Europe: HPAI H5N1 in epidemiologic year 2005–06 (
We conducted analyses to describe each epizootic, examined the geographic and temporal spread (epidemic curves), and assessed differences in clinical illness and death rates. For spatial analysis, we grouped countries into 4 regions (North, South-West, South-East, and Central Europe) on the basis of the broad migration patterns of the major migratory water bird species affected by HPAI (
We obtained virus HA gene sequence data from countries’ submissions to the EU Reference Laboratory and from GISAID (
In 2016–17, a total of 1,108 poultry outbreaks were reported in 21 countries in Europe. Extensive farm-to-farm spread, predominantly in ducks, seemed apparent in France, which had >400 farms affected, and Hungary, with >200 farms infected (
| Country | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. poultry infected | No. wild birds infected | No. poultry culled† | No. poultry infected | No. wild birds infected | No. captive birds infected | No. poultry culled† | No. poultry infected | No. wild birds infected | No. captive birds infected | No. poultry culled† | |||
| France | 1 | 21 | 11,700 | – | – | – | – | 485 | 51 | 3 | 1,529,361 | ||
| Hungary | 29 | 12 | 251,948 | 1 | – | – | 22,000 | 238 | 86 | 5 | 2,678,191 | ||
| Germany | 1 | 220 | 14,300 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 58,964 | 89 | 738 | 15 | 1,150,631 | ||
| Bulgaria | – | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | 71 | 13 | 2 | 511,832 | ||
| Poland | – | 29 | – | – | – | – | – | 65 | 66 | – | 1,167,282 | ||
| Romania | 197 | 17 | 755,372‡ | – | – | – | – | 45 | 93 | 2 | 2,222 | ||
| Czech Republic | – | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | 38 | 39 | – | 79,308 | ||
| Italy | – | 19 | – | 1 | – | – | 31,985 | 16 | 6 | – | 357,049 | ||
| Spain | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | –– | 10 | 2 | – | 28,330 | ||
| Croatia | § | § | § | – | – | – | – | 9 | 12 | – | 1,546 | ||
| United Kingdom | – | 1 | – | 1 | – | – | 6,178 | 12 | 23 | – | 102,849 | ||
| Netherlands | – | – | – | 5 | 1 | – | 245,600 | 8 | 48 | 10 | 202,004 | ||
| Slovakia | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | 8 | 58 | 3 | 351 | ||
| Greece | – | 25 | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | 8 | – | 28,275 | ||
| Serbia | § | § | § | – | – | – | – | 4 | 20 | – | 289 | ||
| Sweden | 1 | 13 | 692 | – | 2 | – | – | 4 | 30 | 2 | 203,053 | ||
| Austria | – | 46 | – | – | – | – | 2 | 55 | 1 | 1,258 | |||
| Ukraine | § | § | § | – | – | – | – | 2 | 3 | 1 | 10,288 | ||
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | § | § | § | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 148 | ||
| Denmark | 1 | 26 | 102 | – | – | – | – | 1 | 49 | 1 | 69 | ||
| FYROM | § | § | § | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | 438 | ||
| Belgium | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 3 | 13 | 4,047 | ||
| Finland | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 15 | 2 | – | ||
| Ireland | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 10 | – | – | ||
| Lithuania | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 5 | – | – | ||
| Portugal | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | ||
| Slovenia | – | 28 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 41 | – | – | ||
| Switzerland | – | 9 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 87 | – | – | ||
| Luxembourg | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 4 | – | ||
| Totals | 230 | 487 | 1,034,114 | 13 | 5 | 1 | 364,727 | 1,116 | 1,565 | 64 | 8,058,831 | ||
| Total infected | 717 | 19 | 2,745 | ||||||||||
*Table includes all reported HPAI H5N8 outbreaks through July 31, 2017. It excludes the new wave of secondary H5N8 outbreaks observed in Italy from the beginning of July 2017 through September 2017, which has different drivers and kinetics with maintenance in the poultry (primarily turkey) population rather than through wild bird introduction. FYROM, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza. †It is uncertain if for some outbreaks only the number of poultry in one farm building or if the poultry population in the area of the farm were reported. This estimate should be used as an approximation and indicator of impact. ‡One observation contained 600,000 birds, representing the overall population of backyard flocks affected in Romania. This number is an approximation. §These countries did not submit data to the Animal Disease Notification System in 2005–06; however, there is other evidence of H5N1 incursion in the period.
The number of wild bird detections was substantially different between epizootics: 1,559 incidents in 27 countries in 2016–17, 487 in 18 countries in 2005–06, and only 5 in 3 countries in 2014–15. Almost half of the wild bird incidents reported in all 3 epizootics were in Germany.
A total of 49 different wild bird species were reported infected with HPAI H5 virus of the Guangdong lineage in 2016–17, 28 in 2005–06, and 6 in 2014–15 (
| Species group | Species | No. (%) events | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H5N1 2005–06 epizootic | H5N8 2014–15 epizootic | H5N8 2016–17 epizootic | ||
| Rails | Eurasian coot ( | 5 (1) | 8 (0.5) | |
| Crested coot ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Purple swamphen ( | 4 (1) | |||
| Common moorhen ( | 1 (0.2) | 2 (0.1) | ||
| Total | 10 (2) | 11 (1) | ||
| Swans | Unspecified. | 197 (38) | 2 (22) | 262 (16) |
| Mute swan ( | 92 (18) | 344 (20) | ||
| Whooper swan ( | 2 (0.4) | 80 (5) | ||
| Total | 291 (56) | 2 (22) | 683 (41) | |
| Ducks | Unspecified | 57 (11) | 143 (9) | |
| Northern pintail ( | 2 (0.4) | |||
| Eurasian wigeon ( | 1 (11) | 21 (1) | ||
| Mallard ( | 4 (1) | 1 (11) | 43 (3) | |
| Common pochard ( | 4 (1) | 8 (0.5) | ||
| Red-crested pochard ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Common goldeneye ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Greater scaup ( | 2 (0.4) | |||
| Common merganser ( | 5 (1) | |||
| Tufted duck ( | 18 (3) | 82 (5) | ||
| Eurasian teal ( | 1 (11) | 3 (0.2) | ||
| Smew ( | 1 (0.2) | |||
| Shelduck ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Common eider ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 93 (18) | 3 (33) | 307 (18) | |
| Geese | Unspecified | 30 (6) | 94 (6) | |
| Canada goose ( | 5 (0.3 | |||
| Barnacle goose ( | 1 (0.2) | |||
| Greater white-fronted goose ( | 9 (1) | |||
| Lesser white-fronted goose ( | 2 (0.4) | 4 (0.2) | ||
| Greylag goose ( | 1 (0.2) | 21 (1) | ||
| Red-breasted goose ( | 1 (0.2) | |||
| Bean goose ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Pink-footed goose ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 35 (7) | 134 (8) | ||
| Gulls | Unspecified | 9 (2) | 89 (5) | |
| Great black-backed gull ( | 11 (1) | |||
| Herring gull ( | 1 (0.2) | 28 (2) | ||
| Black-headed gull ( | 1 (0.2) | 1 (11) | 23 (1) | |
| Lesser black-backed gull ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Common gull ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 11 (2) | 1 (11) | 154 (9) | |
| Waders | Green sandpiper ( | 1 (0.1) | ||
| Eurasian curlew ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Species group | Species | No. (%) events | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H5N1 2005–06 epizootic | H5N8 2014–15 epizootic | H5N8 2016–17 epizootic | ||
| Birds of prey | Unspecified | 30 (6) | ||
| Buzzard | 1 (0.2) | 6 (0.4) | ||
| Eagle | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Falcon | 1 (0.2) | 3 (0.2) | ||
| Hawk | 1 (0.2) | 3 (0.2) | ||
| Owl. | 2 (0.4) | 4 (0.2) | ||
| Barn owl ( | 1 (0.2) | |||
| Peregrine falcon ( | 1 (0.2) | 8 (0.5) | ||
| White-tailed eagle ( | 24 (1) | |||
| Common buzzard ( | 7 (1) | 70 (4) | ||
| Rough-legged buzzard ( | 1 (0.2) | |||
| Eurasian eagle-owl ( | 2 (0.4) | 1 (0.1) | ||
| Eurasian sparrowhawk ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Common kestrel ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Northern goshawk ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 47 (9) | 124 (7) | ||
| Crows | Unspecified | 1 (0.2) | ||
| Eurasian magpie ( | 1 (0.2) | 4 (0.3) | ||
| Hooded crow ( | 3 (0.2) | |||
| Rook ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Carrion crow ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Common raven ( | 1 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 2 (0.4) | 11 (1) | ||
| Grebes | Great crested grebe ( | 7 (1) | 12 (1) | |
| Little grebe ( | 1 (0.2) | 4 (0.2) | ||
| Total | 8 (2) | 16 (1) | ||
| Thrushes | Blackbird ( | 1 (0.1 | ||
| Song thrush ( | 2 (0.1) | |||
| Total | 3 (0.2 | |||
| Pigeons, doves | Wood pigeon ( | 2 (0.1) | ||
| Collared dove ( | 1 (0.2) | 1 (0.1) | ||
| Rock dove ( | 1 (11) | |||
| Total | 1 (0.2) | 1 (11) | 3 (0.2) | |
| Herons | Unspecified | 2 (0.4) | 16 (1) | |
| Grey heron ( | 4 (1) | 48 (3) | ||
| Total | 6 (1) | 64 (4) | ||
| Storks | Unspecified | 2 (0.4) | ||
| White stork ( | 3 (0.2) | |||
| Total | 2 (0.4) | 3 (0.2) | ||
| Pelicans | Unspecified. ( | 2 (0.1) | ||
| Terns | Common tern ( | 2 (0.1) | ||
| Cormorants | Great cormorant ( | 6 (1) | 17 (1) | |
| Other | Unspecified | 9 (2) | 2 (22) | 140 (8) |
The types of poultry infected in each epizootic are shown in
| Type of poultry | H5N1 2005–06 epizootic | H5N8 2014–15 epizootic | H5N8 2016–17 epizootic | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. (%) farms | No. with only 1 species | No. (%) farms | No. with only 1 species | No. (%) farms | No. with only 1 species | |||
| Ducks | 3 (23) | 0 | 495 (44) | 433 | ||||
| Geese | 113 (10) | 81 | ||||||
| Ducks and geese | 29 (13) | 0 | ||||||
| Turkey | 5 (2) | 1 | 3 (23) | 0 | 91 (8) | 82 | ||
| Broilers | 23 (10) | 17 | 4 (31) | 0 | 93 (8) | 48 | ||
| Laying hens | 47 (4) | 29 | ||||||
| Pigeons | 9 (1) | 1 | ||||||
| Guinea fowl | 10 (1) | 1 | ||||||
| Peacocks | 2 (0) | 0 | ||||||
| Pheasants | 8 (1) | 5 | ||||||
| Quail | 2 (0) | 1 | ||||||
| Ostrich | 1 (0) | 0 | ||||||
| Backyard† | 176 (77) | NA | ||||||
| Unknown | 2 | 360(32) | NA | |||||
| Total infected farms | 230 | 13 | 1,116 | |||||
*NA, not available. †Backyard represents those households that keep few birds, normally layer hens, for their own consumption. The category was used only in the 2005–06 epizootic.
Ducks, geese, turkeys, and broiler chickens on average had higher illness rates in 2005–06 than in the other epizootics (
Morbidity (A) and mortality (B) rates as percentages of populations reported in infected poultry farms during 3 highly pathogenic avian influenza epizootics in Europe, 2005–06, 2014–15, and 2016–17. Years given are epidemiologic years (October through September of the next year). Diamonds with error bars indicate means and 95% CIs. Asterisks indicate farms with unique poultry species used for analysis; dagger indicates large majority of data from backyard farms reported in Romania.
We determined the epidemiologic curves of the 3 epizootics (
Epidemic curve of 3 HPAI H5 virus epizootics in Europe: A) 2005–06 H5N1; B) 2014–15 H5N8; C) 2016–17 H5N8. Years given are epidemiologic years (October through September of the next year). Dashed lines indicate number of countries reporting an HPAI infection since the beginning of the epizootic; vertical line in panel C indicates data collected through July 31, 2017. D) Weekly average number of poultry outbreaks for each epizootic. Horizontal lines indicate mean the day at which half of the poultry outbreaks have occurred (diamonds); error bars indicate 1 SD. E) Number of poultry outbreaks for each month for the 3 epizootics. HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza.
In 2005–06 and 2016–17, a peak in wild bird incidents preceded the peak in poultry outbreaks (
We mapped a temporal-spatial analysis of the 3 epizootics (
Geographic and temporal spread of the 2005–06 HPAI H5N1 epizootic. A) Location of each incident reported. Blue shading indicates countries where cases were reported. B) Month of first report of an HPAI H5N1 incident. Years given are epidemiologic years (October through September of the next year). HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza.
Geographic and temporal spread of the 2014–15 HPAI H5N8 epizootic. A) Location of each incident reported. Blue shading indicates countries where cases were reported. B) Month of first report of an HPAI H5N8 incident. Years given are epidemiologic years (October through September of the next year). HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza.
Geographic and temporal spread of the 2016–17 HPAI H5N8 epizootic. A) Location of each incident reported. Blue shading indicates countries where cases were reported. B) Month of first report of an HPAI H5N8 incident. Years given are epidemiologic years (October through September of the next year). HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza.
Comparison by region of Europe according to wild bird migratory patterns indicates poultry outbreaks were mostly observed in the South-East and South-West regions in 2005–06 and 2016–17 but in the North in 2014–15 (
Genetic analysis of the HA gene for the 2014–15 and 2016–17 epizootics shows the involvement of H5 clade 2.3.4.4 in all cases where data were available (
Maximum-likelihood tree from viral sequences of the 2016–17 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 epizootic in Europe. Circles represent node support values, filled according to approximate likelihood ratio test values 0–100. Light gray boxes indicate distinct clades with support >50 with isolates from Europe; dark gray boxes indicate clades with <50 or unresolved. Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site. An expanded figure showing trees for all 3 epizootic years is available online (
We also found smaller clusters and singleton sequences including sequences from European viruses; viruses from 2014–15 form 1 subclade, estimated to have emerged in January–February 2014 (
BEAST analyses (
The 2016–17 epizootic of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses in Europe has 5 times more outbreaks in poultry than observed in the H5 clade 2.2 epizootic in 2005–06 and 80 times more than in the H5 clade 2.3.4.4 epizootic in 2014–15. This study highlights the unprecedented magnitude of the 2016–17 HPAI H5 epizootic in Europe, in terms of size (both number of poultry outbreaks and wild bird incidents), geographic spread, speed of incidents/outbreaks, and diversity of wild bird species reported infected. As a result, the economic impact is many times higher for 2016–17, which resulted in an
A greater passive surveillance effort to detect influenza virus in wild birds was reported in the EU in 2006 than in 2016 (
Extensive secondary spread is the most probable explanation for the large number of outbreaks reported in the farmed duck sector in 2016–17, possibly because of rapid attenuation of viral symptoms. Hence, on several farms with clinically healthy birds, we detected HPAI infections through active epidemiologic tracings and not on the basis of clinical signs, as reported in data from some member states. The results may also indicate that infection and transmission between domestic ducks is relatively easy for these viruses. The type of husbandry practices and frequent movement of birds, coupled with poor biosecurity and lack of robust hygiene practices, may also make the spread of the viruses between farms easier (
Swans and ducks were the predominant hosts infected in 2005–06 and 2016–17. Of interest, although mallards (
Epidemic curves for the 3 epizootics were significantly different. The incidence values in order of magnitude were 2016–17 > 2005–06 > 2014–15. In the period of the review, the mean temporal distances to the midpoint in the poultry epizootic were different; 2014–15 was relatively short, consistent with the incursion into the poultry sector and potentially lower virus infectivity present in the wild bird reservoir, whereas in 2005–06 and in 2016–17, epidemic curves show a clear peak of detection of wild bird incidence preceding the peak of poultry incidences, which demonstrates the importance of wild bird surveillance.
For the 2016–17 epizootic, the epidemic curve shows a long extended tail with small sporadic peaks relating to localized but limited detection and spread in both poultry and wild birds (
The viruses showed close genetic similarity to viruses contemporaneously circulating in Central and Southeast Asia. The lower genetic diversity observed in 2016–17 was accompanied by reassortment of all gene segments, as shown in previous studies (
Epidemiologic results suggest 2 broad corridors of virus incursion in 2005–06 and 2016–17, through northern and central Europe with subsequent spread, later corroborated through phylogenetic analyses of the HA gene of the viruses from the 2016–17 epizootic. This dual incursion probably relates broadly to known postbreeding movements of northern duck species, which breed widely across northern Eurasia (
This study presents many limitations (online Technical Appendix). Differences in the implementation of passive wild bird surveillance between countries, which are implied in the EU avian influenza annual report for 2016 (
Despite apparent heavy infection pressure in wild birds in 2016–17, the virus was not detected early in the epizootic in areas in eastern Europe, such as the Danube Delta, with high density of early migratory waterfowl. There were significant incursions in poultry in northern Europe, particularly Germany and Poland, and these areas also reported the greatest number of infected wild birds. This finding may reflect the implementation of enhanced surveillance in wild bird populations rather than true increased risk. Southwestern Europe had relatively few wild bird detections compared to the number of poultry outbreaks, perhaps because of the establishment of the virus in the duck production sector in southwestern France, not as a result of increased introductions from wild birds (
The extent of the 2016–17 H5 epizootic indicates an urgent need to reappraise the effectiveness of surveillance strategies in both wild and domestic birds and to monitor key populations for emergence of viral variants. The differences we observed in the 3 epizootics illustrate the difficulty of predicting HPAI epizootics. However, the temporal peak of wild bird detections preceding the peak of poultry outbreaks at the EU level highlighted the utility of surveillance in wild birds, as observed in other studies (
Additional information about 3 epizootics of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 Guangdong lineage in Europe.
These authors are joint first authors.
The following laboratories supplied virus sequence data used in our analysis: National Food Chain Safety Office, Veterinary Diagnostic Directorate, Laboratory for Molecular Biology, Hungary; the Croatian Veterinary Institute, Croatia; the National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; Wageningen UR, the Netherlands; the National Veterinary Institute, Denmark; the Friedrich-Loeffler Institute, Germany; National Veterinary Institute, Sweden; Wageningen University and Research Centre, the Netherlands.
The work at Animal and Plant Health Agency was jointly funded by the European Commission and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London, through the EU reference laboratory. This work was funded in part by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) –funded Centers of Excellence in Influenza Research and Surveillance (contract HHSN272201400008C) and a US Defense Threat Reduction Agency Broad Agency Announcement award (FRBAA09-6-2-0114).
Dr. Alarcon is a lecturer in animal health economics at the Royal Veterinary College, London. During this study, he was a veterinary epidemiologist at the Animal and Plant Health Agency, United Kingdom, where his role and research focused on the analysis of avian influenza surveillance data in Europe.