On October 27, 2014, CDC released guidance for monitoring and movement of persons with potential Ebola virus disease (Ebola) exposure in the United States (
Enhanced entry screening was conducted at five U.S. international airports at which travelers from Ebola-affected West African countries were identified and assigned a risk categorization for Ebola exposure. The Ebola-affected West African countries and the U.S. risk categories have changed over time, as described in the CDC interim U.S. guidance (
After potential exposure to Ebola, one of two daily public health actions, either active monitoring (AM) or direct active monitoring (DAM), was required for 21 days. AM was recommended for low-risk travelers and consisted of twice-daily temperature checks and self-evaluation for symptoms consistent with Ebola (
Complete monitoring (either AM or DAM) was defined as making contact with the monitored person with no gaps in reporting (e.g., no loss to follow-up) of >48 hours. Weekly estimates of the number of persons under monitoring and reporting symptoms, and calculations of incomplete monitoring were collected from the jurisdictions’ weekly reports. The overall estimate of persons under monitoring was calculated as the sum of persons reported as 1) completing monitoring, 2) leaving the United States during their monitoring period, and 3) remaining under monitoring on March 8, 2015.
Monitoring was conducted by 60 jurisdictions: the 50 states, NYC and DC, five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands), and three freely-associated states (Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau) (
During November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015, in the 60 jurisdictions, 10,344 persons were monitored (
During the study period, a median of 1,710 persons (range = 1,331–2,119) were monitored in a given reporting week (
In a given week, a median of 1.5 persons for whom monitoring was indicated could not be contacted upon arrival in the jurisdiction (0.4%; range = 0–48 persons per week). The number of persons who could not be contacted in a given week decreased from a median of 23 persons per week (1.4%) in November to less than one person per week in February (0.03%). Of the persons ever contacted for monitoring, a median of 7.5 persons had gaps in being monitored that were >48 hours in a given week (0.6%; range = 1–26 persons per week). The median number of persons with >48-hour gaps in monitoring decreased from 20 persons per week (1.0%) in November to three per week (0.2%) in February.
During a given reporting week, a median of 20 persons under monitoring (1.2%, range = 9–43 persons) reported Ebola-compatible symptoms. The number of symptomatic persons peaked in December 2014. Of the symptomatic persons in the low-risk and some-risk categories, 39 were tested for Ebola during their monitoring period; none tested positive for Ebola. No persons at high risk reported Ebola-compatible symptoms.
All 50 states, DC, NYC, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands monitored persons at low risk (
Within 7 days of issuance of CDC guidance on movement and monitoring in October 2014, all 50 states and two local jurisdictions were effectively monitoring travelers arriving from countries with widespread Ebola transmission and HCWs caring for patients with Ebola in the United States. By December 22, all U.S. territories were reporting to CDC. Less than 1% of monitoring was incomplete. Anecdotally reported reasons for incomplete monitoring included missing or incorrect contact information, logistical issues (e.g., transfer from one jurisdiction to another), and noncompliance by persons being monitored.
These efforts demonstrate the capacity and infrastructure developed by U.S. jurisdictions to urgently respond to a large-scale monitoring need. Since 2002, considerable resources have been distributed to public health departments to effectively respond to infectious disease outbreaks and other public health threats (
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, because weekly data were reported in aggregate, the estimated numbers of persons monitored might be inexact. For example, overestimates would result if a jurisdiction reported the same person in both low-risk and some-risk categories for a given reporting period. This likely would occur when a person’s risk classification changed during the 21-day monitoring period (e.g., an HCW who completed work in an Ebola treatment unit days before departing the country could change from some risk to low risk). Duplicates were corrected whenever identified. Second, the calculation of the overall number of persons under monitoring might be an underestimate if all persons were not reported as having completed their monitoring, leaving the United States, or still being under monitoring on March 8, 2015.
These results provide evidence of successful U.S. monitoring for Ebola. Jurisdictions demonstrated public health capacity to rapidly conduct and effectively monitor thousands of persons over a sustained period. After monitoring of 10,344 persons, no transmission of Ebola was reported during the study period, and few persons under monitoring reported symptoms suggesting potential Ebola infection (
What is already known on this topic?
The 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic is the largest ever reported. During March 25, 2014–June 23, 2015, a total of 15,109 laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola were reported and 11,232 persons died, primarily in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. To prevent transmission of Ebola in the United States, CDC issued monitoring and movement guidance on October 27, 2014, and provided epidemiologic and clinical expertise in support of 60 jurisdictions’ implementation of this guidance.
What is added by this report?
This report is the first to present results from the 60 U.S. jurisdictions that monitored persons with potential exposure to Ebola, including those returning from Ebola-affected countries. A total of 10,344 persons were monitored during November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015, with >99% complete monitoring.
What are the implications for public health practice?
This report provides evidence that jurisdictions can rapidly implement a complex monitoring system and monitor thousands of persons with potential exposure to Ebola over a sustained period. In addition, this report provides documentation that among the 10,344 monitored, none were diagnosed with Ebola.
The 60 jurisdictions that conducted monitoring; Steve Boedigheimer, Christine Kosmos, and staff members of CDC’s State Coordination Task Force and Global Migration Task Force.
Additional information available at
Number of persons (N = 10,344) with potential Ebola exposure who were monitored, by risk category and week — United States, November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015
Number of persons (N = 10,344) with potential Ebola exposure who were monitored and percentage with complete monitoring, by week — United States, November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015
* Complete monitoring is defined as making contact with the monitored person with no gaps in reporting of >48 hours.
Number of persons with potential Ebola exposure monitored in 50 states, New York City, and the District of Columbia — November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015
Summary of active and direct active monitoring of persons with potential Ebola exposure, by risk category — United States, November 3, 2014–March 8, 2015
| Risk category | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Low (but not zero) risk | ||||
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| Monitoring element | High risk and some risk | Travelers | U.S. HCWs | Total |
| Type of daily monitoring | DAM | AM | DAM | — |
| Reporting frequency to CDC | Daily | Weekly | Weekly | — |
| No. of persons monitored | 315 | 9,512 | 527 | 10,344 |
| No. of jurisdictions conducting monitoring | 47 | 54 | 10 | 54 |
Adjusted for persons whose risk category changed from some risk to low risk.