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In March of 2003, an outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) occurred in Northern Vietnam. This outbreak began when a traveler arriving from Hong Kong sought medical care at a small hospital (Hospital A) in Hanoi, initiating a serious and substantial transmission event within the hospital, and subsequent limited spread within the community.
We surveyed Hospital A personnel for exposure to the index patient and for symptoms of disease during the outbreak. Additionally, serum specimens were collected and assayed for antibody to SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) antibody and job-specific attack rates were calculated. A nested case-control analysis was performed to assess risk factors for acquiring SARS-CoV infection.
One hundred and fifty-three of 193 (79.3%) clinical and non-clinical staff consented to participate. Excluding job categories with <3 workers, the highest SARS attack rates occurred among nurses who worked in the outpatient and inpatient general wards (57.1, 47.4%, respectively). Nurses assigned to the operating room/intensive care unit, experienced the lowest attack rates (7.1%) among all clinical staff. Serologic evidence of SARS-CoV infection was detected in 4 individuals, including 2 non-clinical workers, who had not previously been identified as SARS cases; none reported having had fever or cough. Entering the index patient's room and having seen (viewed) the patient were the behaviors associated with highest risk for infection by univariate analysis (odds ratios 20.0, 14.0; 95% confidence intervals 4.1–97.1, 3.6–55.3, respectively).
This study highlights job categories and activities associated with increased risk for SARS-CoV infection and demonstrates that a broad diversity of hospital workers may be vulnerable during an outbreak. These findings may help guide recommendations for the protection of vulnerable occupational groups and may have implications for other respiratory infections such as influenza.
A World Health Organization (WHO) medical officer consulting with physicians at a hospital in Hanoi, Vietnam provided one of the earliest descriptions of a respiratory illness that later became known as SARS. Suspicions were first raised in Vietnam when staff at a small private health care facility, Hospital A, in Hanoi began to fall ill after caring for a business traveler recently arrived from Hong Kong [
Enhanced infection control practices, cohorting of patients, and increased use of barrier protections were initiated on March 6th, after it was recognized that a severe respiratory illness was affecting several staff members. There were no negative pressure rooms at the hospital. N95 respirators, goggles, and face shields were made available to staff on March 12th [
Hospital A is a small (<60 bed) private facility in Hanoi, providing inpatient specialist, laboratory, and nursing services. At the time of the outbreak, in addition to Vietnamese staff, several expatriate nurses and physicians were employed, often as clinical specialists on short-term contract from France. This report describes SARS-CoV secondary attack rates among the cohort of hospital staff at Hospital A and presents the results of a nested case-control study designed to identify risk-factors for SARS-CoV transmission after admission of the index patient. The primary objectives were to ascertain the extent of SARS-CoV transmission among the clinical and non-clinical staff at the hospital and to determine the nature of the initial exposures to the index patient that resulted in a substantial transmission event.
We conducted a survey of symptoms and exposures among the cohort of workers at Hospital A, and a nested case-control study to assess risk factors for acquiring SARS-CoV infection after admission of the index case. For the latter study, only individuals who had worked at least one shift during the time the index patient was hospitalized were included (Figure
During the outbreak, in the final two days that the hospital was open (March 17–18, 2003), investigators obtained a comprehensive list of hospital employees and held meetings with individual units (i.e., security, nursing, etc.) to recruit study participants. Upon providing written consent, participants were asked to complete a short, self-administered questionnaire and to provide a serum specimen for determination of antibodies to SARS-CoV. Questionnaires were translated into Vietnamese and responses were back-translated into English. Information was collected regarding the participant's contact with the index patient during his stay in the hospital from February 26th (evening) to March 5th, as well as their symptoms from the time the index patient was admitted to the hospital until 10 days after he was transferred (~1.5 incubation periods [
All exposure variables were comprehensive for the period that the index patient was hospitalized at Hospital A. For example,
A physician who provided care for SARS patients at Hospital A throughout the outbreak (this physician resided temporarily at the hospital while the outbreak was ongoing) served as a proxy respondent for the staff who had died (n = 6) or were too ill (n = 1) to respond at the time of the survey. This physician had assisted WHO investigators in conducting the initial staff interviews in early March following recognition of respiratory illnesses among staff. Work shift schedules were available for 30.0% of the Hospital staff and were used to verify staff responses. The protocol was approved following expedited review by the hospital institutional review board and the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.
Laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV infection was performed at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, Georgia, USA) and was based either on detection of RNA from SARS-CoV in clinical specimens (
To determine which work-related activities may have been associated with contracting SARS-CoV infection after admission of the index case, a case-control study was performed. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for study cases and controls are outlined in Figure
Study cases were defined as persons having: (
Controls were defined as individuals within the study cohort who (
Exposure and demographic variables used for analyses were dichotomous categorical; unknown or missing data was rendered as a negative response. Non-parametric tests (
Advanced age (> 50 years) and underlying medical conditions were not significant correlates of case status in this outbreak [
A staff census prepared in February 2003, indicated that 193 individuals were employed at Hospital A at the time of the SARS outbreak. The distribution of personnel between clinical and non-clinical roles is shown in Table
Two peaks of illness onset among staff were evident, on March 4th, and 9 days later on the 13th (Figure
Overall, 79% of Hospital A staff completed the exposure and symptom questionnaire, and 64% contributed at least one serum specimen. The lowest rates of participation in the exposure and symptom survey occurred among physicians and ICU nurses staffing categories (58.6%, 57.1%, respectively), but in both instances participation increased to over 64% for the serosurvey (Table
The questionnaire was completed by proxy for seven individuals who had died or were too ill to complete the questions at the time of survey administration. Removal of these respondents from the study pool did not substantively affect study findings (shown below), therefore these responses were included analyses as appropriate.
Results of the survey regarding symptoms of illness experienced by study participants are summarized in Figure
Consistent with findings from a clinical study of SARS patients conducted in Vietnam [
Of the 124 Hospital A staff who participated in the serosurvey, 36 (29%) had at least one serum specimen that tested positive for the presence of antibody to SARS-CoV antigen (Table
These 4 newly identified seropositive individuals (2 general ward nurses, 1 laundry worker, and 1 receptionist) had mild illness and were not identified during the outbreak despite active surveillance conducted among staff at Hospital A. Among this group, the 2 General Ward nurses reported having had at least three symptoms associated with SARS illness in this outbreak (the first reported fatigue, headache, and shortness of breath; the second also reported headache along with myalgia, chills, dizziness, anorexia, and vomiting), but neither reported having experienced fever or cough, which were inclusion criteria in the WHO SARS case definition used at the time. Both nurses also reported experiencing diarrhea during the study period. However, diarrhea was common among all Hospital A workers (23% of all reporting workers) regardless of SARS case status. Neither the laundry worker nor the receptionist reported having experienced symptoms significantly associated with SARS illness in Vietnam, with the exception that the latter reported vomiting.
Twenty-two study cases and 45 controls were identified (Figure
Nearly all activities associated with physical proximity to the index patient or to his hospital rooms were significantly associated with SARS-CoV infection by univariate analysis (Table
Multivariate analyses were not performed due to the limited size of the study population.
SARS has been documented, under certain circumstances, to be highly communicable in hospital settings. Attack rates among workers with direct patient care roles have been observed as high as 10.0 and 11.8% in Canada and Hong Kong, respectively [
During several other outbreaks, airborne transmission of SARS-CoV was suggested as an important route of transmission in hospitals and residential settings [
Overall, we found that hospital workers who had greatest opportunity for proximity to the index patient were clinical staff, and among clinical staff, those with direct patient care duties experienced the highest attack rates and death rates among all categories of Hospital A workers. When Hospital A closed during the SARS outbreak, a second hospital (Hospital B) was designated to care for suspect SARS cases. There were no SARS cases among staff at Hospital B, and a serosurvey conducted among workers at the facility revealed no inapparent or asymptomatic infections despite the presence of numerous confirmed SARS cases in the wards [
A previous study of clinical workers at Hospital A suggested that the proportion of doctors and nurses using masks as a precautionary measure increased significantly after the initiation of secondary cases and that the use of masks had a significant impact on diminishing SARS-CoV transmission [
During the course of this study, four workers, none of whom had been previously identified as cases, were found to have been infected with SARS-CoV. None of the four reported having had cough or fever, but two complained of diarrhea and another had a sore throat. A similar study conducted among health care workers in Singapore, revealed serologic evidence of SARS-CoV infection in two workers (of 112 exposed individuals) who experienced only mild symptoms of illness [
There were several limitations to this study. The first is the small sample size employed for the nested case-control, which contributed to a general lack of precision in measures of effect (odds ratios), and precluded our ability to look for independent risk factors through multivariate analyses. In addition, because of the need to minimize the complexity of the questionnaire, we were unable to assess either the duration, or the intensity of potential exposures, both of which are likely to be important modifiers of absolute risk. However, our streamlined approach using generalized questions allowed us to rapidly survey a large fraction of the hospital worker population, rather than just medical professionals. Finally, there were several potential sources of bias in this study which could have affected our results and conclusions. Although we performed the study prior to closure of the hospital, while the staff were still actively engaged in the outbreak investigation, we failed to achieve full staff participation, particularly among physicians and certain categories of nurses. This could have introduced a selection bias favoring enrollment of persons with less opportunity for direct contact with the index patient. Similarly, we questioned individuals about their exposure to the index patient 13 days after he was transferred to Hong Kong, and used a proxy to complete exposure questionnaires for deceased individual. Either of these could have introduced non-systematic information (recall) bias to our findings. We attempted to minimize the influence of these potential sources of bias by using case investigation forms and physician notes to verify self-reported information when ever possible.
Many of the job-related activities identified in this study as potential risk factors for SARS-CoV infection, such as entering the patient's room, and touching a visibly contaminated surface relate to 'proximity' contacts and possibly fomite involvement. These types of contact are broadly applicable to many different job categories from receptionist to physician, implying that our concept of occupational categories at risk for nosocomial infection may need to be broadened to include many different kinds of workers without direct patient care duties [
The outbreak of SARS in northern Vietnam investigated here serves as a tragic reminder of the profound impact that the introduction of a highly communicable, virulent pathogen can have on the relatively closed community of a small hospital. In such instances, very early events following introduction can be pivotal in determining the ultimate magnitude of the outbreak and the degree of spread within the hospital. Appropriate recognition of those at highest risk of exposure and illness in conjunction with rapid, accurate identification of potential cases at the earliest stages of illness, are vital to minimizing the extent of spread. The results of this investigation highlight the diversity of workers at risk for nosocomial exposures and contribute to our understanding of risk factors for SARS-CoV transmission, which may include being in proximity to an infected patient or touching a contaminated surface.
The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests.
All authors read and approved the final manuscript. MR participated in the design of the study performed the statistical analyses and drafted the manuscript; BA participated in the design and coordinated implementation of the study; VT participated in the implementation of the study; JM participated in data analyses and preparation of the manuscript; DB participated in design of the study and preparation of the manuscript; JS participated in implementation of the study; SM participated in design of the study; KL participated in implementation of the study; VH participated in collection and analysis of laboratory diagnostic specimens; PH participated in data analysis and manuscript preparation; AP participated in design of the study; TU participated in design and implementation of study and supervised manuscript preparation.
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
We would like to acknowledge and thank the many individuals within the Ministry of Health, Socialist Republic of Vietnam for their assistance with this study, especially Dr. Trinh Quan Huan, Director, Department of Preventive Medicine. We must also thank the staff of the Hanoi French Hospital, and the WHO staff in Hanoi, in particular Roger Doran, and Pascale Brudon, the WHO Representative in Vietnam at the time of the outbreak. The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the funding agencies.
Epidemic curve of the SARS outbreak among Hospital A staff, Hanoi, 2003.
Diagram representing criteria for selection of case and control subjects to evaluate risks for SARS-CoV infection stemming from hospital exposure to the Hanoi index patient. (*) SARS cases were confirmed by serologic testing, viral culture, or RT-PCR performed on specimens obtained from persons with clinically compatible illness. (†) Excluded as study cases were SARS cases among the staff who were unlikely to have contracted infection from the index case (i.e., illness onset after March 5th, 2003 or seroconversion > 18 days after last exposure to the index patient); included as study cases are those SARS cases among the staff who had illness onset on or before Mar 5th,
Subjective symptoms of illness reposted among staff at Hospital A (n = 27 SARS cases, n = 115 non-cases), Hanoi, 2003. The presence of an asterisk indicates that the symptom was significantly associated with SARS case status (p < 0.05, Fisher's exact, two-sided). (#) indicates sample sizes for cases and non-cases of 8, and 58 respectively.
Hospital A staff by job category – SARS attack rates and serologic profiles, Hanoi, 2003.
| Direct patient care | Physician§ | 29 | 8 | 27.6 | 4 | 17 (58.6) | 19 (65.5) | 7 (36.8) |
| Midwife | 10 | 4 | 40.0 | 0 | 9 (90.0) | 8 (80.0) | 4 (50.0) | |
| Nurse¶ (gen. ward) | 19 | 9 | 47.4 | 2 | 16 (84.2) | 19 (100) | 10 (52.6) | |
| Nurse¶ (Op.Rm./ICU) | 14 | 1 | 7.1 | 0 | 8 (57.1) | 9 (64.3) | 0 | |
| Nurse¶ (other) | 7 | 4 | 57.1 | 0 | 7 (100) | 6 (85.7) | 4 (66.7) | |
| Other clinical staff | Dental | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 (100) | 1 (33.3) | 0 |
| Laboratory | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 (85.7) | 3 (42.9) | 0 | |
| Pharmacy | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (100) | 2 (100) | 0 | |
| Radiology | 6 | 2 | 33.3 | 0 | 5 (83.3) | 5 (83.3) | 1 (20.0) | |
| Physiotherapy | 1 | 1 | 100.0 | 0 | 1 (100) | 1 (100) | 1 (100) | |
| Sanitation/Kitchen | Housekeeping | 16 | 4 | 25.0 | 0 | 16 (100) | 11 (68.8) | 4 (36.4) |
| Laundry | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 (100) | 6 (85.7) | 1 (16.7) | |
| Kitchen | 5 | 1 | 20.0 | 0 | 4 (80.0) | 2 (40.0) | 1 (50.0) | |
| Other | 2 | 1 | 50.0 | 0 | 1 (50) | 1 (50.0) | 1 (100) | |
| Other non-clinical | Administration | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 (78.6) | 8 (28.6) | 0 |
| Reception | 13 | 1 | 9.1 | 0 | 10 (76.9) | 6 (46.2) | 2 (33.3) | |
| Security | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 (87.5) | 6 (75.0) | 0 | |
| Maintenance | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 (100) | 3 (100) | 0 | |
| Operations | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 (84.6) | 8 (61.5) | 0 | |
* Refers to cases identified during the course of the outbreak. 4 of the 36 initially identified SARS cases during the outbreak did not have serological confirmation, and they were replaced by the 4 additional, previously unrecognized, seropositive individuals identified during the serosurvey (n = 36).
† The case fatality rates among physicians, nurses from the general ward, and among staff with patient care duties are 50, 22, and 23%, respectively.
‡ Positive serologic results are listed as 'new' if the individual was not recognized as a symptomatic case during the outbreak, but was found to be seropositive during the course of this study.
§ Physicians cases include: Anesthetist/Anesthesiologist (3), General Practitioner (2), Pulmonary Specialist (1), Gynecologist (1), Orthopedic Surgeon (1). Radiologists are included in the 'Radiology' category.
¶ Nurses who were assigned to the general inpatient ward, or the intensive care unit/operating room are indicated, others not specifically assigned are grouped into a single category.
Comparison of survey responses and staff work schedules during the SARS index patient's hospitalization in Hanoi, Vietnam.
| Midwife (n = 10) | 9 (90) | 9 | 8 | 88.9 |
| Nurse (Op.Rm./ICU) (n = 14) | 7 (50) | 6 | 6 | 100 |
| Housekeeper (n = 16) | 16 (100) | 15 | 16 | 93.8 |
| Receptionist (n = 10‡) | 9 (90) | 9 | 7 | 77.8 |
| Security (n = 8) | 7 (87.5) | 7 | 7 | 100 |
* Shift schedules were obtained from Hospital A human resources administration for approximately 30% of Hospital A staff.
† Agreement between reported and scheduled work activity among surveyed staff.
‡ Receptionist does not include cashiers (1) and store clerks (2) who also worked in the reception area of Hospital A and who are included in Reception category in Table 1.
§ Kappa score κ = 0.476 (p = 0.002); suggests intermediate qualitative agreement for two reporting sources.
Single variable analysis of risk factors for SARS Co-V infection among hospital staff cases and controls, Hanoi, 2003.
| n = 22 | % | n = 45 | % | ||||
| Touched index patient | 2.8 | 0.9–8.5 | 0.085 | 9 | (41) | 9 | (20) |
| Talked to or touched index patient without mask‡ (ever) | 1.9 | 0.6–5.9 | 0.363 | 7 | (32) | 9 | (20) |
| Came within 1 meter of index patient | 9.3 | 2.8–30.9 | <0.001 | 17 | (77) | 12 | (27) |
| Came within 1 meter of index patient, without mask‡ (ever) | 5.4 | 1.8–16.3 | 0.003 | 14 | (64) | 11 | (24) |
| Spoke with index patient | 3.5 | 1.2–10.4 | 0.028 | 11 | (50) | 10 | (22) |
| Entered patient room | 20.0 | 4.1–97.1 | <0.001 | 20 | (91) | 15 | (33) |
| Spoke with index patient in his room | 3.7 | 1.1–12.6 | 0.052 | 8 | (36) | 6 | (13) |
| Saw (viewed) index patient | 14.0 | 3.6–55.3 | <0.001 | 19 | (86) | 14 | (31) |
| Visited patient room when patient was not there | 3.7 | 1.3–10.9 | 0.027 | 12 | (55) | 11 | (24) |
| Touched visibly contaminated surface | 7.8 | 2.3–25.9 | 0.001 | 12 | (55) | 6 | (13) |
| Entered general ward | 8.0 | 1.7–38.4 | 0.005 | 20 | (91) | 25 | (56) |
| Upper respiratory infection w/in prior 6 months | 0.2 | 0.04–0.9 | 0.039 | 2 | (9) | 15 | (33) |
| 'Other' non-clinical job¶ | 0.2 | 0.03–0.7 | 0.011 | 2 | (9) | 18 | (40) |
| Direct patient care activities | 2.0 | 0.7–5.6 | 0.298 | 13 | (59) | 19 | (42) |
| Sanitation/kitchen job | 2.2 | 0.7–7.0 | 0.223 | 7 | (32) | 8 | (18) |
*
†
‡ Respirator or surgical mask; N95 respirator masks were not widely available at Hospital A until March 12th.
§ A proportion of enrollees (n = 19 cases, n = 8 controls) were asked about a history of heart disease, lung disease, diabetes, and smoking. None of these factors had a statistically significant association with SARS cases status.
¶ Other non-clinical jobs include administration, reception, security, maintenance, operations (see Table 1).