In the USA in 2012, 4,383 workers died while on the job (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2012a). This equates to approximately 12 workers dying every day in the USA while at work (2012). In that same year, nearly three million US workers experienced non-fatal work-related illnesses and injuries for an overall incidence rate of 3.4 cases per 100 equivalent full-time workers (BLS, 2013). The costs of occupational injury and illness in the USA are an estimated $250 billion per year (Leigh, 2011). This dollar amount exceeds that of chronic diseases including cancer, diabetes, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (2011). However, substantial these numbers may appear, the true toll of work-related injury and illness is estimated to be two to three times greater due to inconsistent official data sources and likely underreporting of injuries by workers and employers (Leigh et al., 2004; United States House of Representatives, 2008).

In 2012, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 119 law enforcement officers (LEOs) died while on the job (BLS, 2012b). The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted report found 95 deaths during the same time period (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). Different inclusion criteria may be one explanation for this difference (Tiesman et al., 2013). Law enforcement work is a dangerous occupation due to the numerous hazards faced by LEOs. These hazards significantly increase the risk of dying or being seriously injured on the job and can occur in a dynamic environment. LEOs are exposed to physical hazards including violence and injury, physical exertion, armed and unarmed combat; psychological stressors such as exposure to crime scenes and exposure to death; organizational stressors such as shift work; mental health issues such as anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder; cardiovascular disease; exposure to blood and bodily fluids; and increased risk for suicide (Hessl, 2003; Deschamps et al., 2003; Violanti et al., 2012; O’Hara and Violanti, 2009; Zimmerman, 2012; Gershon et al., 2009). LEOs are also routinely exposed to a much less commonly considered job hazard, high-speed and high-risk driving situations as well as work performed along busy roadways (Tiesman et al., 2010).

Across all occupations and industries, motor-vehicle-related events (MVEs) are consistently the leading cause of work-related death in the USA In 2012, MVEs accounted for 35 percent of all occupational injury fatalities in the USA (n = 1,567) (BLS, 2012a). Work-related motor-vehicle crashes are also expensive for employers. One study estimated that a single work-related motor-vehicle fatality cost employers approximately $500,000 in direct and liability costs and a non-fatal crash cost $74,000 (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2003). MVEs were the leading cause of LEO fatalities in 2013 and have been for some time (National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), 2013). In the last decade, fatal MVEs, including motor-vehicle crashes and roadside incidents, outnumbered intentional acts of violence such as being shot, strangled, or stabbed (National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund, 2014). Besides spending numerous hours behind the wheel conducting vehicle patrols, LEOs have unique risk factors for MVEs including driving in inclement weather conditions, high-speed driving situations, working alongside interstates and roadways near speeding motor vehicles, and having a multitude of distractions inside the patrol car (Tiesman et al., 2010; Clarke and Zak, 1999). However, given these unique risk factors, LEOs can be complacent toward their increased risk for motor-vehicle crashes and roadside incidents (Wehr et al., 2012).

Risk perception has been defined as acknowledgement of the probability of incurring harm (Cox and Tait, 1991). An individual’s perception of risk plays a crucial role in occupational safety and health (Weyman and Kelly, 1999; Rosenstock et al., 1988; Melia et al., 2008; Arezes and Miguel, 2008). Not only does a worker’s perception of risk accurately predict specific safety behaviors, it has also been identified as an independent predictive factor for work-related injury (Mullen, 2004). An inaccurate perception of risk may lead to a worker’s inability to assess a situation and engage in appropriate safety precautions or behaviors (Huang et al., 2006; Harrel, 1998). This is pivotal for LEOs as they need to continually assess their risk for injury and death in an ever-changing environment. A better understanding of LEO’s risk perception and attitude toward workplace hazards and job tasks is important for the effective development and communication of workplace prevention programs and policies – especially related to motor-vehicle safety.

This special edition journal focusses on traffic and motor-vehicle safety among LEOs and fills a significant gap in the literature dealing with on-duty MVEs. The purpose of this paper is to explore LEO’s perception of risk of on-duty MVEs and identify factors that influence this risk including prior MVEs as well as knowledge of fellow officers’ motor-vehicle-related injury or death using data gathered from a large state-based study. We also compare an officers’ motor-vehicle risk perception to their risk perception of acts of intentional violence such as being assaulted or being shot on the job.

A cross-sectional design utilizing a stratified random sample was employed for this study. Data were collected via paper-and-pencil questionnaire. The questionnaire and research study were approved by the NIOSH Human Subjects Research Board and the US Government Office of Management and Budget. This project was funded by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

Our findings indicate that LEOs were aware of the likelihood of injury and death associated with on-duty MVEs. Officers’ motor-vehicle risk perception scores were significantly higher than intentional violence risk perception scores. However, this perception of risk did not extend to officers’ view of the danger of specific job activities. Officers deemed the most hazardous job tasks to be those that involved a risk for intentional injury, such as responding to calls of potential violence. Another main finding from our study was that personal experience with on-duty MVEs significantly impacted officers’ perception of motor-vehicle risk.

With the exception of 2011, MVEs have been the leading cause of on-duty death among LEOs for the prior 16 years (NLEOMF, 2013). Since the 1960s, overall law enforcement fatalities have declined; however, motor-vehicle-related deaths have risen (NLEOMF, 2013). Recently, the law enforcement community has re-focussed their efforts on improving their understanding of MVEs, and more importantly, how best to prevent them (Ashton, 2012; Batiste et al. (2011); Ashton, 2011; Gustafson, 2013). Language on officer safety and health now includes topics like seat belt use, speed caps, cell phone restriction, and intersection crossing policies. Also, programs that raise knowledge of on-duty MVEs such as Below 100 and the MoveOver campaign may also add to this increased awareness among LEOs (Stockton et al., 2010; Moveoveramerica, 2013). It is possible that this messaging is impacting how LEOs view motor-vehicle hazards. Our study demonstrated that officers were aware of the likelihood of occupational injury and death associated with on-duty MVEs as indicated by the high motor-vehicle risk perception scores. This finding is important as it demonstrates that there is a baseline awareness of the seriousness of the hazards associated with motor vehicles in law enforcement.

While officers had significantly higher motor-vehicle risk perception scores compared to intentional violence risk perception scores, officers still deemed the most hazardous job tasks to be those involving the potential for assault. In fact, literature supports that these calls can be very dangerous for LEOs (Kercher et al., 2013). In our study, nearly 90 percent of officers reported that responding to “other” scenes of violence was “dangerous” or “very dangerous.” This is in stark comparison with the 12 percent of officers who believed that driving under non-emergency conditions to be “dangerous” or “very dangerous.” Studies have found that when workers regularly perform tasks and become familiarized with them, they are more likely to underestimate the risks associated with them (Fleming and Buchan, 2002). On average, officers in our study spent over 50 percent of their workweek behind the wheel of a patrol car (mean = 22.4 hrs, data not shown). It is feasible that officers come to view driving-related job tasks as non-threatening because they are routine.

Another possible explanation of this finding is the association between perceived risk and perceived control. Studies have demonstrated that when workers perceive they have control over tasks, they generally perceive less risk for those tasks (Weyman and Kelly, 1999). It has been well-documented that many drivers consider themselves to be more skilled behind the wheel and safer than the “average” driver (Svenson et al., 1985; Dejoy 1989). This “optimism bias” also extends to driver’s views on crash risk. Many drivers believe they are less likely to be involved in a motor-vehicle crash than others (Svenson et al., 1985; Dejoy, 1989). While there are no data specific to LEOs to support this hypothesis, there is also no reason to believe LEOs would be exempt from the optimism bias.

We found that prior on-duty MVEs significantly increased officers’ perception of motor-vehicle risk. Research has demonstrated that an individual’s experience with workplace injuries helps to shape their perception of risk and in turn, response to specific workplace hazards (Nelkin and Brown, 1984; Wiegman et al., 1991; Cree and Kelloway, 1997; Rundmo, 1995). Generally, people with a history of specific injuries score higher on perceived risk measures of those injury events recurring (Watzke and Smith, 1994; Glik et al., 1991; Rundmo, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). In our study, the impact of prior MVEs was specific to motor-vehicle risk perception; occurrence of prior MVEs did not significantly impact intentional violence risk perception scores. What is currently unknown is how long after an on-duty MVE does it continue to impact an officers’ perception of risk. Also, is the severity of the MVE correlated with changes in perception of risk? Regardless, we believe that our data support a recommendation to provide LEOs with increased motor-vehicle training soon after an on-duty MVE. Intervening soon after a MVE, regardless of severity, capitalizes on this time period.

Knowledge of a motor-vehicle-related death or injury of a fellow officer was also associated with significantly higher motor-vehicle risk perception scores. Such knowledge also increased intentional violence risk perception scores, although not significantly. It may be that knowledge of a motor-vehicle death or injury affects overall perception of risk among officers. While this finding did not reach statistical significance, it may suggest a possible intervention for agencies. Prior research has found that the use of personal stories has a strong influence on workers (Lavack et al., 2008; Ricketts et al., 2010). Advances in technology such as body-worn and dash-mounted cameras allow agencies to capture events as they unfold (National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, 2012). Programs like Below 100 and the Street Survival Seminar are widely available in the USA and utilize images captured by these technologies to tell the stories of officers involved in critical incidents (Stockton et al., 2010; Calibre Press, 2013). Agencies could also consider adding personal testimonies of their own officers who have been involved in serious crashes in their driving safety training as a way to increase perception of risk and encourage others to engage in safety behaviors.

In the multivariate analysis, while motor-vehicle crashes in the previous three years had the greatest impact on motor-vehicle risk perception, prior roadside incidents were also an important predictor of motor-vehicle risk perception. While officers are trained on a variety of roadway procedures including parking a vehicle offset and using passenger-side approaches, these cannot fully prevent officers from being struck by moving vehicles. Civilian drivers must also be educated on safe roadway procedures. The Move Over America public health campaign is intended to increase public awareness of move over laws which require motorists to move into another lane of traffic when an emergency vehicle or responder is on the side of the road (Moveoveramerica, 2014). While every US state with the exception of Hawaii has a move-over law in place, a recent phone survey found that 71 percent of Americans had not heard of these laws.

While officers may feel that the prevention of roadside incidents is largely outside of their control, there are several strategies that could significantly reduce officer’s chances of being struck and killed while on the roadway. High-visibility personal protective equipment, such as reflective vests, and the use of flares and cones, alert motorists to crash scenes. The code of federal regulations states that all workers within the right-of-way of a federal-aid highway who are exposed to traffic shall wear high-visibility safety apparel (Code of Federal Regulation, 2007). The safety of officers can be further protected at crash scenes with the use of an incident management system and proper traffic management, especially for large crash scenes or scenes involving multiple vehicles. However, the decision of when to use an incident management system may be made by other non-law enforcement agencies like the Department of Transportation or local highway crews whose primary concern may be traffic backups and delays. Actively including these groups in crash response decisions may help to create a safer work environment for officers.

This study was not without limitations. First, the study was conducted in the state of Iowa and consisted of mostly small and rural law enforcement agencies. It is unknown if these findings are applicable to agencies in larger or more urban locations. Second, since the study was cross-sectional in nature, the results represent associations only and determining causation is not possible. Third, standardized and validated tools were not used to measure the construct of risk perception. Fourth, the recall period used in this study was three years. When deciding on an appropriate recall period to be used in survey research, the trade-off between minimizing recall bias and maximizing rate estimates must be balanced. Here, we used a longer recall period to calculate LEOs’ prior history of on-duty MVEs to improve capture of low-frequency events. However, by doing so we could have increased the likelihood of recall bias (Zwerling et al., 1995). Finally, the participation rate at the agency level was low at 44 percent. It is possible that agencies that chose not to participle differed from those agencies that did. However, among those agencies who did participate, the officer response rate was high at 79 percent.

We found that officers were aware of the likelihood of occupational injury and death associated with on-duty MVEs and this awareness may be due to the recent cultural change in law enforcement toward an emphasis on the prevention of on-duty MVEs. We also found that officers who had been involved in a prior on-duty MVE had higher motor-vehicle risk perception scores. There is little research on the occupational risk perception from a LEO standpoint, or even the risk perception of occupational motor-vehicle crashes with which to compare our results to. Knowledge of how an officer perceives specific job hazards and situations would be useful when developing and implementing evidence-based programs in the workplace. The adoption of protective behaviors and equipment is very much dependent on the workers’ perception of specific hazards (Huang et al., 2006). For example, restrictive driving policies, such as speed caps, may be viewed in a more favorable light if the officer is aware of the true fatality risk associated with job tasks that appear to be mundane. Perhaps working to change the culture of safe motor-vehicle operations among LEOs is a needed first step in the prevention of MVEs. Based on our findings, we believe that capitalizing on officers’ knowledge of this risk is a possible avenue for highly impactful prevention programs, which in turn may foster a safer workplace and potentially reduce occupational injuries and fatalities.