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Underpaid Boss: Gender, Job Authority, and the Association Between Underreward and Depression

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Abstract

Underreward is associated with depression—but is that association contingent upon job authority and other forms of status in the work role? And, do these patterns differ for women and men? Analyses of a national sample of American workers reveal that underreward is more strongly associated with depression among women with higher levels of job authority compared to similarly situated men. The authors then demonstrate that this

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pattern is amplified when other status elements are considered: income, skill level, autonomy, and decision latitude. These patterns are observed net of a range of sociodemographic measures, work stressors, and workplace sex composition. The findings of this study provide new insights about the gendered ways that job authority and other forms of status shape the association between underreward and depression. In doing so, the authors speak to diverse theoretical traditions related to distributive justice and engage with key ideas of reward expectation states theory. The efforts of the authors dovetail with recent interest in the gendered implications of authority and status as well as their connections to psychological distress.

Keywords
pay equity, stress, gender, authority, distributive justice, depression

The sense of being paid appropriately for the work that we do represents a basic element of distributive justice (Homans, 1974). Theory predicts—and empirical evidence confirms—that perceived underreward is related to elevated levels of unpleasant affective outcomes (Adams, 1965; Austin & Walster, 1974; Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983; Hegtvedt, 1990; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Markovsky, 1985; Walster, Walster, & Bercheid, 1978). Our study begins by first confirming this pattern: In a large national sample of workers, perceived underreward is associated with higher levels of psychological distress—as measured by a well-known index of *depressive symptoms* (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; Radloff, 1977).[1] Then, the objective of this article shifts its focus to the potential moderating factors, asking: (a) Does the relationship between underreward and depression differ across levels of job authority? (b) Does the moderating effect of authority further depend on other forms of status in the workplace? (c) How is gender influential for shaping the observed patterns related to these two research questions?

Our article contributes to social–psychological knowledge on distributive justice by discovering situational factors that function as conditional effects—that is, the demonstration of moderating contingencies (Hegtvedt, Clay-Warner, & Johnson, 2003). We draw inspiration from Hegtvedt and Parris (2014), who asserted the following in their comprehensive review: "Research on 'moderating factors' has made inroads, but falls short of the types of structural situations involving differences in power, status, and legitimacy . . . " (p. 120). In his call for

greater theoretical integration, Turner (2007) suggests specific moderating factors: "How does justice intersect with power and status dynamics, as well as expectation states associated with power and status?" (p. 290). We address these concerns by evaluating the ways that job-related authority and other kinds of statuses in the workplace intersect with gender to shape the link between underreward and depression.

Identifying the factors that modify the relationship between underreward and depression is important for several reasons. First, surveys indicate that more than 4 in 10 American workers report feeling underpaid (Jacobe, 2008; Saad, 2010). Second, underreward is a potential stressor that can harm personal and organizational well-being (Ford, 2014; Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2001; Robbins, Ford, & Tetrick, 2012; Schunck, Sauer, & Valet, 2015; Wheaton, 1999). Third, because women and men tend to work in different work conditions and positions, they may be differentially vulnerable to the strains associated with underreward. Bringing gender into the picture offers insight into the questions described earlier because the social meanings and interactional consequences of job authority—and status more broadly—are known to be gendered (Kanter, 1977; Pudrovska, 2013; Pudrovska & Karraker, 2014; Ridgeway, 2001; Schieman & Reid, 2008). For example, all else being equal, female managers are more often evaluated as less likable and less competent than male managers (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004). Considering workers' gender may elucidate the ways that job authority and other workplace statuses interact to influence the connection between perceived underreward and levels of depressive symptoms.

Theoretical Framework

We provide the following summary roadmap for the sections that follow and their associated hypotheses. We begin with the basic—and well-established—association between underreward and depression. The subsequent sections of this article then examine ways that workplace factors potentially modify that relationship. These factors revolve around social–structural arrangements that convey status, positive regard, or tangible rewards for the possessor.

The crux of our argument is that job authority represents a structural arrangement and signifier of high status that provides the fundamental foundation for *the expectation of higher rewards*. We posit that this expectation might underlie the link between underreward and depression. Moreover, as we will outline in detail, we consider the possibility

that higher status-carrying features of a job amplify expectations of higher rewards. The specific features we consider in this article are income, job skill, job autonomy, and decision latitude (Grusky, 2001; Treiman, 2001). In these predictions, our objective is to connect status-related features of the job to the sense of deservingness for appropriate pay—these conditions might further amplify job authority's effect. Furthermore, as status characteristics theory proposes, gender is also a highly salient background status characteristic that shapes the experiences of job authority and other status-related processes on the job (Ridgeway, 2001). Because we expect that gender might influence the patterns described earlier, we test for potential differences between women and men in the two- and three-way contingencies in our analyses (more on this is detailed in the Plan of Analyses section).

Violated Reward Expectations: Authority and the Link Between Underreward and Depression

According to Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen (1972), "violation of expectations about reward produce strain and some sort of pressure to change the situation" (p. 119). This identification of *strain* in early distributive justice literature presented an opportunity for alignment with the sociological study of stress (Pearlin, 1989). In the conceptual framework of the Stress Process Model (Wheaton, 1999), the violation of reward expectations represents an "underreward stressor" that is associated with unfavorable affective outcomes including distress (Hegtvedt, 2006; Hegtvedt & Parris, 2014; Narisada, 2017; Schunck et al., 2015). However, additional complexities emerge when we consider ways that job authority might moderate the relationship between underreward and depression. On one hand, the relationship might be strongest among workers with low levels of authority because they tend to have less access to economic resources, workplace control, and other forms of status (Grusky, 2001; Mirowsky & Ross, 2003). From an amplified disadvantage perspective, lower statuses might combine to exacerbate the link between underreward and depression. On the other hand, theory and prior evidence provide a compelling rationale for the alternative prediction that high levels of job authority might exacerbate the positive association between underreward and depression. As Sawaoka, Hughes, and Ambady (2015) contend,

> Powerful people are faster to perceive and react against situations in which they are victims of unfairness . . . because *power is accompanied by*

> *a sense of entitlement*, powerful people more strongly expect fair outcomes for themselves and are faster to perceive injustices that violate these expectations. (p. 1023, emphasis added)

Among those with high status, when actual rewards fall short of expectations, these violated reward expectations might foster a sharper sense of cognitive discomfort compared to those with lower status (Berger & Webster, 2006; Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983; Hegtvedt, 2006; Homans, 1974). One manifestation might be a stronger link between underreward and depression among those with high authority.

It is reasonable to suspect that authority might be linked to an enhanced sense of entitlement for fair rewards. Job authority involves relational and structural forms of control over other people and resources (Elliott & Smith, 2004; Wolf & Fligstein, 1979). This enhanced control implies greater responsibility and accountability. Because of its origins in organizational positions and role-set arrangements, Weber (1922/1968) conceived of job authority as a form of *legitimate authority* (also see Dornbush & Scott, 1975; Elliott & Smith, 2004; Zelditch, 2001). As Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund (1995) assert,

> Authority is a valued attribute of jobs, both because it confers status on a person and because the responsibilities it involves may be intrinsically rewarding . . . job authority is one of the central ways in which the financial rewards of work are allocated. (p. 407; also see Kalleberg, 2011; Reskin & Ross, 1992; Spaeth, 1985).

The status-related rewards and responsibilities afforded to individuals with authority contribute to its portrayal as a "highly coveted workplace resource" (Smith, 2002, p. 511; also see Huffman, 2016)—but this also has implications for the experience of violated reward expectations.

Expectation states and distributive justice theories identify the differential distribution of socially valued rewards such as earnings and other status-related perks (Berger et al., 1972; R. L. Cohen & Greenberg, 1982; Ridgeway, 2011). Although expectation states theory limits the scope of its predictions to task-orientated situations, Ridgeway and Nakagawa (2014) note its relevance to the work role because goal-orientated interactions occur in workplace contexts and, ultimately, "mediate access to significant life outcomes such as income, positions of authority, social prestige, or health" (p. 6). Reward expectations theory—an extension of the status value theory of distributive justice—refines this insight by recognizing the ways that situations of action link

to performance and reward structures. Berger and Webster (2006) characterize reward expectations theory as follows:

> The theory is concerned with describing how actors form reward expectations in status situations. The basic argument of the theory is that the pattern of status distinctions that have become salient in a group and the prevailing cultural beliefs on how rewards are typically distributed, which are activated from the actor's encompassing social framework, play major roles in the formation of reward expectations. The theory uses the concept of referential beliefs (or structures) introduced in the status value theory of distributive justice, and it distinguishes different types of such belief structures. (pp. 275–276)

A core tenet of reward expectations theory is that actors hold socially validated beliefs—or referential structures—that delineate how status characteristics *should align with* reward levels. Categorical structures are one form of referential structures that represent social categories, such as gender and occupation, which "involve criteria of 'who you are' in determining the distribution of rewards" (Berger & Webster, 2006, p. 276). These categorical structures contribute to distribution rules or norms that define generalized notions about the legitimate allocation of resources—that is, "who should get what" (Alves & Rossi, 1978; R. L. Cohen & Greenberg, 1982; Shepelak & Alwin, 1986). Along this vein, most prior theorizing on this topic focuses on *levels* of reward.

In this project, we apply rewards expectations theory to assert that job authority sets the parameters for situations of action within valued role positions—that is, the scope of obligations and the span of responsibilities—which, in turn, help to define status value, justice principles, and reward expectations (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Wagner, 1985; Cook, 1975; Hegtvedt, 1992; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). Extending this perspective, we propose that "who you are" (e.g., a worker with greater authority) determines not only the *levels* of reward (the distribution) but also how *violated reward expectations* (the underreward stressor) are experienced and, by extension, ultimately might correspond to psychological distress.

Violated reward expectations represent a perceived misalignment of actual rewards with attributes that signal deservingness—like legitimated authority (Berger et al., 1972; Ridgeway, 2006; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Zelditch, 2006; Zelditch & Walker, 1984). As Turner (2007) suggests: "High-power individuals are generally given the right to get more, even if their actual costs and investments are unknown or low;

such is the effect of legitimated authority" (p. 295). Others also emphasize the link between power and the sense of entitlement (e.g., De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). For workers with greater authority, having a sense of *appropriate* pay reflects the legitimation of their higher status—but feeling underpaid violates it. Indeed, research demonstrates that those with higher workplace status are more dissatisfied than those with lower status when they fail to receive what they feel is deserved (Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007). In one experimental study, Sawaoka et al. (2015) find that individuals who are primed to feel more powerful tend to be more sensitive to the experience of distributive injustice. Equity theory predicts that workers will feel greater unfairness in pay when they do not receive whatever amount they feel entitled to (Adams, 1965; Taris, Kalimo, & Schaufeli, 2002; Walster et al., 1978). As such, claims about the link between power or status and the enhanced sense of entitlement is critically important for determining the ways that individuals with different levels of job authority might experience and respond to violations of distributive justice. When actual and expected rewards are misaligned, workers with greater authority should be especially likely to experience distress because their higher status seems undervalued or called into question (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983; Hegtvedt, 2006). Collectively, we draw upon these ideas to formulate the *authority-contingent violated rewards* hypothesis: The association between underreward and depression should be stronger among individuals with high job authority.

Authority–Status Combinations and Amplified Violated Reward Expectations

Expectation states and reward expectations theories posit that actors *combine* different criteria as multiple referential structures to determine reward expectations (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). We argue that this process extends to the ways that violated reward expectations are experienced. As Berger and Webster (2006) contend: "If actors hold referential beliefs with respect to a given status characteristic, those beliefs are activated if the status characteristic becomes salient in an immediate situation" (p. 276). In work organizations, authority operates in conjunction with other forms of role performance—and the status associated with it—that corresponds with both investments and rewards. Hegtvedt (2006) asserts that "within a situation, an individual's position in terms of work

performance or authority may become salient" (p. 53). Furthermore, Hegtvedt (1989) also notes that individuals feel that they ought to be paid an amount that is appropriate to the intrinsic worth of their job—as indicated, for example, by the level of skill or training required in the work role (Hartmann, Roos, & Treiman, 1985). We apply these ideas to hypothesize that other status-related features of the work role interact with authority to amplify the experience of violated reward expectations.

With these theoretical ideas as a guide, we evaluate four core elements of job-related status*:* *personal income*, *skill level*, *job autonomy*, and *decision latitude*. Collectively, these represent role conditions that define "intrinsic worth," the "situations of action," and "work performance" that, as we noted earlier, scholars have emphasized as consequential for reward expectations.[2] Actors perceive that rewards should be allocated appropriately based on these conditions in the work role. We propose that the combinations of authority and job-related status become salient by defining expectations about reward allocation. For workers with high authority–status combinations, underreward might pose even greater challenges to one's sense of esteem, honor, and identity as a valued worker—amplifying the felt discord between the possession of higher status features of the work role and the simultaneous feeling of being underpaid. Taken together, we integrate these ideas to formulate the *status-amplified violated rewards* hypothesis: The association between underreward and depression will be strongest among individuals who possess high authority–high job-related status combinations, such as both authority *and* high income or skill.

Gender, Authority–Status Combinations, and Violated Reward Expectations

We have articulated a case for job authority as an important factor that might modify the association between underreward and depression—an association we expect to be amplified by other high-status features of a job (i.e., income, skill, autonomy, and decision latitude). In this section, we elaborate further by positing that these dynamics are likely gendered because of the way that gender as a social system is related to status and legitimacy processes (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, & Norman, 1998; P. N. Cohen, Huffman, & Knauer, 2009; Elsesser, 2016; Huffman, 2016; Ridgeway, 2001). We assess who is affected more by underreward—high-authority women or men, each with high-status related job arrangements?

On one hand, it is reasonable to argue that underreward will be more strongly associated with depression among *men* with high authority and other forms of job-related status. Reward expectations theory suggests that when a status characteristic like gender is salient, individuals who belong to the advantaged status should tend to express a greater sense of entitlement to rewards than those in the disadvantaged group (Ridgeway & Nakagawa, 2014). Stereotypes in the gender belief system delineate men as the advantaged group—with greater perceived social significance, status, competence, and valued skills (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Ridgeway, 2001, 2006; Webster & Foschi, 1988). Furthermore, stereotypes about leadership characterize men (all else being equal) as better leaders, more likeable leaders, and more deserving of higher compensation and workplace status, as compared to women leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). In short, men's authority is seen as more legitimate than women's authority. By extension, high-status men might feel even more deserving of whatever they judge to be appropriate pay. Perceived underreward could challenge this sense of entitlement and could represent a threat to men's identity as having achieved high status at work. Studies suggest that men, because of their status as the high-power group, express greater entitlement by paying themselves more for the same work relative to women (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984; Pelham & Hetts, 2001). These ideas provide the basis for one variant (A) of the *gendered-contingent violated rewards* hypothesis: The association between underreward and depression should be strongest among men with high authority—and the presence of other forms of job-related status might amplify that pattern.

On the other hand, the gendered meanings of work, status, and leadership might be deployed to predict the opposite: That underreward will be more strongly associated with depression among women, as compared to men, with greater authority and status in the work role. The gendered status beliefs and stereotypes described earlier create *barriers* for women in their attempts to not only achieve positions of job authority but also enact it (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Ridgeway, 2001, 2006). Women's job authority is often perceived as less legitimate and more likely to be questioned by subordinates, peers, supervisors, and others than is men's authority (P. N. Cohen et al., 2009; Heilman, 2001; Huffman, 2016; Jacobs, 1992; Kanter, 1977). Moreover, women with authority are often segregated into positions that are more circumscribed with less autonomy and decision latitude (Huffman, 2016; Reskin & Ross, 1992; Schieman, Schafer, & McIvor, 2013). Women

who have attained higher levels of job authority might therefore struggle to have that authority perceived as legitimate, and this struggle may be linked to physiological and emotional stress response (Pudrovska, 2013; Pudrovska & Karraker, 2014; Taylor, 2016). Furthermore, gender inequality—and workplace inequality in particular—has been linked to physiological and emotional stress response in women (Johnson, Hegtvedt, Brody, & Waldron, 2007; Pudrovska & Karraker, 2014; Simon & Nath, 2004; Taylor, 2016).

Women in positions of authority—because the basis of their job authority as legitimate is already challenged by gender stereotypes and inequality—might be especially sensitive to underreward. It is plausible that underreward among women in positions of authority might heighten the link between authority, the struggle for legitimacy, and depression because underreward could signal to women that their authority is not fully regarded as legitimate or valued. Legitimacy, therefore, might create a context in which it is difficult to challenge existing patterns, and those patterns work against or contribute to the link between underreward and depression among high-authority–high-status women. According to Ridgeway (2001), "even wealthy, powerful women are disadvantaged by gender status beliefs compared to their wealthy, powerful male peers" (p. 638). Collectively, we propose that these ideas provide the basis for an alternative variant (B) of the *gendered-contingent violated rewards* hypothesis: The association between underreward and depression should be strongest among women with high authority—and the possession of other forms of job-related status might further amplify that pattern.

Methods

Sample

To test our hypotheses, we analyze data from the 2005 Work, Stress and Health study (WSH), a national sample of the U.S. labor force. To obtain the sample, a list-assisted random digit dialing (RDD) selection drawn proportionally from all 50 states from GENESYS Sampling Systems was used. The sampling approach employed the List +1 method, which yields a higher proportion of productive numbers (Lepkowski, 1988). List-assisted RDD is widely accepted by most survey research organizations as a cost-effective alternative to the RDD methods originally developed by Waksberg (1978). List-assisted RDD increases the probability of residential numbers while minimizing

the biases often associated with nontraditional RDD techniques. The sample was based on the following criteria: (a) telephone numbers for residential households, (b) households agreeing to answer screening questions, (c) successfully screened households with one or more employed adults, and (d) eligible households with a subsampled adult who agreed to be interviewed. To be eligible, individuals had to be aged 18 years or older and in the paid labor force. Of the total number of eligible individuals (2,544), 71% (1,800) participated and completed the interview. In our analyses, we followed others' approach (e.g., Schunck et al., 2015) by excluding the self-employed—that is, people who pay themselves—because the processes associated with perceptions of pay are distinct from those who are paid by an employer. This provided an analytic sample of 1,498 cases (904 women and 594 men). To provide a sense of the national representativeness of the WSH data, we report age and race comparisons (Appendix A) and occupation-by-gender comparisons (Appendix B) with the 2005 American Community Survey (ACS)—one of the largest household surveys in the United States (see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about.html).

Focal Measures

Depressive symptoms. We examine one of the most commonly studied forms of psychological distress: *depressive symptoms* (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003). These items ask study participants the number of days in the past 7 days that they felt "sad," "unable to shake the blues," "that everything was an effort," "couldn't get going," "tired or run down," "had trouble keeping your mind on what you were doing," and "had trouble getting to sleep or staying asleep." We averaged responses to these seven items to create the depression index ($\alpha = .83$).[3]

Perceived underreward. We assess perceived underreward with the following item: "When you think about the pay you get for your work, do you feel you are underpaid a lot, underpaid a little, paid about right, overpaid a little, or overpaid a lot?" Response choices are coded $0 = paid\ about\ right$, $1 = underpaid\ a\ little$, and $2 = underpaid\ a\ lot$. We excluded individuals who reported over-reward because of concerns about data sparseness; only 57 individuals reported feeling "overpaid a little" and 7 others reported feeling "overpaid a lot."[4]

Job authority. We used four items to assess job authority: (a) "Do you influence or set the rate of pay received by others?" (b) "Do you have

the authority to hire or fire others?" (c) "Do you supervise or manage anyone as part of your job?" and, if a participant answered "yes" to the last question, (d) "Do any of those individuals supervise or manage others?" These items are similar to those in other studies (Elliott & Smith, 2004; Schieman & Reid, 2009). We coded "no" responses 0 and "yes" as 1 and then summed responses such that higher scores indicate more authority. To minimize concerns about data sparseness, we combined scores of 3 and 4 into one category because of the small number of respondents who answered "yes" to all items ($n = 58$).

Income. Income is assessed with the question: "For the complete year of 2004, what was your total personal income, including income from all of your paid jobs, before taxes?" Given the highly skewed distribution, we logged income for the analyses.

Skill. To measure skill level, we averaged two indicators. The first uses the following question to measure respondents' perceptions of the skill level required for their jobs:

> If you had to guess, about how long would it take the average person to learn how to do your job?... Think about the main tasks, duties, or responsibilities—or those that you think are most important aspects of your job.

Time unit options (i.e., weeks, months, years) were open. We coded responses into months and logged this measure to reduce skewness. Given the conceptual and empirical overlap between this item and the question about education, we combined these two items to create the skill index. Education level is coded follows: $0 = less\ than\ high\ school$, $1 = high\ school\ graduate/GED$, $2 = some\ college\ but\ no\ degree\ earned$, $3 = associate's\ degree\ (2\ years)$, $4 = college\ graduate\ (BA\ or\ BS)$, and $5 = postgraduate/advanced\ degree\ (MA,\ PhD)$. We standardized (because of their different scales) and averaged the two items to create the index.

Autonomy. We use two items to measure autonomy. The first taps the closeness of supervision in relation to task autonomy: "How often does someone else decide how you do your work?" Response choices are $1 = never$, $2 = rarely$, $3 = sometimes$, and $4 = frequently$. We reverse coded the responses so that higher scores indicate more freedom from close supervision. Another question asks about the degree of autonomy

in scheduling work: "Who usually decides when you start and finish work each day at your main job? Is it someone else, or can you decide within certain limits, or are you entirely free to decide when you start and finish work?" We coded responses as 0 = *no control*, 1 = *limited control*, and 2 = *full control*. We standardized the two items (because of different response choices) and averaged them to create the autonomy index.[5]

Decision latitude. We use four items that tap various aspects of decision latitude (or job challenge) that reflect degree of decision-making, problem-solving and learning, and control over the pace of work: "How often do you make decisions on what needs to be done?" "How often do you have the chance to solve problems?" "How often do you have the chance to learn new things?" and "How often do you control the speed at which you work?" Response choices are 1 = *never*, 2 = *rarely*, 3 = *sometimes*, and 4 = *frequently*. We averaged the items such that higher scores indicate greater decision latitude at work. The distribution of scores on this index revealed severe negative skew such that few cases reported "never" or "rarely." To effectively reduce this severe negative skew, we follow the advice of Hamilton (2013) and cube the index.[6]

Control Measures

All models adjust for demographic characteristics, occupation measures, stressors, and gender composition (see Appendix D for basic descriptive statistics). *Age* is coded in years; *non-Hispanic Whites* are contrasted with African Americans and the remaining as "other"; *married* are contrasted with previously married and never married; *number of children* counts those younger than 18 years residing at home. To minimize confounding threats from *health conditions*, we include an index that sums the following (*no* = 0, *yes* = 1): high blood pressure, high cholesterol, dermatitis/skin problems, allergies or asthma, diabetes or high blood sugar, arthritis or rheumatism, any kind of stomach problem like ulcers or acid reflux, or heart disease.

To assess *occupation*, we used open-ended information about the job title of the "main job at which you worked last week." We contrast professional with all others (administrative, service, craft, and labor). We assessed *job sector* by contrasting private for-profit with government and non-profit. To assess *job tenure*, one item asks: "How many

years have you worked at your current job?" We also included a measure of the total *hours* per week of work.

In addition to demographic characteristics and occupation-related measures, we account for work-related stressors. We use a set of items to measure *job demands*: "In the past 30 days, has anyone at work made too many demands on you?" If participants reported yes, we then asked about the role-set source of those demands: "Was it a supervisor, someone you supervise, customer/client, coworker, or someone else at work?" Participants could choose any source and describe the frequency of demands: 1 = *rarely*, 2 = *sometimes*, or 3 = *frequently*. Individuals who reported "no one made too many demands" are coded 0. We then asked a follow-up question: "How often do the demands of your job exceed those doable in an 8-hour workday?" Response choices are 0 = *never*, 1 = *rarely*, 2 = *sometimes*, and 3 = *frequently*. We standardized the items (because of different response choices) and averaged them to create the job demands index.

The *interpersonal conflict* at work items ask about the following in the past 30 days (Schieman & Reid, 2008, 2009): "someone treated you unfairly," "someone blamed or criticized you for something that wasn't your fault," "someone did not do the work that needed to be done or did it in a sloppy or incompetent way," "someone got annoyed or angry with you," "someone gossiped or talked about you behind your back," "someone teased or nagged you," and "someone gave you unclear directions about work you needed to do." Response choices are coded as 0 = *no* and 1 = *yes*. We summed the responses to create the interpersonal conflict at work index.

Three items measure *work–nonwork interference* (Bellavia & Frone, 2005; Schieman, Milkie, & Glavin, 2009): "How often does your job interfere with your home or family life?" "How often does your job interfere with your social or leisure activities?" "How often do you think about things going on at work when you are not working?" Response choices are 1 = *never*, 2 = *rarely*, 3 = *sometimes*, and 4 = *frequently*. We averaged the items for the index ($\alpha = .68$).[7]

In addition to work-related stressors, we measure the *gender composition* of the workplace by assessing the gender of superiors, subordinates, and coworkers. For the gender of superiors, in the regression analyses we compare those who reported having only women superiors to three other groups: those who have only men superiors, those who have a mix of women and men superiors, and those who have no superiors. We repeated this same procedure to measure the gender composition of subordinates and other coworkers. We also included a

more general measure of the gender composition of the study participant's occupation using data from O*Net in the form of the overall percentage of women in the respondent's occupation (see http://www.onetonline.org).

It is especially important to statistically control for *workplace stressors* and *gender composition*, as we do in our analyses, because of their potential influence on the gendered nature of job authority, status, and reward expectations. Women with authority often encounter negative workplace climates, including interpersonal conflict (Heilman et al., 2004; Kanter, 1977; Korabik & Van Kampen, 1995; Pudrovska & Karraker, 2014; Ridgeway, 2011; Taylor, 2010) and these climates have been found to be related to physiological stress response and depression (Manago & Taylor, 2015; Pudrovska & Karraker, 2014; Taylor, 2016). Likewise, the work–family interface is gendered and its associated strains are linked to distress (Hochschild, 1997; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004; Kalleberg, 2011; Risman, 1998).

It is important to account for gender composition of the workplace for several reasons. First, women in male-dominated occupations are even more likely than women in more sex-balanced occupations to have their legitimacy as leaders questioned (Heilman, 2001; Heilman et al., 2004). Moreover, gender composition provides a source of reference groups and social comparisons (Berger et al., 1972; Gibson & Lawrence, 2010; Hegtvedt, 2006; Valet, 2018), and women may develop pay expectations and evaluations relative to other women when those women are closer in proximity, position, and perceived similarity (Bylsma & Major, 1994; Bylsma, Major, & Cozzarelli, 1995; Crosby, 1976; Duguid, Loyd, & Tolbert, 2012; Jackson, Gardner, & Sullivan, 1992; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Major, 1994; Sumner & Brown, 1996). For instance, Valet (2018) finds that women employed in male-dominated occupations report their earnings to be more unjust compared to women employed in female-dominated occupations. Furthermore, high-status women compare themselves, in terms of pay, with other high-status men, rather than lower status women, given high-status men's closer proximity and positioning to high-status women (Gibson & Lawrence, 2010; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992), and these processes would likely operate differently in male-dominated occupations, as compared to more mixed-sex occupations. For example, when professional women compare themselves to professional men they express greater levels of dissatisfaction than when they compare themselves to other women, likely because professional women tend to be paid less than professional men and have poorer working conditions (Buchanan, 2008; Zanna, Crosby, & Loewenstein, 1987).

In sum, if reward expectations equalize as status achievements converge for women and men, then high-status women might be more sensitive to underreward because of discrepancies in rewards between women and men or cognitive awareness of gender inequality in workplace rewards (Gibson & Lawrence, 2010). Because we seek to isolate the gendered effects of perceived underpayment, job authority, and other job-related statuses, our analyses statistically control for the influences of workplace stressors and gender composition.

Plan of Analyses

We report the findings from our analyses in two parts. In the first part, the base model regresses depression on underreward, authority, income, skill, autonomy, and decision latitude (Table 1). Model 2 adds a two-way interaction term for Underreward × Authority to test if the association between underreward and depression is contingent upon level of authority (Table 1). Model 3 adds a three-way interaction term for Underreward × Authority × Gender to evaluate if that two-way interaction term differs significantly between women and men (Table 1). Then we test if income, skill, autonomy, and decision latitude further elaborate on those patterns (Table 2). We test each three-way term (e.g., Underreward × Authority × Income) separately for men and women—and we also pool the sample to test for statistical significance of each four-way term (e.g., Underreward × Authority × Income × Gender) (Table 2).[8] All models adjust for the entire set of control variables.

Results

Model 1 of Table 1 shows an overall association between perceived underreward and elevated levels of depression ($b = .135$, $SE = .046$, $p < .01$). Women report higher average levels of depression than men, while the following are associated with lower depression: income, skill, and decision latitude; job autonomy is unrelated to depression net of these other conditions.

Does the relationship between underreward and depression differ across levels of job authority? As shown in Model 2, the nonsignificant coefficient for the Underreward × Authority interaction term ($b = .038$, $SE = .043$) indicates that the relationship between underreward and depression does not initially differ across levels of authority. However, as shown in Model 3, the statistically significant coefficient

Table 1. Depressive Symptoms Regressed on Underreward, Job Authority and Status, and Control Variables (Women, $N = 904$; Men, $N = 584$).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Focal variables			
Underreward	.135**	.139**	.058
Job Authority	−.012	−.007	−.050
Women	.389***	.391***	−.401***
Underreward × Job Authority		.038	−.044
Underreward × Women			.155
Job Authority × Women			.118
Underreward × Job Authority × Women			.176*
Income	−.133*	−.131*	−.131*
Skill Level	−.165**	−.161**	−.154**
Job Autonomy	−.063	−.063	−.053
Decision Latitude	−.010***	−.010***	−.010***
Control variables			
Age	−.020***	−.020***	−.020***
Black[a]	.164	.167	.172
Other[a]	−.192	−.185	−.190
Previously married[b]	.255**	.257**	.260**
Never married[b]	−.165	−.165	−.178
Children at home	.062	.062	.068
Health conditions	.247***	.247***	.246***
Professional = 1	−.123	−.127	−.147
Private sector = 1	.057	.057	.047
Job tenure	.001	.001	.000
Work hours	−.003	−.003	−.003
Job demands	.146**	.145**	.147**
Interpersonal conflict	.330***	.330***	.343***
Work-to-home conflict	.386***	.386***	.387***
No superiors[c]	.103	.105	.109
Men superiors only[c]	−.054	−.051	−.047
Men and women superiors[c]	.142	.151	.153
No subordinates[d]	.090	.096	.155
Men subordinates only[d]	.092	.100	.135
Men and women subordinates[d]	.044	.040	.068
No coworkers[e]	.097	.098	.098
Men coworkers only[e]	.115	.113	.099
Men and women coworkers[e]	−.070	−.072	−.077
Percentage of women in occupation	−.000	−.000	−.000
Constant	.975	.966	.937

Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown (standard errors available upon request).

[a]Compared to Whites.

[b]Compared to married.

[c]Compared to workers who have female superiors only.

[d]Compared to workers who have female subordinates only.

[e]Compared to workers who have female coworkers only.

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Table 2. Three-Way Interactions Predicting Depressive Symptoms.

	Women ($N = 904$)	Men ($N = 584$)
Does the interaction between underreward and job authority differ by income?		
Underreward	.152*	.118
Job Authority	.063	.017
Income	−.149	−.065
Underreward × Job Authority	.133*	−.014
Underreward × Income	.075	−.056
Job Authority × Income	.083	−.061
Underreward × Job Authority × Income	.246**	.010
Does the 3-way interaction differ for women and men?	.252*	
Does the interaction between underreward and job authority differ by skill?		
Underreward	.160*	.116
Job Authority	.064	−.021
Skill	−.202*	−.116
Underreward × Job Authority	.128*	−.005
Underreward × Skill	.040	−.064
Job Authority × Skill	.034	−.021
Underreward × Job Authority × Skill	.189**	−.003
Does the 3-way interaction differ for women and men?	.226*	
Does the interaction between underreward and job authority differ by autonomy?		
Underreward	.169*	.104
Job Authority	.072	−.055
Job Autonomy	.056	−.133
Underreward × Job Authority	.127*	−.011
Underreward × Job Autonomy	.190*	−.011
Job Authority × Job Autonomy	.078	.110
Underreward × Job Authority × Job Autonomy	.254**	.034
Does the 3-way interaction differ for women and men?	.248*	
Does the interaction between underreward and job authority differ by decision latitude?		
Underreward	.111	.124
Job Authority	.129	−.075
Decision Latitude	−.011***	−.007*
Underreward × Job Authority	.082	−.024
Underreward × Decision Latitude	.001	.007
Job Authority × Decision Latitude	−.005	.005
Underreward × Job Authority × Decision Latitude	.014**	−.002
Does the 3-way interaction differ for women and men?	.015*	

Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown in the table (standard errors available upon request). Results based on models that include all of the control variables are listed in Table 1.

*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$, ***$p<.001$ (two-tailed test).



Figure 1. Relationship between perceived underreward and depressive symptoms at low versus high levels of job authority by gender ($N = 1{,}498$).

for the Underreward × Authority × Gender three-way term ($b = .176$, $SE = .087$, $p < .05$) indicates that job authority moderates the association between underreward and depression—and it does so differently for women and men. Figure 1 illustrates this pattern, showing that the relationship between underreward and depression is more positive among individuals with greater authority—but only among women. These different observations for women and men support the alternative variant (B) of the hypothesized gender-contingent effect of job authority that we articulated earlier.

The next set of analyses (Table 2) evaluates the ways that income, skill, autonomy, and decision latitude might further elaborate on the pattern demonstrated in Model 3 of Table 1. The upcoming sections show that the association between underreward and depression is amplified among high-authority women with greater income, skill, autonomy, and decision latitude.

Income

Starting with the top set of rows in Table 2, among women the coefficient for the three-way Underreward × Authority × Income term ($b = .246$,



Figure 2. Interaction of perceived underreward and job authority predicting depressive symptoms at low- versus high-income levels (women, $N = 904$).

$SE = .086$, $p < .01$) indicates that the two-way interaction between underreward and authority varies by level of income. As Figure 2 illustrates, the association between underreward and depression is stronger among high-authority women who earn more personal income (right panel).[9] By contrast, among men we find a nonsignificant coefficient for the three-way Underreward × Authority × Income interaction term ($b = .010$, $SE = .081$, *ns*). Next, we test if this three-way interaction term is statistically different for women and men; the significant four-way coefficient for the Underreward × Authority × Income × Gender interaction term ($b = .252$, $SE = .110$, $p < .05$) suggests that it is.

Skill

Moving down the rows in Table 2, we show the results for our tests of whether skill level modifies the two-way interaction between underreward and authority. The findings are similar to those for income: Among women, we find a statistically significant coefficient for the Underreward × Authority × Skill term ($b = .189$, $SE = .065$, $p < .01$), which indicates that the interaction effect for underreward and authority is contingent upon skill. Figure 3 shows that the positive association



Figure 3. Interaction of perceived underreward and job authority predicting depressive symptoms at low- versus high-skill levels (women, $N = 904$).

between underreward and depression is stronger among high-authority women who possess a high skill level (right panel). We also find gender differences: Among men, we observe a nonsignificant coefficient for the three-way Underreward × Authority × Skill term ($b = -.003$, $SE = .075$, *ns*). Moreover, our test whether the three-way interaction is statistically different between women and men is again confirmed—We find a significant four-way term for Underreward × Authority × Skill × Gender ($b = .226$, $SE = .105$, $p < .05$).

Autonomy

The subsequent rows in Table 2 report the results for job autonomy as a contingency—again revealing patterns consistent with those observed for income and skill level. Among women, the significant coefficient for the three-way Underreward × Authority × Autonomy term ($b = .254$, $SE = .094$, $p < .01$) indicates that the interaction between underreward and authority varies by level of autonomy. As Figure 4 illustrates, the association between underreward and depression is stronger among high-authority women who also have autonomy in the work role (right panel). By contrast, among men there is a nonsignificant



Figure 4. Interaction of perceived underreward and job authority predicting depressive symptoms at low versus high job autonomy (women, $N = 904$).

coefficient for the three-way Underreward × Authority × Autonomy term ($b = .033$, $SE = .078$, *ns*). Moreover, we find additional support for gender differences with a significant four-way coefficient for the Underreward × Authority × Autonomy × Gender interaction term ($b = .248$, $SE = .123$, $p < .05$).

Decision Latitude

In the final set of rows of Table 2, we describe the findings for decision latitude as a contingency. Among women, the coefficient for the Underreward × Authority × Decision Latitude term ($b = .014$, $SE = .004$, $p < .01$) indicates that the interaction between underreward and authority varies by level of decision latitude on the job. Figure 5 illustrates that the association between underreward and depression is stronger among high-authority women who also have greater decision latitude (right panel). By contrast, among men we find a nonsignificant coefficient for the Underreward × Authority × Decision Latitude term ($b = -.002$, $SE = .004$, *ns*). And once again, we find consistent evidence that these patterns differ between women and men: We observe a



Figure 5. Interaction of perceived underreward and job authority predicting depressive symptoms at low versus high decision latitude (women, $N = 904$).

significant four-way interaction coefficient for the Underreward × Authority × Decision Latitude × Gender term ($b = .015$, $SE = .006$, $p < .05$).

Discussion

We first tested the *authority-contingent violated rewards* hypothesis, which predicted that the association between underreward and elevated levels of depression would be stronger among individuals with greater job authority. We failed to find support for that prediction in the overall sample—that is, when we tested the two-way interaction between underreward and authority, the observed coefficient was not statistically significant. However, we elaborated on that pattern when we tested the alternative *gendered-contingent violated rewards* hypothesis: The association between underreward and depression was stronger among those with greater authority—but that was observed among women only (support for variant B). Furthermore, we found support for the *status-amplified violated rewards* hypothesis—but, once again, only among women. The association between underreward and depression was stronger among women with higher authority–status

combinations (e.g., Authority × Income). While underreward was linked with elevated depression among men overall, we failed to find support for the *authority-contingent violated rewards* or the *status-amplified violated rewards* hypotheses among men. Collectively, our findings suggest that the relationship between perceived underreward and levels of depressive symptoms is contingent on combinations of job authority and other forms of status at work—and those contingencies appear to manifest more strongly among women relative to men.

Conclusion

When reward expectations are violated and one feels underpaid, theory predicts negative affective outcomes such as psychological distress (Hegtvedt, 2006). Furthermore, expectation states and reward expectations theory suggest that possessing higher status in the work role might amplify the distress associated with underreward. These points are especially relevant given claims about the intensified sense of entitlement to fair rewards among individuals with higher status (e.g., Diekmann et al., 2007; Sawaoka et al., 2015). Integrating status characteristics theory, we then proposed that gender—as a system that includes gender stereotypes and their links to status beliefs—further elaborates on these dynamics. According to Ridgeway (2001),

> As a diffuse, very general social role, gender is more likely to be present in the workplace as an implicit background identity that modifies in varying degrees the performance and evaluation of other roles, like worker and manager, that are more salient in the situation than it is. (p. 644)

We tested alternative predictions about gender differences in the interrelationships among underreward, authority–status combinations, and depression. According to status characteristics and expectation states theories, men tend to inhabit the more highly valued state—and therefore generally tend to receive more honor, esteem, and resource advantages in society. Job authority, on the other hand, is a *specific* status characteristic associated with the work role, and its possessor has status value. The combining principle (or multiple standards) in expectation states theory implies that high-authority men represent a combination of diffuse (gender) and specific (high authority) states that presumably have greater status value than similarly situated women. Reward expectations theory predicts that violated reward expectations should represent a greater insult and threat to identity among those with higher

statuses because they possess a heightened sense of entitlement to whatever they perceive as an appropriate reward. In light of this scenario, we should have subsequently observed that the relationship between underreward and depression is strongest among men with greater job authority. However, we found the opposite pattern: Job authority moderated the link between underreward and depression only among women, and other indicators of job-related status amplified that pattern for women and not for men.

These observations encourage an alternative interpretation regarding the predictions of status characteristics and expectation states theories. That is, we can understand our findings from the angle of high status: High-authority women's disadvantaged status and barriers they face *and* their sense of entitlement as compared to men's advantaged status *and* the sense of entitlement they might possess. In other words, it might be the particular combination of entitlement and structural barriers that contributes to variations in the link between perceived underreward and levels of depressive symptoms. Status characteristics and expectation states theories underscore that status beliefs shape perceptions of legitimacy for low-status (disadvantaged) and high-status (advantaged) groups (Berger et al., 1998; Ridgeway & Berger, 1986). These beliefs influence the ways that men and women in formal roles (e.g., the work role) are given access to authority and resources, as well as the nature of their evaluation in these roles (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). In circumstances where gender is salient—for example, in matters related to authority and leadership in the workplace—women are perceived as less status worthy compared to men and often encounter more negative responses to their assertions of authority (Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway & Nakagawa, 2014). Moreover, some scholars suggest that "ascriptive inequalities in workplace power . . . increase at higher levels of power" (Elliott & Smith, 2004, p. 365). Status beliefs related to gender therefore create obstacles for women as they attempt to enact authority at the same level as men. Collectively, these processes can be applied to understand why underreward is most strongly associated with depression among high-authority women who also possess other indicators of status on the job. Perceived underreward reflects these barriers that high-achieving women encounter and might represent a process in which high-status women find themselves encountering the glass ceiling.

While we have sought to draw upon the ideas embedded in expectation states, reward expectations, and status characteristic theories, we also recognize that there might be other reasons why women with high

authority and workplace status experience such a strong link between perceived underreward and depression. For example, compared to their lower status peers, women who have achieved higher status tend to have more exposure to egalitarian ideals (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004), an increased cognitive awareness of inequality (Davis & Robinson, 1991), and a greater anticipation of distress when faced with pay injustice (Johnson et al., 2007). These dynamics may intensify as women experience greater authority (Elliott & Smith, 2004). It is therefore plausible that high-status women might be especially attuned to the injustice of underreward and therefore likely to feel entitled to pay fairness.

Another area that requires additional attention involves the social comparison processes involved in the patterns we have articulated in this article. Our measure of perceived underreward is ambiguous in terms of its reference or comparison standard. Because these data do not contain explicit information about expectations or norms, we can only make assumptions about social comparison processes. Surveys that contain measures with clearer comparison points might provide greater insight about the experiences of underreward among high-status women—and the reasons for their elevated depressive symptoms. The underlying comparison processes might be complicated by the fact that women in positions of authority often face persistent stereotypes that perpetuate the notion that women, in general, are not well-suited to leadership positions; men, on the other hand, do not face similar stereotypes. We contend that situating social comparison processes within a gendered lens of job authority and status might further advance insights about the gendered experiences of underreward. In addition, we have suggested ways that higher status workers feel entitled to appropriate rewards—and that violated reward expectations might challenge their sense of esteem and identity. Future research might consider how self-concept and identity processes play out differently across the spectrum of workplace power and status, and especially in a workplace context where women's leadership abilities are devalued.

A few other study limitations and suggestions for future research deserve consideration. First, we provide analyses of cross-sectional data so any conclusions about causal dynamics are limited. While theoretical propositions suggest that negative affect results from underreward, it might be that individuals with more depressive symptoms see their work roles in a more negative light. That prospect is certainly plausible, but the demonstration of interaction effects based on social–structural arrangements complicates that assertion. If reverse causality were operating in these data, this would imply that depression

is *causing* perceived underreward—but given our observations, this would mean that such a dynamic would *mainly* be occurring among high-authority women with greater job-related status. The rationale for this direction of causality is less compelling than the other way around—that is, as equity theory predicts, underreward causes distress (and status characteristics and situational factors function as moderators; Hegtvedt, 2006). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that with cross-sectional data we cannot make any definitive claims regarding causality. Moreover, selection effects are possible. However, if depression or perceived underreward had tended to select study participants out of work roles that entail greater authority or other forms of high status, then it seems unlikely that we would have observed the patterns that we found among high-authority women. Nonetheless, we recommend that future research replicate these complex patterns with longitudinal data that tracks women and men over time. This would challenge researchers to trace *changes* in levels of job authority, perceptions about pay, and dimensions of status in their efforts to map causal relationships and determine the effects of any selection processes.

In closing, one motivation for this article is the fact that more than 4 in 10 American workers perceive underpayment—a workplace stressor that can undermine personal and organizational functioning. Consistent with an enduring concern in the sociological study of stress and mental health, we subsequently demonstrated that the link between underreward and depression is *unevenly distributed in the population*. In our effort to elaborate on this pattern, we shed new light on the intersection of gender, job authority, and other forms of workplace status as contingencies. Our rationale for these particular combinations follows from calls for greater theoretical integration, especially of social–psychological traditions related to expectation states, reward expectations, and status characteristics. Moreover, our findings parallel scholarship that shows the gendered nature of job authority and its health implications. For example, Pudrovska and Karraker (2014) found that women with greater job authority reported more depression compared to those without authority; by contrast, men with authority reported less depression than men without authority. Those authors suggest that the social conditions of women's job authority are more difficult than those of men (e.g., legitimacy as being a leader is routinely questioned)—and this inequality may negatively impact high-authority women's mental health. The processes associated with perceived underreward represent potential mechanisms to further understand the gendered health implications of job authority. As we noted at the start of

this article, we drew inspiration from recent social–psychological literature that encourages new knowledge about the factors that function as conditional effects in distributive justice processes. Our effort to show the ways that a multitude of social–structural factors elaborate on the relationship between underreward and depression speaks directly to that encouragement.

Appendix A

Table A1. Age and Race Comparisons Between the ACS and the WSH.

	2005 ACS	2005 WSH
Age, years		
18–29	.229	.173
30–39	.202	.209
40–49	.226	.274
50–59	.186	.234
60+	.158	.108
Race		
White	.675	.721
Black	.105	.152
Hispanic	.105	.076
Asian	.041	.025
Other	.074	.027

Note. Proportions are shown in the table. ACS = 2005 American Community Survey; WSH = 2005 Work, Stress and Health study.

Appendix B

Table B1. Occupational Status by Gender Comparisons Between the ACS and the WSH.

	Women		Men	
	2005 ACS	2005 WSH	2005 ACS	2005 WSH
Occupation				
Managerial, professional	.374	.319	.316	.263
Tech, sales, admin	.353	.412	.181	.264
Protective services	.010	.009	.031	.064
Services	.189	.202	.102	.080
Precision production, craft	.008	.011	.181	.148
Operators, laborers	.065	.048	.189	.181

Note. Proportions are shown in the table. ACS = 2005 American Community Survey; WSH = 2005 Work, Stress and Health study.

Appendix C

Table C1. Correlation Matrix.

	Job authority	Income	Skill	Job autonomy	Decision latitude
Job authority	1.00	.267	.182	.200	.291
Income	.322	1.00	.460	.200	.278
Skill	.238	.463	1.00	.160	.314
Job autonomy	.196	.177	.186	1.00	.239
Decision latitude	.282	.285	.273	.210	1.00

Note. Correlations for men presented below the marginal. Correlations for women presented above the marginal. All correlations are significant at $p < .001$.

Appendix D

Table D1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Gender Comparisons.

	Women ($N = 904$)	Men ($N = 594$)
Focal variables		
Depressive Symptoms	2.159***	1.528
Underreward	1.874***	1.710
Job authority	0.667***	0.869
Income (logged)	3.281***	3.645
Skill	−0.045*	0.038
Job autonomy	−0.145*	−0.052
Decision latitude	3.467*	3.527
Control variables		
Age	43.249	42.731
White	0.676**	0.749
Black	0.185**	0.133
Other	0.139	0.118
Married	0.502***	0.604
Previously married	0.250***	0.138
Never married	0.248	0.258
Number of children	0.811	0.785
Health conditions	1.713***	1.401
Professional = 1	0.313**	0.239
Private sector = 1	0.600***	0.690
Job tenure	7.853**	9.130
Work hours	40.049***	46.227
Job demands	0.044	0.031

(continued)

Table D1. Continued

	Women ($N = 904$)	Men ($N = 594$)
Interpersonal conflict	0.033	0.013
Work-to-home conflict	2.498	2.523
No superiors	0.061	0.067
Men superiors only	0.271***	0.650
Women superiors only	0.439***	0.140
Men and women superiors	0.223***	0.143
No subordinates	0.633***	0.586
Men subordinates only	0.021	0.135
Women subordinates only	0.142***	0.040
Men and women subordinates	0.204	0.239
No coworkers	0.225	0.266
Men coworkers only	0.040***	0.170
Female coworkers only	0.171***	0.044
Men and women coworkers	0.564	0.520
Percentage of women in occupation	67.852***	32.125

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests for statistically significant differences between men and women).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Notes

1. For the sake of brevity, we will refer to depressive symptoms as "depression" and perceived underpayment as "underreward"—recognizing that in the first instance we are talking about *symptoms* and in the second instance we are referring to subjective accounts or *perceptions*.

2. We recognize that, conceptually speaking, personal income might be viewed as somewhat different from these other characteristics (which could be considered compensable, job-related status factors). Our basic point here is that each of these represents, to varying degrees, some aspect of job-related status, and that it is important to consider the ways these combine with job authority to shape the relationship between perceived underreward and depression.
3. A reviewer suggested that underreward can be conceptualized as a situational stimulus that provokes an emotional reaction—as in the conventional experimental design of an episode or event of underreward, followed by a negative emotional response. However, scholars in the stress process tradition have conceptualized underreward as a form of role strain because it can be an enduring chronic experience that is linked to the everyday structural arrangements of the work role (Pearlin, 1989; Wheaton, 1999). Repeated exposure to underreward might correspond with generalized symptomology like depressive symptoms. Within the stress process perspective, researchers have identified depressive symptoms as especially sensitive to these kinds of enduring undesirable role circumstances (e.g., Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; Pearlin & Bierman, 2013; Pearlin, Menaghan, Lieberman, & Mullan, 1981). Based on this conceptualization of underreward as a chronic stressor, we maintain that the generalized index of depressive symptoms is worth investigating. In this regard, we see one contribution of this article to be the encouragement of a greater alignment of the stress process and distributive justice literatures on the topic of perceived underreward.
4. Separate analyses confirmed that these thin cells were especially problematic for estimates involving the three- and four-way interaction tests. We considered the approach of including overreward with the appropriately paid but ultimately decided against it because theoretical and empirical distinctions set "overpaid" and "appropriately paid" appraisals apart (Hegtvedt, 2006; Hegtvedt & Parris, 2014), and because there were simply too few cases for meaningful analyses of interaction terms. Future research with larger samples is required to more effectively investigate the status-based and gendered experience of over-reward. In addition, in this article, we chose to analyze underreward as a continuous measure because analyses of three- and four-way interactions; retaining the categories meant multiple comparisons of categorical contrasts with multiple combinations of two other variables (i.e., authority and income, and authority and skill). This made the presentation and interpretations of results quite cumbersome and unwieldy. Future research might consider multiple item index with a wider range of response choices.
5. We recognize that these two items have sometimes been examined separately as indicators of freedom from supervision and schedule control. In our initial analyses, these items had similar and overlapping moderating effects. For the

sake of brevity and presentation, we therefore decided to combine them into a single "autonomy" index—but we urge future research to attempt to unpack the potentially different influences of task versus scheduling autonomy.

6. Appendix C presents a correlation matrix for men and women. These results demonstrate that the constructs are far from perfectly (or even strongly) correlated. Income and skill have the strongest correlation (.44 for both women and men). Most of the correlations fall below the .30 level. These patterns suggest that the degree of "status crystallization" is modest—that is, the same individuals who have high job authority *do not* necessarily appear at the top of the distributions of these other indicators of job-related status.
7. While the "home/family life" and "social/leisure life" aspects of the first two items are often conceptualized as distinct spheres, we observed that the factor loadings for these items are highly similar (.88 and .86, respectively).
8. Given the complexity of combining multiple variables in three-way and four-way interactions, we used robust regression techniques as a precaution against influential cases. Robust regression is appropriate when outliers or particular observations might exert undue influence.
9. In Figure 2, we represent low income with the value of women's income at the 25th percentile and high income with the value of women's income at the 75th percentile. In each of the subsequent figures, we use these same 25th and 75th percentile values to represent low versus high levels of skill (Figure 3), job autonomy (Figure 4), and decision latitude (Figure 5).

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