

Transposition of EU directives related to occupational road safety by three member states

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Abstract

Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of work-related fatalities in most high-income regions, including the European Union (EU). This research assesses transpositions of relevant EU directives by the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Sweden. The market-driven UK uses a business-led model to manage occupational road risk. Although technically correct, its transpositions were tempered by earlier legislation requiring employers to ensure a safe workplace “so far as is reasonably practicable.” French policymaking is dominated by government, with engagement of the “social partners” (labor and industry). Transposition delays stemmed from domestic debates on the 35-hour workweek, existing collective agreements, and long-established structures of French codes of law. Swedish policymaking is consensual and corporatist, with road safety policy strongly influenced by the systems-based Vision Zero model. Transposition rarely required major changes to Swedish law. The main conclusion is that although member-state transpositions were generally technically accurate, they were influenced by domestic politics, institutional arrangements, and policy beliefs.

Background

Occupational road safety at EU level

Motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) are the leading cause of occupational fatalities in most high-income countries and regions, including the European Union (EU). In 2005, 40% of the 5,720 workplace fatalities in the EU were the result of an MVC (European Commission, 2009). At the EU level and within many EU member states, jurisdiction for occupational road safety is split between transportation and labor agencies. In addition, there are marked differences between management of freight and passenger transport and other types of occupational driving. Regulation of the transport industry by the European Economic Community (EEC) dates from the 1960s, and was directly linked to the longstanding pursuit of a single European market with free movement of goods and labor. Accordingly, earliest regulation of transport by the EEC centered on removing barriers to trade, although development of regulations concerning working time and rest periods for transport workers also began during this time.

Not until passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 did social policy, including occupational safety and health (OSH), come under the EEC’s purview. The SEA ceded to the EEC the right to legislate on issues such as work hours, work-related stress, and ergonomics (Majone, 1993). The comparatively late addition of OSH to the EEC’s policy portfolio presented challenges for full integration of new EEC-level mandates into existing state-level

law. Domestic employment regimes varied considerably, and were historically embedded in state-specific value systems, interest-group configurations, and labor market practices.

The first major OSH legislation after passage of the SEA was the 1989 “Framework Directive” on “measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work.” The Framework Directive applies to all public and private sector enterprises, and obligates the employer to “take the measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including prevention of occupational risks and provision of information and training, as well as provision of the necessary organization and means” [Article 6(1)]. The employer is also required to “be in possession of an assessment of the risks to safety and health at work, including those facing groups of workers exposed to particular risks” [Article 9(1)a] (Commission of the European Communities, 1989). The Framework Directive’s scope and breadth imply that its requirements for risk assessment might apply to mobile work situations such as occupational driving.

Directives are handed down to member states with the expectation that they will be “transposed” into state law within a certain time period. The European Commission and other EU institutions may bring legal action in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against member states for non-transposition of directives, with the possibility of substantial financial penalties (Hix, 2005). Analyzing state responses to EU labor directives, Falkner et al. (2005) proposed that member states generally fall into one of three “worlds of compliance:” the “world of law observance,” where compliance with EU directives is valued to the point where it overrides domestic concerns; the “world of domestic politics,” where EU directives compete at the domestic level with priorities of the member-state government and interest groups; and the “world of neglect,” where political will to adapt state law to EU directives is limited and implementation may be poorly managed (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, & Leiber, 2005).

Occupational road safety policy in EU member states

This research centers on differences in occupational road safety policy between three EU member states: the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Sweden. The literature describes the distinct policy style of the UK as liberal and market-oriented, France as state-centered and interventionist, and Sweden as corporatist¹ and consensual (Bovens, 't Hart, & Peters, 2001; Hayward, 1982; Siaroff, 1999). Comparative accounts of transport policy also inform comparison of occupational road safety policy (Douillet & Lehmkuhl, 2001; Kerwer & Teutsch, 2001b; Knill, 2001; Stevens, 2004). For example, the Anglo-Saxon model of transport policy promoted by the UK saw market mechanisms with minimal government regulation as the means to an optimally efficient transport network (Kerwer & Teutsch, 2001b; Stevens, 2004). In contrast, the Continental approach espoused in France viewed transport as a public good in which the state has responsibility to intervene in order to meet various economic and social welfare objectives. Consequently, the Continental approach tends to accept a heavier regulatory burden than the Anglo-Saxon approach (Stevens, 2004). Underlying the interventionist Continental approach was the desire of the state and labor unions to protect domestic transport industries from competition from foreign carriers and drivers (Kerwer & Teutsch, 2001a; Stevens, 2004). Sweden’s transport policy is a hybrid; although it has pursued social welfare goals for workplace safety and transport safety via

¹ Corporatism has been defined as the “co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of the national economy by the state, centralised unions, and employers (these latter two co-operating directly in industry), presumably to the relative benefit of all three actors” (Siaroff, 1999, p. 177).

state-driven interventions, its provisions for entry and licensing in the road transport industry are fairly liberal (Richardson, 1979).

Member states' labor policies have generally reflected the same underlying philosophy as transport policies, falling into three groups: those with constitutional guarantees of workers' rights and substantial state intervention in labor markets, those in which the state has refrained from supporting comprehensive industrial codes and regulations, and those in which corporatist agreements between employers and unions usually take the place of government-imposed rules and regulations (Rhodes, 2005). France belongs to the interventionist group, the UK to the non-interventionist group, and Sweden to the corporatist group.

With respect to occupational road safety policy, UK business interests, fleet industry suppliers, and academics act both independently and in concert with government. Safety promotion is supported by research identifying occupational crashes as a significant proportion of total road fatalities and recommending employer interventions (Clarke, Ward, Bartle, & Truman, 2009; Darby, Murray, & Raeside, 2009; Downs, Keigan, Maycock, & Grayson, 1999; Murray, Ison, Gallemore, & Nijjar, 2009). Central-government agencies most involved in occupational road safety are the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Although it is an OSH agency, the HSE does not exercise its jurisdiction over occupational MVCs; it neither collects data nor enforces OSH regulations in cases of occupational driving. Instead, central-government response has taken the form of non-regulatory "guidance" or "codes of practice" targeted at employers. HSE and DfT have issued a joint guidance document, *Driving at Work: Managing Work-related Road Safety* (Health and Safety Executive, 2003). As the basis for its conclusions, *Driving at Work* cited domestic traffic law and risk assessment provisions of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations. The latter is a transposition of the EU Framework Directive, thus the UK may be seen as having applied this directive to occupational driving.

Unlike the UK, where business interests dominate, French initiatives for occupational road safety center on governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. Responsibility for road safety falls to *Sécurité routière* in the transport ministry, and occupational safety to *La Direction Générale du Travail* in the labor ministry. Many activities for prevention of occupational MVCs reside in a social security agency, the *Caisse nationale de l'assurance maladies des travailleurs salariés (CNAMTS)* [National Health Insurance Fund for Employees], which operates under government authority but is managed by the "social partners" (labor and industry). CNAMTS has strong interest in MVC prevention because it pays compensation for both work-related crashes and commuting-related crashes (Eurogip, 2003).

A formal steering committee, the *Comité de pilotage pour la prévention du risque routier professionnel* [Steering Committee for the Prevention of Occupational Road Risk] was formed in 2001 by joint action of the ministries of transport and labor to develop a coordinated response to occupational MVCs. Because transport safety regulations are limited to the operation of vehicles weighing more than 3.5 tonnes, the *Comité de pilotage* elected to focus on light vehicles not covered by existing regulations. After extensive consultation with stakeholders from labor and industry, the *Comité* published its proposals to promote the safety of light vehicles used for work purposes. Citing the Framework Directive, the White Paper emphasized the need for occupational safety managers to assess road risk (*Comité de pilotage pour la prévention du risque routier professionnel* [Steering Committee for the Prevention of Occupational Road Risk], 2007).

The importance of governmental initiatives for occupational road safety in France is consistent with the literature's general characterizations of the French policy climate: reliance on a centralized, technocratic bureaucracy with the central state as the primary governance mechanism (Bovens, et al., 2001; Hayward, 1982). It is also consistent with a categorization of France as one of the least corporatist states in Europe, based on the presence of only three of 22 factors said to be associated with the "ideal type" of corporatism: a powerful central state with some level of intervention in the economy, some blurring of the distinction between the public and private sectors, and high levels of social expenditures (Siaroff, 1999). However, the literature also suggests that in the case of road transport policy, the French system may in fact possess elements of corporatism, including tripartite consultative mechanisms and centralized labor agreements (Douillet & Lehmkuhl, 2001).

Swedish policymaking reflects a consensual and corporatist approach. Major government policy decisions often involve appointment of broad-based commissions to study issues and present recommendations (Bovens, et al., 2001). Legislative histories reflect the formal inclusion of private and public sector road users as key stakeholders in policy development. Sweden's overarching road safety program, "Vision Zero," reflects a commitment to eliminate all road fatalities by making the road environment as forgiving of human error as is possible. This "safe-systems" approach to road safety which combines human factors, vehicle design, and roadway design, shifts responsibility for road safety from the individual driver to organizational actors, including transport companies and other employers (Vägverket, 2008).

Three Swedish agencies at the central-government level are involved in policy for occupational road safety. *Trafikverket* (the Swedish Transport Administration) is responsible for strategic planning for road safety, infrastructure planning, and construction, and for operational aspects of driver licensing. *Transportstyrelsen* (the Swedish Transport Agency) is responsible for developing driving tests for regular and commercial driver licensing, and for regulations and penalties applicable to all kinds of road users. *Arbetsmiljöverket* (the Swedish Work Environment Authority) is housed in the Ministry of Employment. Based on its interpretation of the Framework Directive, *Arbetsmiljöverket* has integrated road safety into occupational safety policy, determining that the roadway is part of the work environment and that employers bear some responsibility for minimizing road risk for employees, regardless of the ownership of the vehicle (Swedish Work Environment Authority, 2003/2004).

Aims

This research assessed the relative contributions of EU directives and state-level policy processes and instruments in determining occupational road safety policy for the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Sweden. Emphasis is on transposition of relevant directives into state-level law. More specifically, the research aimed to:

- Compare and contrast the policy instruments that have been implemented to reduce occupational road risk in these countries, and the policy ideas behind these instruments
- Identify EU directives and policy recommendations related to occupational road safety
- Assess the differential responses of the three EU member states to these directives, with emphasis on determining whether these responses mirror the "world of domestic politics" for the UK, the "world of law observance" for Sweden, and the "world of neglect" for France, based on the findings of Falkner et al. (2005)

Methodology

The methodology is primarily qualitative. Data sources are EU directives, policy documents, guidance documents, scientific literature, and interviews with key informants in government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and industry. Three of the EU directives assessed here are specific to freight and passenger transport (Driver Certificate of Professional Competence [CPC], Operator CPC, and Road Transport Working Time). The remaining three are road safety or OSH directives with broad relevance for occupational driving (Driving License, Working Time, and Seat Belt). The approach here is not to comprehensively assess the transposition of each provision of each directive, but to assess only provisions with direct application to occupational road safety. The same pre-selected provisions were assessed for all three member states (Table 1). More specifically, state-level legislation, regulations, and other policy documents were reviewed point-by-point to identify and evaluate provisions that corresponded to those in the EU directives.²

Directive	Short Title	Source	Provisions Assessed
Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences [Consolidated version of 2007]	Driving License Directive	OJ* No. L 237, 24.08.91, p.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual recognition of licenses by member states • Licensing for specific vehicle categories • Harmonized license codes denoting special qualifications or limitations • Licensing limited to those who pass theory and skills tests and who meet medical standards
Directive 2003/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 on the initial qualification and periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods or passengers, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 and Council Directive 91/439/EEC and repealing Council Directive 76/914/EEC	Driver CPC Directive	OJ No. L 226, 10.9.2003, p. 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial qualification based on test of theory and skills, with course attendance requirement optional • Periodic retraining to update knowledge and skills
Council Directive 98/76/EC of 1 October 1998 amending Directive 96/26/EC on admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and road passenger transport operator and mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications intended to facilitate for these operators the right to freedom of establishment in national and international transport operations	Operator CPC Directive	OJ No. L 277, 14.10.98, p. 17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirements that entities wishing to engage in the occupation of road transport operator shall be of good repute, of appropriate financial standing, and satisfy requirements for professional competence • Conditions under which the compliance of these three criteria are to be demonstrated • Mutual recognition of operator CPCs by member states <p>[Combined for analysis with original directive 96/26/EC]</p>
Directive 2002/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 on the organisation of the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities	Road Transport Working Time Directive	OJ No. L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 35	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Average weekly working time not to exceed 48 hours • Minimum 30-minute break after 6 hours of work • Night work limited to 10 hours in each 24-hour period
Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the	Working Time	OJ No. L 299,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applicability to public and private sectors • Average weekly working time, including

² For detailed side-by-side comparisons of selected text of EU directives and text of corresponding state-level legislation and regulations, see Pratt, SG (2011), The role of institutional structures, interest groups, and framing in explaining occupational road safety policy in the European Union and member states: an application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and multi-level governance. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.

Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [Consolidates Dir. 93/104/EC and its amending Dir. 2000/34/EC]	Directive	18.11.2003, p. 9	overtime, not to exceed 48 hours <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory rest breaks for work shifts of more than 6 hours • Minimum daily rest of 11 consecutive hours in each 24-hour period • In any 7-day period, 24 hours of uninterrupted rest in addition to the 11 hours of daily rest • Night work limited to 8 hours in each 24-hour period
Directive 2003/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 April 2003 amending Council Directive 91/671/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to compulsory use of safety belts in vehicles of less than 3,5 tonnes	Seat Belt Directive	OJ L 115, 9.5.2003, p. 63	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory use of restraints by all occupants of passenger vehicles and buses • Bus passengers to be informed of requirements that seat belts be worn

* OJ: Official Journal of the European Communities.

Table 1. EU directives included in transposition analysis

Primary data sources were as follows:

- For EU directives: the EUR-lex database of European law found at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>
- For the British legislation that transposed EU directives: the UK Statute Law Database (www.statutelaw.gov.uk) and the www.legislation.gov.uk site
- For French legislation and regulations: The Legifrance database is the main Web portal for French legislation (<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>). Source materials were found in the *Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF)* [the Official Journal of the French Republic], *Bulletins Officiel* [Official Gazettes] of the relevant ministries, and the Highway and Labor Codes.
- For Sweden: Government sources provide ready access to legislation and legislative histories, with many major statutes available in English translation. The *Riksdag* Web site, www.riksdagen.se, is especially useful for retrieving the motions, propositions, and committee reports that preceded formal legislation. Notisum AB provides free access to statutes and case law dating from the 1970s (www.notisum.se).

The present research assesses the transposition of the six EU directives using Falkner's criteria of timeliness and accuracy. Here, "accuracy" refers to the correspondence between technical elements of the EU directive and the resulting national law. Where there are quantitative requirements, such as maximum numbers of hours in the work day, the member state should be held to the "letter" of the directive. Where the requirements are more qualitative, we can only hold the member state to transposing the "spirit" of the directive. The literature and interviews of key informants provided insights as to whether non-transposition was based on opposition to the directive or inability to transpose.

Results

Table 2 below summarizes the main features of the transpositions of the six EU directives.

Directive	Member State		
	United Kingdom	France	Sweden

Driving License	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Late transposition • Incomplete transposition of some elements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very late transposition • ECJ action for non-transposition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slightly late transposition • Many provisions already in state law • Emphasizes social aspects of driving
Driver CPC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transposed several months late • “Test-only” option • Some elements incorporated by reference 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transposed to conform with domestic processes for vocational training • “Training + test” option 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transposed more than one year late • “Training + test” option
Operator CPC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Idea of “professional competence” dates from 1968 Road Traffic Act • Existing regulations largely in compliance • Some ambiguity on recognition of non-UK CPCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vague on recognition of CPCs from other states • Followed state-level precedent of separate regulations for goods and passenger transport • Operators outside directive’s scope also required to provide proof of professional competence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Late transposition for content of CPC exam, but high-quality transposition of training objectives
Road Transport Working Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timely and correct transposition • Incorporates domestic policy belief of ensuring worker safety “so far as is reasonably practicable” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transposed against backdrop of laws adopting 35-hour work week • Followed state-level precedent of separate regulations for goods and passenger transport • Collective bargaining a key input 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing legislation largely in compliance • 40-hour work week, but derogation opportunities • Complementary state law for lighter vehicles
Working Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Substantial misfit with domestic beliefs • Very late transposition • Individual opt-out” • Unsuccessful action in the ECJ against European Commission (“treaty-base game”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transposed against backdrop of laws adopting 35-hour work week • Variations via sectoral collective agreements • Lack of provisions to ensure adequate rest for “mobile workers” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing legislation largely in compliance • ECJ action for non-transposition • 40-hour work week, but widespread derogations possible via collective agreements
Seat Belt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited occupation-based exemptions • Incorporates domestic policy belief of taking all reasonable steps to inform bus passengers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early adopter of passenger-vehicle laws • Required new laws for trucks and buses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State-level law largely in compliance long before Directive • Required new law that bus passengers be informed

Table 2. Summary table: State-level transpositions of EU directives

While generally technically accurate, the UK transpositions were colored by an established policy belief originating in the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act that required employers to ensure worker safety “so far as is reasonably practicable” [Section 2(1)] (HMSO, 1974). This belief is reflected in British transpositions to the present day, despite the fact that EU directives (most notably the Framework Directive) conceive of employer responsibilities as more absolute. The UK encountered its greatest challenge in transposing the Working Time Directive; across all six directives and all three member states, this is the only instance in which the member state had no existing legislation as a starting point for transposition. The omission in British law may be attributed to deep-seated beliefs rooted in economic liberalism that working time should be agreed upon by the employer and employee and that its regulation would be harmful to business. Domestic opposition to the first Working Time Directive (93/104/EC) was sufficiently strong that the UK took action against the European Commission in the ECJ on the grounds that working time did not fall under the EU’s

competence for OSH regulation. The UK lost the case in the ECJ but continued to resist transposition, complying only after a more leftist Labour government came to power in 1997.

In the UK, there is a clear divide between OSH-type directives implemented by the HSE (for this research, the Working Time Directive) and transport-type EU directives implemented through DfT and law enforcement (the remaining five directives examined here). In France, this distinction is somewhat blurred, as a state-level tradition of collective bargaining has influenced the transposition of both transport-type and OSH-type directives. France's transpositions accommodated existing modes of policymaking and institutional arrangements, although in some instances the status quo may have made transposition more complicated. For example, transposing the Driver CPC Directive required that regulations in several policy realms be modified to accommodate the domestic practice of initially qualifying commercial-vehicle drivers through the employment ministry and providing "refresher" training through the transport ministry. In addition, France transposed the Road Transport Working Time Directive separately for goods and passenger transport because collective bargaining was segmented along these sectoral lines. Finally, the domestic debate on the 35-hour workweek overshadowed any imperative to implement the Working Time Directive, showing the primacy of state-level policy discourse over initiatives originating at EU level.

The very process of transposing regulations is quite different in France than in the UK, where the government can, by virtue of its simultaneous control over the executive and legislative branches, generally push through the policies it chooses. In France, consultation with the social partners is integral to issuance of governmental decrees and orders, a process that may introduce delays in transposition. Another source of delay is domestic collective agreements, many of which pre-date EU directives. One example is the EU working time directives, where the French transposition process would necessarily include examination of existing agreements one by one to assess conformance with new EU directives. Finally, any transposition would require lawmakers to determine whether proposed measures would conflict with or require amendments to one of the many French codes of law.

The only directive for which France may be shown to have truly "neglected" transposition was the Driving License Directive. A successful ECJ proceeding against France centered on a minor provision on the duration of the on-road driving assessment, but as administrative documents reveal, France was grappling with more fundamental issues surrounding licensing, which were not resolved for more than a decade after issuance of the Directive. For the other five directives, France's delays were not appreciably longer than those of Sweden or the UK, nor was the quality of its transpositions appreciably lower. Rather than characterizing French policymaking as a matter of neglect, it would be more accurate to say that some French transpositions fell victim to societal and administrative distractions at the domestic level. The sources of these distractions were domestic priorities such as the 35-hour work week and well-established practices for social-partner engagement and collective agreements.

As Falkner et al. would predict, Swedish transpositions generally reflect compliance with EU directives, although some were completed a few months past EU deadlines. Transpositions of the directives on licensing and training reflect Nordic leadership in conceptualizing training models (Hatakka, Keskinen, Gregersen, Glad, & Hernetkoski, 2002), as well as the core belief (consistent with Vision Zero) that sees the driver as an individual interacting with the road system as a member of a larger society (Johansson, 2009). Swedish transpositions of the Seat Belt Directive and working-time directives were based on existing regulations that were already largely in compliance with EU directives. The only Swedish provisions identified here

that raise concerns allow the work week to be increased from the standard 40 hours to 48 hours by collective agreement. This concern is balanced by the fact that Sweden, unlike the other two member states, has working-time regulations that cover operation of OLVs.

Conclusions

Overall, the transposition assessments supported the claims of Falkner et al. that the UK's transpositions belong to the "world of domestic politics" and Sweden's belong to the "world of law observance." However, France should not be relegated to the "world of neglect" for this policy area, and its approach is more corporatist than the literature would suggest. A case can be made that all three member states in fact belong to a "world of domestic politics," with policy responses influenced to varying degrees by domestic beliefs and processes and underlying institutional structures.

Policy for occupational road safety remains essentially a domestic matter for the three EU member states. How it is managed depends in part on its characterization as a transport safety issue tied to business or industrial policy, as in the UK, or as a social welfare issue tied more closely to OSH policy, as in France and Sweden. The three states retain differences in their preferred policy instruments, institutional arrangements, and underlying societal beliefs. The EU directives considered here may have been intended to harmonize conditions across member states, but the resulting state-level laws are by no means identical and retain essential features of the state-level laws and policy instruments that preceded them. These findings suggest that even where EU directives impose quantitative requirements on member states, the result will not necessarily be a pan-European policy for occupational road safety.

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

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Session 1 – Occupational safety-international perspectives

Advocating for good practice in work related road safety: The role of the road safety NGO, **Mary Williams*** & **Caroline Perry**, Brake, The Road Safety Charity, NZ & **Dr Will Murray**, Interactive Driving Systems, UK (NPR)

Transposition of EU directives related to occupational road safety by three member states, **Dr Will Murray***, Interactive Driving Systems, UK & **Dr Stephanie Pratt**, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, USA (PR)

Benchmarking for effective work related road safety management, **Lori Mooren***, Transport And Road Safety (TARS) Research, **Bruce Searles & Anton Benc**, Benchmarking Partnerships & **Kim Creef**, NSW Centre for Road Safety, Transport for NSW, Australia (PR)

National fleet safety programme – New Zealand, **Audrey Jensen***, Accident Compensation Corporation, NZ (NPR)

Session 2A – Organisational and industry transport risks 1

Organisational approaches to fleet safety, **Russell White***, Driversafety.com.au (NPR)

An investigation of light vehicle fleet safety in South Australia, **Jamie MacKenzie***, **Dr Robert Anderson & Daniel Seanson**, Centre for Automotive Safety Research, University of Adelaide (PR)

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