CHAPTER 15

Some Unique Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict and Their Implications for Managing the Conflict

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I recently observed a group of children playing a game called Rip van Winkle in a park. The rules of the game required one participant to pretend that he or she had fallen asleep and awoken 50 years later. The young Rip would then tell the others how they and their neighborhood had changed during that period. I thought about that game several times over the next few weeks, wondering how my own world had changed over the last 50 years. After determining that I had not aged at all, I decided that the world of today had changed in nearly every aspect compared with that in the early 1950s. Methods of communication, modes of travel, the treatment of illness, and even the geographical maps of countries have undergone dramatic transformation. The slumbering Rip van Winkle would face a whole new vocabulary that included PCs, DVDs, e-mails, AIDS, and IRAs. He would run into young aliens with purple hair, earrings in their navel (or other unmentionable body parts), and tattoos creeping down their backs.

But Rip could take comfort that one aspect of the world had not changed. People in various parts of the world are still excluding or killing others because of their ethnicity. Indeed, Arab and Jew, Serb and Croat, and Greek and Turk are keeping the flame of ethnic hatred burning. The Kurds still search for a homeland. Incidents of racial violence can still be found in the United States. Ethnic and tribal warfare grip central Africa and deadly disputes paint the horizons in South Asia. Indigenous peoples in North America, New Zealand, and Australia, who once quietly accepted their place at the bottom of the social barrel, have awoken to claim land and rights that were taken from them.

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERGROUP CONFLICT: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE LABORATORY

The resiliency of the hatred between groups has perplexed social psychologists for decades. In the late 1950s, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues assembled a group of "normal, well-adjusted boys of the same age, educational level, from similar sociocultural backgrounds and with no unusual features in their personal backgrounds" (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). The boys were bussed from Oklahoma City to a camp in rural Oklahoma, where they were divided into two groups. Each group was given its own bunk and distinctive clothing. The two groups then engaged in a series of encounters that brought them into direct competition with each other. As the competition escalated, so, too, did the hostility between the groups.

The Sherif camp studies laid the foundation for Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) of intergroup relations. RCT argued that actual or perceived competition between groups leads to intergroup hostility and is the basis for prejudice (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Taylor & Moriarty, 1987). Competition fuels the perception that the out-group is a threat to the in-group (Bobo, 1988, 1999; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) and leads to the dehumanization (Bandura, 1999) and demonizing (Bar-Tal, 1990; White, 1984) of the out-group.

However, an interesting observation by Sherif et al. (1961) offered an additional insight into the world of intergroup conflict. They reported that soon after the two groups of campers were formed, and *before the competition began*, disparaging comments flew between the two groups. This observation suggests that group formation, not competition, may be the necessary ingredient for intergroup hostility and violence. This is the position of Social Identity Theory (SIT; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). In the tradition of psychology, SIT explains group and intergroup behavior by focusing on the psychology of the individual. According to the theory, one's self-identity is composed of two parts. The *personal identity* includes those characteristics such as physical dimensions and personality traits that are unique to the individual. The other side of the identity coin is the *social identity* that includes the social groups and categories to which one belongs. Other investigators (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Luthanen & Crocker, 1992; Worchel & Coutant, 2001; Worchel, Iuzzini, Coutant, & Ivaldi, 2000) expanded the concept of social identity to include such aspects as the role and status one has within the in-groups. According to SIT, most individuals are motivated to hold a positive self-image. This leads them to join high-status groups and, once a member of a group, they seek to advantage that group relative to out-groups. Herein are the keys to the castle of intergroup hostility. In attempting to advantage their own group, individuals will disparage, depreciate, and delegitimize (Bar-Tal, 2000) the out-groups and give greater resources to the in-group than to the out-groups (Tajfel, 1970). This shabby treatment of the out-groups and the preference to the in-group is theoretically designed to enhance the individual's social identity.

Still concerned with identifying the basic seeds of intergroup hostility, Tajfel (1970) not only trained the scientific lens on the individual rather than on the group, but he also distilled the concept of group from a physical entity composed of people acting and interacting to people in the *minimal group*. The minimal group was a conceptual group or the cognitive image of the individuals that formed a category. The intriguing feature of much of the research on SIT was the demonstration that individuals could come to favor their own group and discriminate against other groups even when there was no interaction or acquaintance with members of either group.

Related to SIT was *social categorization theory* (Hogg, 2001; Turner, 1985) that concerned itself with how individuals became part of some groups/categories rather than others. However, rather than examine the interaction and negotiation processes that individuals undertake with groups to gain acceptance (Moreland & Levine, 1982; Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman, 1992), social categorization theory focused on how individuals "think" their way into categories. Investigators (Abrams & Hogg, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) explicated the process by which individuals slice and dice the world into cognitive categories and locate themselves within some of the categories.

Social identity theory has spawned exciting and prolific research programs concerned with the relationship between groups and the individual's role in this relationship (Capozza & Brown, 2000; Worchel, Morales, Paez, & Deschamps, 1998). Research expanded beyond the minimal group and examined the relationship between existing groups. The theory is largely responsible for identifying the importance of identity as a basic ingredient in the relation between groups. Although SIT championed the role of individual identity, other investigators (Worchel, 1998; Worchel & Coutant, 2001; Worchel et al., 2000) suggested that the desire of groups to achieve a positive identity of their own also helped chart the course of intergroup relations. SIT and social categorization theory also emphasized the principle that individuals (and groups) respond to the world as they perceive/interpret it rather than to how it exists in dispassionate physical reality. In other words, cognition and mental activity are as important as actual events, conditions, and entities.

MOVING ON: THE SPECIAL SITUATION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

As stimulating as the work on SIT and social categorization has been, one gets the feeling that it is incomplete. The appetite is whetted but the

hunger is not satisfied. One critical issue that is not addressed by the approaches is how (when and why) individual cognition results in collective action (Worchel, in press). Intergroup violence involves united action of many people acting in unison against a target (out-group). The examination of individual cognitive processes does not give sufficient insight into how collectives form and act. The issue of collective action is a crucial one (Durkheim, 1898; Le Bon, 1895/1977; Moscovici, 1986; Reicher, 2001; Tarde, 1892). Worchel (in press) argued that an understanding of the processes involved in group formation and collective behavior requires an examination of both motivation and cognition at individual and group levels. Identifying the minimal conditions under which an individual may dislike or even aggress against members of an out-group does not paint a complete picture of intergroup conflict, especially conflict between ethnic groups.

Conflict between ethnic groups tends to have unique characteristics that sets it apart for other types of intergroup conflict. First, it is frequently protracted, often occurring over generations. The "hot" spots of today's ethnic violence such as the Middle East, the Balkans, India/Pakistan, Iraq, Cyprus, and Central Africa have been bathed in blood for decades and sometimes generations. The violence ebbs and flows, but rarely is it settled. In fact, it is a challenge to identify any ethnic conflict of the past that one could view as being forever finished. Second, ethnic conflict is often violent in nature. Death and destruction are not limited to armies or combatants, but generally consume innocent bystanders including women and children (Worchel, 1999). Indeed, the aim of the violence is not limited to conquering the other group, but is often designed to eliminate the group. Such is the nature of the aim that a unique term has been coined to describe it: genocide (Staub, 1989).

I (Worchel, 1999) attempted to explain the level of violence by referring to the unique nature of ethnic groups. I suggested that ethnic groups have characteristics that are not common to any other human group or category. My basic argument was that ethnicity is forever. Individuals are born into an ethnic category, and they can never change this distinction. They cannot be expelled from their ethnic group nor can they decline membership in this group. Once born a Kurd, always a Kurd. The salience and meaning (see chap. 1) of the ethnic identity may change, but not the basic ethnic distinction. Even enduring classifications such as religion or nationality can change by individual choice or outside force. Because of this fact, ethnic identity becomes the bedrock for one's social identity.

The immutable nature of ethnic identity gives a very distinct and distressing characteristic to ethnic conflict. Large-scale confrontations such as war typically involve groups carved out on three dimensions: nationality, religion, and ethnicity. The prize in wars between nations is often measured in territorial gains, and with these gains come the people who inhabit that territory. National citizenship is a condition that can be changed with the stroke of a pen and the issuance of a passport. Hence, the inhabitants of a conquered land may be transformed into citizens of conquering nation. For example, former German citizens became Polish citizens as a result of redistributing land after World War II. In fact, a nation may grow in stature and strength by adding to its landmass and population. In the case of religious wars, the ultimate prize is the mind rather than the body. The strength of a religion, and possibly its "correctness," is often measured by the number of individuals who have adopted the specific religion. Therefore, one of the valued outcomes of a holy war is the number of infidels who can be converted to the victor's religion. Human history is filled with examples, often involving extreme cruelty, of the conquered being "encouraged" to adopt a new religion. (This view does not ignore the fact that religious wars are often accompanied by the slaughter of many nonbelievers.)

But, consider the situation of ethnic war. Here, no conversion is possible, regardless of the desires and willingness of the parties. The ethnic Jew cannot decide to become an ethnic Arab. The Hawaiian cannot be forced to become an ethnic Russian, no matter the means of persuasion applied. How, then, does a group win an ethnic war? The ultimate answer is to completely eliminate the opposing ethnic group, to commit genocide. A middle ground for achieving victory in an ethnic war is to pollute and dilute the ethnic pool of the vanquished. Hence, ethnic wars are often marked not only with high loss of life of the combatants, but also with the seemingly wanton killing of noncombatant women and children (Banton, 1997; Worchel, 1999). Further, comparisons of these wars also show an unusually high incidence of rape in ethnic wars; rape can be viewed as a symbolic and actual pollution of the ethnic line. The permanence of ethnic identification may help explain the reasons that these conflicts are so often violent and so difficult to resolve.

Although this discussion gives some insight into the nature of ethnic violence, several more basic questions must be asked. What constitutes ethnicity, and how does its meaning encompass the anthropological characteristics of land, language, leadership, and lifestyle? Why is ethnic conflict so common? Are there unusual or special conditions that must be examined to understand the causes of ethnic violence? The chapter now turns to these questions.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT: CASTS IN STONE

Social Identity

According to SIT, the seeds of intergroup conflict are sown as soon as distinct groups are formed, either physically or cognitively. Several factors

influence the erection of walls between groups or categories. For example, my colleagues and I (Worchel, 2001; Worchel & Coutant, 2001; Worchel et al., 2000) found that threats either to the individual or to the individual's group initiate the social categorization process and the formation of distinct categories. A terrorist attack on Jews in Israel leads Jews around the world to more strongly recognize their Jewish identity. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11 led Americans to engage in patriotic behaviors such as displaying flags. President Bush used this process to gain support for an invasion of Afghanistan and the suspension of individual rights within the United States. Several investigators have demonstrated a general link between threats to one's country and a rise in patriotism (Andrews, 1997; Kashti, 1997; Worchel & Coutant, 1997). Likewise, threats to an individual's identity can excite identification with a group and depreciation of the out-group. Brewer (1991), for example, suggested that personal failure can lead to greater identification with the in-group.

Although social identity and social categorization processes lead to discrimination between groups formed on almost any basis, I (Worchel, 1999) have argued that these processes are especially likely to occur in the case of ethnic groups. The basis for this suggestion is that ethnic groups are fundamental to human identity. Individuals are born into ethnic groups and they can never change this identity. They cannot be excluded, kicked out of, or excommunicated from an ethnic group; a Kurd cannot be expelled or have his Kurdish ethnicity taken away from him. However, the meaning or salience of ethnicity can change, depending on a variety of factors. Further ethnic identity is often readily evident in physical appearance and language, characteristics that guide social categorization (Turner et al., 1987). Therefore, ethnic identity always lurks as a basis for categorizing the world and building one's identity on a solid foundation. This factor may help explain why ethnic conflict is so resistant to eradication, showing patterns of increasing and decreasing but never disappearing.

The Fateful Role of History

One of the distinguishing features of ethnic groups is their history. Although ethnic groups may be distinguished along cultural, physical appearance, and language dimensions, each ethnic group has its own history that includes information about its beginnings, its heroes and heroines, and its accomplishments and conquests (Ben-Amos, 1997; Smith, 1986). On the surface, history can be described as a combination of dates, people, and events, issues over which there is little disagreement or dispute. However, these factors are only the clothes of individual; to identify the heart and soul of history, we must dig much deeper (Gershoni, 1992).

During the last five years, I have worked with the Seeds of Peace International Camp. The camp has an eerie resemblance to the Sherif camps (Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). The camp brings together adolescents (14–17 years of age) and their adult supervisors from ethnic and cultural groups engaged in violent and protracted conflict. Campers come from a variety of "hot" regions, including the Middle East (Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Moroccan), the Balkans (Serb, Croat, Kosovar, Macedonian, Bosnian, Albanian), Cyprus (Greek and Turkish Cypriots), and south Asia (Indian, Pakistani, Afghani). The campers arrive at the camp in the woods of central Maine and are assigned to bunks. Campers wear green T-shirts throughout the three-week session. These shirts signify their association with the camp but do not deindividuate them because their physical differences remain easily identifiable. To the surprise of many of them, they often find themselves sleeping next to someone from the group they consider their enemy.

Time at camp is tightly scheduled to include a variety of activities. Many of these activities are common to summer camps throughout the world: swimming, playing softball and soccer, taking archery practice, and engaging in crafts. Activity groups are always ethnically mixed. Religious services for the three major religions (Islam, Jewish, Protestant) are held each weekend, and the services are interpreted for visitors. At the conclusion of camp, the campers are broken into two large groups that engage in a variety of competitive contests. A defining activity of the camp is the coexistence sessions that are held with ethnically mixed groups. During these sessions, campers discuss their feelings and perceptions of the conflict in their region, often confronting each other over the conflicts. The adult delegation leaders who accompany have their own program and participate in their coexistence groups.

A multitude of questions can be raised about the impact of the camp on ethnic conflict. But even a short visit to the coexistence sessions reveals the causes of ethnic conflict. One of the constant themes that arises in the groups involves history, or rather, *interpretations of history*. Each side attempts to legitimize its claim to land and its political position through references to history. For example, Palestinians legitimize their land claims by arguing that the Zionist movement of the 1940s displaced Palestinians who were living on the land. The Israelis respond that there were Jewish settlements in the area in the early 1900s, and Jewish immigration to the region was simply reclaiming territory. The pages of the history book are then turned back further, as each side attempts to show that their claim to the region predates that of the other side. The Old Testament becomes the history book as the tit-for-tat interpretations of history flow back and forth. The passing of a wandering band of nomads is interpreted by one side as establishing a claim to land, but the other side views this event as only leaving a disappearing footprint in the shifting sands. There is often

agreement on names, dates, and events, but total disagreement on the meaning of the events. At some point in almost every session, a point of frustration is reached, several participants throw up their hands in despair, and claim that the issue is not the past, but what to do in the present. However, in the next session, history inevitably worms its way back into the discussion. The "why" of historical events replaces the "what" of these events.

Interpretations of history are not only important for establishing legitimacy of positions, but they also define present actions. A common schism between participants from the Middle East involves the labeling of terrorists. Israelis perceive the violence as acts aimed at the peace-abiding residents. The Palestinians, on the other hand, describe the actions as the examples of freedom fighters who are struggling to regain territory that has been illegally seized. Whether it is the Middle East, the Balkans, or U.S. attacks on Iraq, history is used to define the actions of each side as being defensive. One has the impression that all ethnic wars are fought between defenders; there are no aggressors.

The interpretation of history can be viewed as a group belief (Bar-Tal, 2000) that defines a group, serves as a bond between people, and legitimizes their actions. History is best perceived as a belief, rather than a compendium of data and facts, because of the critical role of interpretation and the selective recall (emphasis) of events. Ben-Amos (1997) captures this position by stating that "Like memory, history attempts to get hold of the past through a complex process that entails selection and interpretation, which are socially conditioned. Both recollection and histography are not engaged in by self-contained individuals, but by people who act according to the cultural norms of the present, and who look at the past through the lenses of their own era" (p. 130). To forsake the interpretation of history offered by one's ethnic group is viewed as an act of disloyalty. And although nations have their own histories, ethnic histories tend to have roots that go much deeper in time and spread across national boundaries.

It is unfortunate that modern social psychology tends to be ahistorical in its approach. Groups are generally created in the laboratory (Tajfel, 1970; Worchel, Axsom, Ferris, Samaha, & Schweitzer, 1978) or randomly assigned at camp (Sherif et al., 1961). These groups have no histories, and, therefore, the research must be silent on the role of history in group formation and intergroup conflict. Likewise, Turner and his colleagues (Turner et al., 1987) are mute on the role of history in developing social categories. This omission overlooks a critical feature of intergroup conflict that may help explain why some conflicts, such as ethnic conflict, are so difficult to resolve.

"The Land": The Homeland in Ethnic Identity and Conflict

Another common theme of the coexistence sessions at the Seeds of Peace camp concerns *territory*. One of the true ironies of social science explorations is that much of the research on intergroup (and interethnic conflict) is undertaken by American scientists. Land in the United States is often viewed as a commodity that has value based on what can be grown on it, what can be mined from it, or what panoramic views can be seen from it (Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975). Land is bought and sold for prices dictated by the marketplace; in many states, the land surface is traded separately from the minerals and water associated with that land. This approach to land is understandable based on the history of the United States. For the most part, Americans are immigrants inhabiting a strange territory. The native inhabitants of the land were largely driven off the land; stripped of their lifestyle, language, and leadership; and the survivors warehoused on reservations. The conquerors viewed the land as a stage where they could conduct their activities such as farming, ranching, or mining. Land that could not support these activities was essentially worthless. The roots of these new Americans reaches only a few generations into the soil.

However, a characteristic of ethnic groups is the *homeland*, the land from which the group sprung. This land has historical meaning and value that is not measured by the activities that it can sustain. The land holds the spirits as well of the bones of one's ancestors and mythical figures. For example, visitors to the Big Island of Hawai'i are warned not to take away volcanic rocks, because these are the hair of Pele and contain her spiritual being. The roots of the ethnic group reach thousands of years into the land. To be buried in the land of one's ancestors is the ultimate wish of people in many ethnic groups (Scott, 2000). From this perspective, "land is an instrument of self-transcendence" (Kelman, 1997, p. 178). The spiritual importance of land is portrayed in the myths of many indigenous peoples, and it is often at the core of the reawakening of the ethnic identifies of these people. This point is clearly seen in the strivings of such people as the Hawaiians, the Maori, and the Aborigine to regain the land of their ancestors. It is the land that provides a stability and continuity to the group. The territory may be a barren mountaintop, a stretch of desert, or a rocky hillside that has no economic value, but is priceless when measured in terms of heritage and symbolism.

The role of homeland has important implications for both the causes and the processes of ethnic conflict. If land is viewed as a commodity, pieces of territory are largely interchangeable or at least compensation for lost territory is possible. If two groups are locked in a struggle over an area, the conflict can be settled or reduced by either dividing the land

between the groups or finding an adequate price to "buy off" one of the parties. This is the reasoning behind some plans to find new territories or locations for the Palestinians or splitting the island of Cyprus between Greeks and Turks. However, this approach ignores the fact that the conflict is not over land, but rather over "the land." "The land" cannot be partitioned, bought, or replaced. The failure to control the homeland represents the failure of the present generation to honor its commitment to past and future generations. Viewed in this manner, it becomes readily apparent why conflict between ethnic groups that claim the same homeland is so difficult to manage.

In an effort to examine the underlying causes of ethnic conflicts, I recently asked campers at Seeds of Peace International Camp to complete a questionnaire examining several areas. One question asked them to indicate their perceptions of the cause of conflict in several regions (including the Middle East, Balkans, Cyprus, India/Pakistan). They were presented with a host of possible causes including religion, traits of the people, leaders, media, economy, history, and land. The campers in the sample came from the Middle East and India/Pakistan/Afghanistan. History and land received by far the most nominations as the main causes of ethnic conflict in each of the regions. These data supported observations made in the coexistence groups that also implicated these two factors as the leading causes of ethnic conflict.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

The future of relations between ethnic groups appears particularly troubling in light of present events. Even when not accompanied by headline-grabbing acts of violence and war, the pendulum of ethnic relations in many regions has swung toward creating cleavages along ethnic lines. In some cases, there is an uplifting quality to the move. In my own state of Hawai'i, there has been an increasing effort to emphasize Hawaiian culture and language among ethnic Hawaiians. Increasing numbers of Hawaiians have undertaken the study of Hawaiian language. Hawaiian immersion schools teach regular courses in Hawaiian language. Oral histories of Hawaiian people are being transcribed and preserved for future generations. The physical landscape is becoming dotted with farms practicing early Hawaiian farming techniques and early Hawaiian fishing techniques. Extensive efforts to preserve sacred cultural sites are increasingly common.

But all is not well in Paradise. The renewal of ethnic pride and ethnic identity has become the root for several conflicts between ethnic Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians. These conflicts involve such issues as ownership of land, admission to schools, and the reach of the legal system. Calls for

a Hawaiian state lead to concern and fear on the parts of some. The sce nario in Hawai'i is similar to that found with indigenous people in Nev Zealand, Canada, Australia, the United States, and Fiji.

In other parts of the world, countries are being surgically divided (o united) into new nations along ethnic lines. The unification of East and West Germany was accompanied by great celebration, but an undercur rent of uncertainty can be found in German efforts to bring back ethnic Germans who have lived in Russia for several generations. Blood ran in the rivers of Yugoslavia as the country split into several more ethnically homogeneous countries (Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia). The "velvet revolution" led to the division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The right-wing political parties in France gained significant power on a platform to "throw out the foreigners." The Basques of north ern Spain are demanding their own nation. The Soviet Union is no longer a union, and the region is now dotted by independent countries with ethnic majorities (see chap. 9, this volume). In many cases, the smaller ethnic nations may be weaker (economically and influence-wise) than the previously united nation, but the separate independent nation stands as a monument to ethnic pride.

Admittedly, the increase in ethnic identity and the formation of ethnic states is not a new phenomenon. It has occurred at other points in human history. But the present rise in ethnically defined nation-states will write a new chapter in human history. The jury is still out as to whether this chapter will be one with a happy or tragic ending.

The research efforts in social psychology and other disciplines offer some prescriptions about how these present outcomes can be nudged to ward the positive side of the equation. Several of the chapters in this book (chap. 3 [Bramel]), chap. 4 [Forbes], chap. 12 [Brislin & Liu], chap. 13 [Levin & Rabrenovic], chap. 14 [McCauley & Bock]) review the research in this area; thus, there is no need for another review. The social psycho logical literature suggests that equal status contact between groups work ing toward a common goal will help stave off violent conflict between ethnic groups. Studies by Gaertner and Dovidio (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989), Brewer and Miller (1984), and Worchel (1979) suggest that inviting reinterpretation or reorganization of cognitive categories to create more inclusive groupings (human beings rather than, for example, Germans, Poles, and Hawaiians) can also propel the process toward har mony. However, Jones and Morris (1993) caution that these efforts may threaten ethnic identity and the positive contributions of unique ethnic groups.

There are, however, several factors that prohibit blindly applying the results to the area of ethnic conflict. First, there are few studies of the long-term effects of interventions relying on contact, recategorization, and cul ture training. Second, the interventions are often one-time events that

occur in a very defined time frame. Whether the approach involves a two-to-three-week session at camp, working on a school project, receiving cultural training, or meeting in a laboratory, the examination of remedies for conflict tends to focus on a single approach or theoretical perspective. Finally, there is little effort to distinguish between the types of intergroup conflict or the ultimate goals of intervention when developing theories or approaches to intergroup conflict. All conflicts between groups tend to be viewed under the same conceptual tent, "intergroup conflict," and the implication is that all of these conflicts can be managed using a similar conceptual approach, be it contact, forming friendships, or reconfiguring categories. There is little guidance as to when contact will be most effective, despite the existence of data showing that in some cases, intergroup contact may actually increase conflict and violence (Brewer, 1986; Sherif et al., 1961; Worchel et al., 1978).

To be fair, the research provides important insight into understanding the causes, processes, and "remedies" of conflict between groups. The paradigm of developing a theoretical framework and transforming concepts into controllable empirical variables deserves high respect. The research on intergroup conflict has brought us to the point where we can ask new questions and demand new answers. It has identified psychological and social processes that accompany many kinds of intergroup conflicts. And it has shown common elements of many such conflicts.

For example, there probably are common bases, such as competition for scarce resources, the search for identity, and the desire for power that ignite intergroup conflict. However, I would argue that there are also important differences in the root causes of intergroup conflicts, and the understanding of these differences is critical in developing approaches to managing the conflict. Along these lines, I suggest that the unique features of ethnic conflict such as the role of history, the importance of homeland, and the permanence of group identity present unique challenges for managing ethnic conflict. I have witnessed countless attempts during the co-existence groups at Seeds of Peace camp to invite recategorization to reduce hostility. Repeated efforts to emphasize the fact that Jews and Arabs are truly cousins from a common family do little toward fostering goodwill. Indeed, the conflicts between family members are often the most violent and resistant to change. History lessons that attempt to correct misperceptions are generally met with suspicion and anger. Indeed, the foundations on which ethnic conflict is based may require an approach that recognizes, even celebrates, group differences. The most effective approach to ethnic conflict may not be one that seeks to reduce or minimize conflict, but rather focuses on developing nonviolent and less destructive responses to this conflict. On the other hand, other types of intergroup conflict, such as those involving labor and management, developers and conservationists, and people of different religions, may best be addressed

with efforts that create shared categories. Just as there is no single root cause to intergroup conflict, there is no single medicine for dealing with all types of intergroup conflicts.

A second point that should not be overlooked concerns the concept of time. Ethnic conflicts have been part of the human landscape for centuries and in some cases, millenniums. The root causes are deeply engrained in the human psyche and in the foundation of the groups. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect that any remedy applied today will eliminate or even have a lasting impact on the conflict of tomorrow. We live in a world of "quick fixes" and immediate remedies. The patience of people in the Western world is short. We may wish to avoid war, but we cannot tolerate a protracted war. U.S. presidents faithfully promise that armed interventions into such areas as the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia will be of short duration, often providing a withdrawal date before the invasion. We are uncomfortable with disagreement and contention in our most intimate relationships, but if these uncomfortable states persist, our solution is to dissolve the relationship. Indeed, some intergroup conflicts can be resolved in short order, but many, especially ethnic conflicts, cannot. There is no quick solution to ethnic conflicts. Like a garden that requires constant care and tending, so, too, does the approach to ethnic conflict require constant effort. No single contact, no single course on cultural training, no single effort to redefine groups, and no single war can make a lasting difference in the course of ethnic conflict. Approaches to ethnic conflict must include a long-term focus and continuing programs. Further, these approaches must not only be applied during times of obvious strife. In fact, these may be the least appropriate times to encourage contact or recategorization. The seeds of ethnic conflict are always present in the soil of the human landscape. Contact, cooperation, and understanding between ethnic groups must be emphasized in times of peace as well as during times of conflict. Ethnic Chinese and Japanese may be living in relative harmony in Hawai'i, but this does not reduce the urgency to develop greater cooperation and understanding between them. Ethnic Italians and ethnic Germans may have found a comfortable accommodation in Switzerland, but this condition should only be viewed as creating an opportunity for developing greater contact and common efforts.

Finally, the roots of ethnic conflict are not only deep, but they are broad. They extend into schools, job settings, religious institutions, political parties, and social clubs. They infect leaders, the media, and the performing arts. As a result, efforts to manage ethnic conflict should visit each of these haunts. As heartwarming as it is to see friendships develop across ethnic lines at the Seeds of Peace camp, it is distressing to see the deep-seated ethnic hatred carried to the camp by 14-year-old youth. Daniel Bar-Tal and I found ethnic stereotypes were clearly evident in kindergarten children. Although the task of developing a broad systematic approach to

managing ethnic conflict is daunting, it also opens new and exciting opportunities for research and theory. For example, programs based on different theoretical foundations may be appropriate for the young but not the old, for schools but not the political arena, for the arts but not the history books.

CONCLUSION

Ethnic conflict has many common features with other types of group conflict, but it is also uniquely distinct. I stop just short of adopting the position that ethnic conflict is "incurable," but it is clear that it serves important needs that make it very resistant to change. The role of ethnicity in individual and group identity, history (and the interpretation of history), and homeland must be considered when examining ethnic conflict. Ethnic identity and ethnic conflict are not, themselves, destructive. One needs only to witness the gracious hula at a Hawaiian luau or observe "culture night" at the Seeds of Peace camp to see the richness that ethnic groups bring to the social landscape. The care given to protecting and tending significant sacred sites offers a template for approaches to conservation and environmental protection.

Ethnic violence is not an inevitable consequence of ethnic conflict. Fiske (2002) recently published a paper entitled, "What We Know Now About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century." Few would disagree with this position, but I would argue that the "problem" of the past century(ies) and of the coming century is managing the *responses* to ethnic conflict. For example, when ethnic groups have common sacred sites, as in the case of Jerusalem, the challenge for managing the inherent conflict is to develop creative approaches to sharing control of the sites while still recognizing the legitimacy of the claims of both groups. This goal is easier identified than achieved, but recognizing and respecting the foundations of ethnic identity can guide approaches to the conflict.

This chapter has identified some of the unique features of ethnic conflict and argued that these characteristics must be considered when developing approaches to managing the conflict. The literature on intergroup relations offers a starting point for addressing ethnic conflict, but it is only a starting point. Future efforts must expand the scope of research while concentrating its focus on the features that distinguish ethnic conflict from other types of conflict. One can only hope that if old Rip van Winkle were to now begin his 50-year snooze, he would awake to a more harmonious social world characterized by positive relationships and respect between ethnic groups.

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