Appendix A

**Composition of the welfare regime typology with a gender lens**

We combined three previously developed typologies (i.e., Siaroff, 1994; Korpi et al., 2013; and De Moortel et al., 2014) to capture welfare regime types relevant to gender and work. Here we summarize each of the three typologies and describe how they complement each other when combined. Appendix Table A1 shows their application to each country, which informed the five welfare regime groupings we used in our analysis.

Critiquing the gender blindness of earlier welfare regime typologies, Siaroff (1994) proposed “a gender sensitive typology” (p. 82) by incorporating the “realities of the labor market” (p. 83) to family-relevant social policies that “set up relative incentives and disincentives for paid work as they apply to women in comparison with men” (p. 83). Siaroff calculated his “female work desirability” score as a weighted average of the female to male ratios in wages, managerial workers, post-secondary students, and employment rates within each member country of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). According to Table 6.4 in Siaroff’s 1994 paper, the score ranged from 0.652 (Finland and Sweden) to 0.251 (Luxembourg), and the distribution had a gap between 0.506 (Austria) and 0.438 (New Zealand). He used the gap as a threshold for high (≥0.506) and low (≤0.438) female work desirability (Table A1, Column 1). We renamed the dimension as “labor market penalty for women” and reversed high and low (e.g., High female work desirability is referred to as low market penalty for women).

Siaroff’s second dimension, family welfare orientation (Table A1, Column 2), was based on social security spending, family policy spending, public childcare, and parental leave. However, scores were calculated without distinguishing different types of family support policies such as full-time public daycare, which makes it possible for both parents to have full-time paid work, and tax incentives for an economically inactive spouse, which would incentivize the less-earning parent to be a full-time unpaid caregiver. In contrast, Korpi and colleagues (2013) proposed a typology with a more refined grasp of family policies’ intentions. Their typology of family policy consists of three dimensions, the traditional family dimension, the dual earner dimension, and the dual carer dimension. The traditional family dimension (Table A1, Column 4) is a weighted average of four policy indicators: Child allowance for minor children, part-time public daycare services for three years up to school age, home care allowance, and marriage subsidies via tax benefits to head of household with an economically non-active spouse (Korpi et al., pp. 9-10). These policies all support women’s part-time paid work or full-time unpaid caregiving; hence, the higher the score, the stronger endorsement for the traditional male-breadwinner/female-homemaker family. Korpi and colleagues found that Nordic countries as well as the US, UK, Ireland, and Switzerland had low scores on this dimension. Central European countries had high scores.

Korpi and colleagues’ second dimension, the dual earner dimension (Table A1, Column 5), was based on public daycare for birth to two-year-olds, full-time public daycare for children three years of age and older, and earnings-related parental insurance (i.e., the percentage of replacement of previous earnings and duration of employment). Although this dimension was to capture policies that “enable mothers to maintain a major and continuous occupational commitment” (Korpi et al., 2013, p. 10), it is about how states support mothers and not about how women are treated in the labor market. Therefore, it is different from Siaroff’s female work desirability (Table A1, Column 1). Korpi et al’s third dimension, the dual carer dimension (Table A1, Column 6), was calculated with weeks of paid leave which can be used either by the mother, the father, or by both, and weeks of paid leave reserved for fathers. These policies are intended to “stimulate fathers to take a more active part in caring for their minor children” (Korpi et al., p. 11). They found that only the Nordic countries scored high on both dual earner and dual carer dimensions, and all other countries had low scores on both. The dual earner and dual carer dimensions help to differentiate Siaroff’s high family welfare orientation (Table A1, Column 2). According to the combinations of these dimensions, Korpi and colleagues distinguished Earner-Carer, Traditional Family, and Market-oriented regime types (Table A1, Column 3). Finally, De Moortel and colleagues (2014) adopted the Korpi typology (Table A1, Column 7), but they included several additional Southern European countries as the traditional family model without substantial state expenditures on family support (Flaquer, 2000).

Siaroff’s female work desirability (Table A1, Column 1) is the only typology dimension we could identify that captures how the labor market treats women. All other dimensions (Table A1, Columns 4, 5, 6, and 8) are about social policies relevant to caring for young children, and we used family welfare types refined by both Korpi and De Moortel and their respective colleagues to capture these social policies. Although not all countries Siaroff evaluated for the labor market treatment of women were included in both of the Korpi and De Moortel typologies, those included in both were always in agreement. Our typology of five regime type is best understood as a replication of Siaroff’s quadrant with an improved family welfare orientation.

References:

De Moortel, D., Vandenheede, H., & Vanroelen, C. (2014). Contemporary employment arrangements and mental well-being in men and women across Europe: a cross-sectional study. *International journal for equity in health,* 13, 90.

Flaquer, L. (2000). Family policy and welfare state in Southern Europe. *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials,* WP núm. 185, 1-18.

Korpi, W., Ferrarini, T., & Englund, S. (2013). Women's opportunities under different family policy constellations: Gender, class, and inequality tradeoffs in western countries re-examined. *Social Politics,* 20, 1-40.

Siaroff, A. (1994). Work, welfare and gender equality: A new tpology. In D. Sainsbury (Ed.), *Gendering Welfare States* pp. 82-100). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Table A1. The summary of welfare regime typologies and country groupings used in the current study1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Regime type used in this study | Country | Siaroff (1994) | | Korpi et al. (2013) | | | | De Moortel et al. (2014) | |
| (1)  Female work desirability2 | (2)  Family welfare orientation | (3)  Type name | (4) Traditional family | (5) Dual earner | (6)  Dual carer | (7)  Type name | (8)  State expenditure on family support |
| I | Denmark | High | High | Earner-carer | Low | High | High | Earner-carer | High |
| Finland | High | High | Earner-carer | Low | High | High | Earner-carer | High |
| Norway | High | High | Earner-carer | Low | High | High |  |  |
| Sweden | High | High | Earner-carer | Low | High | High | Earner-carer | High |
| II | Austria | Low | High | Traditional family | High | Low | Low |  |  |
| Belgium | Low | High | Traditional family | High | Low | Low | Traditional family | High |
| France | Low | High | Traditional family | High | Low | Low | Traditional family | High |
| Germany | Low | High | Traditional family | High | Low | Low | Traditional family | High |
| The Netherlands | Low | High | Traditional family | High | Low | Low | Traditional family | High |
| III | Italy | Low | Low | Traditional family | High | Low | Low | Traditional family | Low |
| Cyprus | Low | Low |  |  |  |  | Traditional family | Low |
| Spain | Low | Low |  |  |  |  | Traditional family | Low |
| Greece | Low | Low |  |  |  |  | Traditional family | Low |
| Portugal | Low | Low |  |  |  |  | Traditional family | Low |
| IV | UK | High | Low | Market oriented | Low | Low | Low | Market-oriented | n/a |
| US | High | Low | Market oriented | Low | Low | Low |  |  |
| V | Ireland | Low | Low | Market oriented | Low | Low | Low | Market oriented | n/a |
| Switzerland | Low | Low | Market oriented | Low | Low | Low |  |  |

*Notes*. 1Shaded cells indicate that the countries were not included in the developers’ typology. 2We called this dimension “Market penalty for women” and changed high to low and low to high.

**Appendix B**

**Full results of robustness checks**

Table B1. Associations with poor self-reported health among workers with caregiving needs by welfare regime type, controlling for education

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Type I: Dual earner-dual carer, low market penalty for women | | | Type II: Traditional family with high support expenditure, high market penalty for women | | | Type III: Traditional family with low support expenditure, high market penalty for women | | | Type IV: Market-oriented, low market penalty for women | | | Type V: Market-oriented, high market penalty for women | | |
| b | SE | p | b | SE | p | b | SE | p | b | SE | p | b | SE | p |
| Intercept | -3.77 | 0.10 | <.0001 | -3.88 | 0.07 | <.0001 | -4.15 | 0.09 | <.0001 | -2.25 | 0.46 | 0.000 | -4.84 | 0.32 | <.0001 |
| Age (mean-centered) | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.467 | 0.07 | 0.01 | <.0001 | 0.07 | 0.00 | <.0001 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.000 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.224 |
| women (vs. men) | 0.39 | 0.11 | 0.002 | -0.12 | 0.11 | 0.300 | 0.62 | 0.10 | <.0001 | 0.10 | 0.00 | <.0001 | 0.37 | 0.03 | <.0001 |
| Education low (vs. high) | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.445 | -0.06 | 0.21 | 0.763 | 0.64 | 0.10 | <.0001 | 0.16 | 0.51 | 0.751 | 0.03 | 0.60 | 0.963 |
| Education med (vs. high) | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.760 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 0.000 | -0.04 | 0.04 | 0.333 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.363 | 0.74 | 0.06 | <.0001 |
| Poor-quality employment | 0.54 | 0.16 | 0.003 | 0.39 | 0.06 | <.0001 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.256 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.068 | -0.05 | 0.26 | 0.865 |
| women\*poor-quality employment | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.531 | -0.26 | 0.13 | 0.060 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.144 | -0.05 | 0.02 | 0.028 | 0.23 | 0.10 | 0.030 |

*Notes*. Logistic regression parameter estimates calculated with sample weights to account for the relative size of the workforce in each country. Standard errors were clustered by country. All regime types and caregiving needs (i.e., whether or not living with at least one person who is not the spouse or partner) were included in the same model with the DOMAIN statement that account for the subsample variability.

Table B2. Associations with poor self-reported health among workers with caregiving needs by welfare regime type, controlling for partner presence

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Type I: Dual earner-dual carer, low market penalty for women | | | Type II: Traditional family with high support expenditure, high market penalty for women | | | Type III: Traditional family with low support expenditure, high market penalty for women | | | Type IV: Market-oriented, low market penalty for women | | | Type V: Market-oriented, high market penalty for women | | |
| b | SE | p | b | SE | p | b | SE | p | b | SE | p | b | SE | p |
| Intercept | -3.68 | 0.10 | <.0001 | -3.81 | 0.07 | <.0001 | -3.96 | 0.12 | <.0001 | -2.21 | 0.29 | <.0001 | -4.40 | 0.29 | <.0001 |
| Age (mean-centered) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.134 | 0.07 | 0.01 | <.0001 | 0.07 | 0.00 | <.0001 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.001 | 0.04 | 0.00 | <.0001 |
| women (vs. men) | 0.35 | 0.11 | 0.006 | -0.10 | 0.11 | 0.367 | 0.59 | 0.10 | <.0001 | 0.08 | 0.01 | <.0001 | 0.31 | 0.04 | <.0001 |
| living with the spouse/partner | -0.36 | 0.06 | <.0001 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.899 | -0.15 | 0.12 | 0.238 | -0.05 | 0.07 | 0.476 | -0.99 | 0.43 | 0.035 |
| Poor-quality employment | 0.50 | 0.16 | 0.006 | 0.39 | 0.07 | <.0001 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.030 | 0.13 | 0.02 | <.0001 | -0.05 | 0.32 | 0.886 |
| women\*poor-quality employment | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.448 | -0.24 | 0.13 | 0.078 | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.071 | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.001 | 0.34 | 0.16 | 0.052 |

*Notes*. Logistic regression parameter estimates calculated with sample weights to account for the relative size of the workforce in each country. Standard errors were clustered by country. All regime types and caregiving needs (i.e., whether or not living with at least one person who is not the spouse or partner) were included in the same model with the DOMAIN statement that account for the subsample variability.